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From the ashes of the First World War, the ILO emerged to address the plight 
of industrial workers. Yet, by 1952, the organization had embarked upon an 
ambitious multilateral enterprise aimed at peasants in the Andes Mountains, known as 
the Andean Indian Program (AIP). My dissertation confronts the paradox of the 
ILO’s postwar turn toward rural “development.” Tracing the formation of an 
international technocracy (ITC), I argue that this group became the principal foot 
soldiers of the International Labor Organization’s Andean Indian Program and 
propelled it to the center of postwar discussions of social and economic 
“development.” I examine the intellectual history of the AIP, as the international 
experts who managed the program encountered the apparatus of regional states and 
the Andean communities targeted for “reform” in order to decompose the strategies 
and practices deployed by the ILO and the AIP. I argue that despite the deployment of 
a “universal” model of development by the ILO, the Andean Program was a “zone of 
contact” between the ITC’s universalizing discourse and a social politics of 
development. Bringing into focus the pivotal actions of particular individuals, 
  
institutions, and states, I argue that the logic defining the Andean Program cannot be 
found only in the adherence of powerful actors to a shared universalizing “discourse,” 
but also in the relationship of that discourse to United States’ hegemony during the 
Cold War. My work reveals that the international technocracy’s efforts to de-
politicize development provided an important avenue for the exportation of U.S. 
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It may even seem paradoxical that the ILO, which has devoted so 
much effort to enlarging the scope and effectiveness of international 
action, should at the same time be giving priority to strengthening the 
nation state in the developing world. But the paradox is more apparent 
than real. We are strengthening the nation state because it is still the 
only viable framework within which economic and social progress can 
take place. And it is only if each developing nation can become 
independent in fact as well as in law that each can play its full part in 
the institutions of the wider international community. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
My dissertation explores the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
management of the Andean Indian Program (AIP) as a case study in the formation of 
international social policy norms after World War II. Two main themes define my 
approach and my contribution to the existing literature. First, I argue that the push to 
establish programs for social and economic development at the ILO and other 
international bodies occurred at a critical moment, as transnational networks and 
institutions were being redefined and their importance reevaluated. The failure of the 
League of Nations to prevent the calamity of World War II left the existing international 
system in ruins and raised the question of how to rebuild. The consolidation of the 
Bretton Woods agreement in July 1944 followed by the adoption of the United Nations 
charter a year later established rules under which such a system could operate. However, 
this foundation was hardly adequate given the likelihood of increasing tensions between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. My dissertation argues that a group of reformers 
at the ILO and who formed part of a growing international network saw the need to go 
further and replace the failed and largely discredited internationalism of the interwar 
years with a more robust and active liberal internationalism. My work is an intellectual 
history of the effort to promote a new internationalism rooted in a universalist concept of 
modernity and “development.” The new internationalism promoted by the ILO was 
fueled in no small part by a particular brand of American exceptionalism, which infused 
the application of technical expertise with a missionary-like zeal. The guiding principle 
of this internationalism was, as described below, a “gospel of production” in which the 




development and global peace and stability through technical assistance and social 
integration programs across the developing world. It is within this broader milieu, I argue, 
that the Andean Program must be understood. The AIP was many things: a bulwark 
against communist infiltration into rural communities, a mechanism for transforming 
Latin American states in the image of western welfare-capitalist governments, and a 
means of raising living standards and promoting full employment. But perhaps above all, 
it was a test case for how the ILO would engage and help build the basis for a new 
internationalism that depoliticized “development” and bolstered United States hegemony 
after the Second World War.  
The second major theme of my dissertation is more specifically concerned with 
the ways in which international institutions are written about and commonly understood. 
To this end, my work reorients the study of international organizations around spaces of 
conflict, resistance, and negotiation. I explore international organizations as nodes within 
a larger reform network that shaped postwar social policy norms, not as the mere 
accomplices of powerful state actors. If the AIP was a vehicle for acting on a broad 
international agenda that supported the extension of American hegemony, then I argue 
that this fact requires examination of the wider context that informed that agenda as well 
as close examination of the specific constraints and opportunities that it imposed on the 
ILO and its work with indigenous peoples. I therefore argue that the AIP was a social 
arena in which international experts, government officials, and indigenous peoples 
negotiated ideas about “modernity,” “expertise,” and national identity that contributed to 
a new internationalism. Because this negotiation occurred on multiple levels, from high 




experts, it is not always easy to identify winners and losers. The sources consulted for 
this study were drawn from archives in the United Sates, various published sources, and 
most especially from the ILO archival records of the AIP. While the ILO field records for 
the AIP provided much rich content, particularly about the program’s development and 
operations in Bolivia, the perspective revealed by these records is necessarily limited to 
that of the experts and officials responsible for administering the program. Despite this 
limitation, paying attention to the intellectual and discursive frameworks that structured 
interactions between ILO project managers, AIP experts, government officials and 
indigenous peoples yields definite rewards. It exposes the making of international social 
policy norms after World War II as the transnational clash of ideas and interests that it 
truly was and demonstrates the ways in which the goals of the AIP could be openly 
subverted and channeled toward other ends, despite the best efforts of the ILO or other 
players to predetermine the outcome.  
The AIP is treated throughout this dissertation as a nexus for multiple, competing 
ideas about the nature of modernity, development, race, and nation. The primary setting 
for the technical assistance work that constituted the AIP encompassed the countries and 
indigenous communities of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia. While Chapter 5 
touches on the program’s operations in Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia to examine the AIP 
from a regional perspective, a full accounting of the AIP’s efforts across the region is 
beyond the scope of this study. As the first and most well-developed component of the 





Figure 1: Locations of the ILO’s Andean Indian Program 1954 - 1969 
The remainder of this introductory chapter delves deeper into the themes examined 
throughout the dissertation, including the role of American exceptionalism in shaping 
postwar technical assistance efforts at the ILO and elsewhere. It provides background 
regarding the history of the ILO to articulate more precisely how the AIP diverged from 
the previous history of the organization since its formation after the First World War. It 
concludes with an examination of the historiographic traditions directly confronted and 
intersected by my work on the AIP. Most importantly, this introductory chapter examines 








World War created new spaces for the exportation of American exceptionalism and the 
conception of a new internationalism that privileged expertise and helped established a 
new “social infrastructure” for enforcing international norms. 
The ability to influence ideas and shape technical assistance discourse is, of 
course, not the same thing as being able to control events. Chapter Two examines the 
“foot soldiers” of international development, a network of individuals that I term the 
International Technocracy (ITC). I explore why individuals, such as the ILO’s Director 
General David Morse, coalesced around a belief in the power of technical assistance and 
became part of a broader network for international reform. Using the ILO and Andean 
Indian Program as a use case, Chapter Two considers some of the ways in which World 
War II and the Cold War made the ITC possible and established its potential as a force 
for international reform and regulation. Perhaps most important in the case of Morse and 
others, was the Anti-Totalitarianism generated by their participation in the war effort. I 
then discuss how the ITC helped push the ILO away from its traditional focus on 
establishing international labor standards toward a greater emphasis on field operations 
that provided technical assistance and promoted development. Chapter Two also sets the 
stage for the encounters that resulted from the ILO’s decision to pursue the Andean 
Indian Program.  
Chapter Three looks more closely at the ILO’s work with indigenous peoples and 
particularly the initiation of AIP operations in Bolivia. Nominally concerned with the 
rights and conditions affecting industrial workers, by 1952 the ILO nevertheless could 
trace an interest in the problems affecting indigenous groups that dated back to its 




make the AIP into its primary, experimental effort in support of international 
development. Chapter Three examines the ILO’s actions in the context of a field of forces 
involving several divergent elements, including Bolivian history and geography, 
transnational discourses of economic rationalization and social integration, a traditional 
“Indigenist” discourse that sought to define the indigenous “problem” in terms of racial 
and ethnic assimilation, national identity, and the demands of modernization.  
In Chapter Four, the ILO’s “integral” method for promoting development in 
Bolivia and across the Andes region is explored as a vector for encounters between 
international experts, state officials, and local communities. The ILO program in Bolivia 
was intended as a way to accelerate economic production and lay down the seeds of an 
indigenous middle class across the region. However, as the chapter illustrates, despite the 
overarching goals of the program’s designers inspired by the vision of a new 
internationalism, the AIP was a contested space in which issues ranging from the 
establishment of agricultural cooperatives to programs for colonization and resettlement 
defined the social politics of development.  
The timing of the program’s launch and the size of its indigenous population 
arguably made Bolivia the model for the AIP in Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to consider the larger regional and international ambitions of 
the program. Chapter Five moves away from the particular use case of 1950s and 1960s 
Bolivia to examine the AIP as a regional program. The analysis largely substantiates my 
argument that the lineaments of the program persisted across national borders, but also 
illustrates how national variations complicated achievement of the goals articulated by 




Five, a brief conclusion summarizes key findings and emphasizes the AIP’s significance 
as a subject of historical analysis. 
Technical Assistance and American Exceptionalism 
 
After the Second World War “development” became practically synonymous with 
the disbursal of western technologies and technical “know-how” to societies in Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa. One member of the initial survey mission that led to the 
establishment of the AIP and a member of the ILO’s senior staff, David Blelloch, defined 
this need in terms of the global expansion of the welfare state. “The whole economic 
development even of the already highly developed countries,” Blelloch wrote in 1952, 
“depends on the extension of the concept of the Welfare State to cover all the 
economically significant portions of the earth’s surface.”1 Blelloch along with many 
others of the same generation saw the movement in favor of “technical assistance” as 
vital to the future. The immediate context for his remarks on technical assistance was the 
decline of the Western colonial empires and the beginnings of the Cold War between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, by emphasizing the “dependent” 
relationship existing between the “already highly developed countries” and the “under-
developed” nations of the world, he also pointed to the ways in which the expansion of 
global capitalism and the unfolding of history itself blurred the lines between national 
and supranational concerns.2 Conceived in this way, as a panacea for injustice and 
conflict, technical assistance was not just as a solution to the economic and social 
problems of a particular nation, state, or society, but a plan for achieving putatively 
1 David Blelloch, “Technical Assistance: Programmes and Policies,” International Affairs 




                                                 
 
universal economic and social goals. For Blelloch, as for other supporters of 
“modernization” and “development,” this technocratic approach represented a pathway to 
the creation of a more equitable world. In this way, just as the welfare state could 
represent an augmentation of the regulatory powers of domestic governments for the 
purpose of expanding the social and economic rights of its citizens, so too could 
“development” represent the enhancement and expansion of international governance in 
the name of social justice. 
The process of decolonization and the beginnings of the Cold war ultimately 
configured much of the geopolitical terrain upon which postwar developmentalism 
operated, but I would argue that the impetus behind this halcyon view of technical 
assistance can be traced to the Second World War and to the successful exportation of a 
particular brand of American exceptionalism. This particular exceptionalism had 
informed the New Deal programs of the 1930s and continued to support the expansion of 
technical assistance and the application of administrative expertise during and after the 
war. Indeed, in what could be regarded as a speech that anticipated the postwar consensus 
on development, Franklin Roosevelt explained to an assembly of ILO delegates in 1941 
that, “social problems and economic [were] not separate water-tight compartments in the 
international any more than in the national sphere.” “In international, as in national 
affairs,” he urged his audience, “economic policy can no longer be an end in itself.” 
Instead, policy and the institutions created for its execution must act “[as] a means for 
achieving social objectives.” Roosevelt urged a larger international commitment “to bring 
about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of 




To be sure, the goal of providing “a decent standard of living” for the “many millions of 
people in this world who have never been adequately fed and clothed and housed,” was 
seemingly limitless in scope. And yet, governed by the dictum that “enlightened social 
policies” could effectively do the work of building a new world order that promoted the 
social and economic welfare of all, the speech mirrored the faith in modern technology 
and technocratic management that characterized much of the New Deal and 
foreshadowed the coming age of “modernization” and “development.”3 It is in this way 
that Roosevelt’s speech anticipated the more complete fusion of social and economic 
goals found in the discourse of postwar developmentalism and in the technical 
assistance/foreign aid programs operated by the U.S. government and international 
institutions such as the ILO. By the 1950s, the ascendancy of “technical assistance” 
captured this synthesis and added modernization and development policy to the arsenal of 
overt and covert techniques used to fight the Cold War.   
After the Second World War the United States was not the only available source 
of ideas about international development, foreign aid, and technical assistance. 
Nevertheless, with the benefits of American capitalism internationally up for grabs, the 
U.S. signified and projected an especially powerful model of economic and social 
development. For many New Deal liberals, the move to the global stage seemed a logical 
extension of work during the 1930s to create jobs for unemployed Americans, to tame 
unbridled capitalism, to ensure protections for the rights of American workers, to 
modernize the American South and raise living standards in rural areas, to create a social 
3 Franklin Roosevelt, “Address of President Roosevelt to the Delegates of the 
International Labor Organization Delivered in the White House and broadcast over a 
nation-wide hookup, November 6, 1941,” www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411106awp.html 
(accessed August 21, 2012). 
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safety net for older Americans, and to stimulate economic recovery and growth by 
promoting consumption. In fact, in the late 1930s and 1940s, scores of U.S. citizens 
found the pull of international problems irresistible. Thus, recalling his leadership of a 
World Bank mission to Colombia in 1949, for example, former New Deal economist 
Lauchlin Currie insisted that ignorance of Colombia’s history or present circumstances 
did not “dull for a moment [his] enthusiasm or shake [his] conviction that if only the 
[World] Bank and the country would listen,” he would “come up with a solution of sorts” 
to the country’s many problems. For Currie, Colombia was an “an economic missionary’s 
paradise,” posing a “marvelous number of practically insoluble problems,” which he 
wished to “do something about.” This reformer’s zeal was, he concluded, largely the 
result of his “baptism [by] fire in the Great Depression,” during which he “had played 
some role in working out the economic recovery program in the New Deal for the worst 
depression the United States had ever experienced,” and of his participation in the Second 
World War.4 As one of the contributing authors of the International Monetary Fund’s 
founding charter, Currie had a direct hand in the construction of the postwar international 
system. 5 In this way, the former Treasury Department official and White House 
economic advisor became the development economist. 
Currie’s experience, I would argue, was not exceptional.6 Indeed, as political  
4 Cited in Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the 
Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 55. Also cited in Gerald 
Meier, Emerging from Poverty: The Economics that Really Matters (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 130. 
5 For the Currie mission report see International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950). 
6 Beside their involvement the United Nations and its specialized agencies, some of the 
more prominent examples of the deployment of U.S. citizens and personnel include the 
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scientist Anne-Marie Burley (Slaughter) argues, “many of the same people who had 
taken responsibility for reshaping American domestic government [during the 1930s] 
took responsibility for the world” as World War II ended. As they did so, “they adopted 
the same generic solution for the world’s problems as for the nation’s: government 
intervention through specialized administrative organizations.”7 The Marshall Plan 
represents the best known of U.S. international commitments to economic development 
after World War II, but across Asia, Europe, Latin American, and in international 
military occupation and reconstruction of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Although this issue 
requires further study, for the European case see for example Laure Djelic, Exporting the 
American Model: The Postwar Transformation of European Business (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); Jeffrey M Diefendorf, et al (eds.), American Policy and 
the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955 (Washington, D.C.: German Historical 
Institute, 1993); Frederico Romero, The United States and the European Trade Union 
Movement, 1944-1951 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); 
Anthony Carew, Labor Under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the 
Marketing of Management Science (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1987). 
For Japan and Asia see for example David Ekbladh, “A Workshop for the World: 
Modernization as a Tool in U.S. Foreign Relations in Asia, 1914-1973,” (Ph.D diss., 
Columbia University, 2003); Mire Koikari, “Exporting Democracy? American Women, 
‘Feminist Reforms,’ and Politics of Imperialism in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945-
1952,” Frontiers 23 (2002): 23-45; Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: 
Americans and the Remaking Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 
1989); Theodore Cohen and Herbert Passin (eds.), Remaking Japan: The American 
Occupation as New Deal (New York, NY: Free Press, 1987); Robert Wolfe, Americans 
as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984). 
7 Anne-Marie Burley, “Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the 
Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State,” in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory 
and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 130. Burely emphasizes both a strong “institutional correlation” 
(i.e. the intergovernmental organizations created at the international level corresponded to 
American approaches to facilitating better relations between labor and business, to police 
corporations, and to utilize the specialized expertise of technical experts for example) and 
a striking resemblance to the reforms recommended by the 1937 Brownlow Report. In 
essence, the Brownlow commission had urged the centralization of governmental 
regulatory agencies and the creation of a permanent planning board. See also Barry Karl, 
The Uneasy State (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1983), 155-164 and Executive 




                                                                                                                                                 
 
institutions such as the United Nations, Americans who supported and helped institute the 
reforms of the New Deal at home deployed their considerable skills and attention abroad.  
To be sure, the mere presence of U.S.-Americans internationally can hardly be 
seen as a unique to the period following the Second World War. The work of historian 
Daniel Rodgers and others illustrates, for example, that transnational exchanges between 
progressive reformers were an integral part of the intellectual milieu of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Atlantic world. In this way, Rodgers shows that Progressive 
Era reformers in the United States and Europe did not limit themselves to the resources of 
their home nations, but instead drew inspiration from a transatlantic palette of ideas and 
policies—he traces the infusion of information and knowledge from Europe into the 
United States and describes the epistemic communities that colored progressive efforts on 
both sides of the Atlantic.8 If, however, as Rodgers suggests, the New Deal represented 
the fruition of early twentieth-century progressive exchanges, then the Second World 
War just as certainly marked an important shift in the flows of knowledge, power, and 
culture internationally. As a result of World War II and the exigencies of the Cold War, 
American reformers were ubiquitous on the international stage, while in their capacity as 
technical experts, policy makers, and international officials such individuals transposed 
domestic social policy models and economic development solutions onto a new 
international context. Put somewhat differently, just as the exchanges of the Progressive 
Era “Atlantic crossings” tended to stream out of Europe and into the United States and 
the rest of the world, the new postwar era of “development” and “modernization” (born 
8 Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1998). See also Alan Dawley, Changing the 
World: American Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). 
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in the crucible of World War II) found the general current of ideas reversed, diverted by 
new circumstances and new realities into different channels than those traveled before.  
We need to know more about the mechanisms and relationships that governed this 
flood of people, culture, knowledge, policy, and technology from the United States to 
other parts of the world. At the same time, my dissertation demonstrates that it is a 
mistake to view these flows as moving only in one direction and exposes the folly of 
supposing only that history’s most powerful actors have the wherewithal to shape events 
and outcomes. The subject of postwar developmentalism is a worthy topic of historical 
analysis for many reasons, not the least of which includes aspects of Cold War history, 
the social and cultural history of international institutions, and the ways in which such 
institutions (institutions such as the International Labor Organization) have sought to 
shape international norms. The focus of the following chapters is on the liberal 
internationalism that propelled the ILO toward a program of social and economic 
integration for rural peasants in the Andes. This internationalism was made up of many 
parts, some of which coexisted rather uncomfortably together in the same package. 
My dissertation argues that the internationalism that informed the ILO’s Andean 
Indian Program and its postwar turn toward developmentalism owed much to the brand 
of American exceptionalism described above. Nevertheless, to understand why 
“development” became such a central part of the history of the postwar period, we must 
also look beyond the influence of any particular nation or state, to the new international 
system constructed during and immediately after the war. Indeed, if the enhanced global 
position of the United States facilitated the deployment of domestic social and economic 




power, then the creation of the United Nations and its specialized institutions 
consolidated and institutionalized the circulation of ideas, technologies, and “know-how” 
upon which the dispersal of “enlightened social policy” depended. 9 As historian Akira 
Iriye argues, “[a]lthough [after World War II] states and governments would be the 
primary agencies for defining economic policies or implementing social programs, 
ultimately the rights and interests of ‘peoples’ would have to be safeguarded through 
cooperative international action.”10 The League of Nations and its specialized institutions 
implemented the rudiments of such a system in the 1920s, but the absence of U.S. 
participation, the onset of a world depression, and other limitations on its ability to act 
seriously circumscribed the League’s capacities.11 Clearly the post-World War II 
9 The role of international organizations in the postwar international system has been 
especially neglected until relatively recently. As historian Akira Iriye concludes, although 
historians and scholars “have written volumes on the history of the contemporary world, 
or more specifically on modern international relations” rather few “contain more than a 
passing reference, if at all, to international organizations,” such as the ILO.  Iriye himself 
writes of the role of international organizations (interstate and non-state) both as 
promoting globalization and as the repositories of “global consciousness.” Akira Iriye, 
Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 4. See also 
Akira Iriye and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), Global Interdependence: The World After 
1945 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014) and  
Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock (eds.), The Human Rights 
Revolution: An International History (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
On the relationship between the U.S. and the United Nations see Gary B. Ostrower, The 
United Nations and the United States, 1945-1995 (New York, NY: Twayne Publishers, 
1998); as well as Seymour Maxwell Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN: People, 
Policy, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Holmes and Meier, 
1988); Stephen Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (2003); 
and Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations 2 volumes (New York, NY: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1982 and 1989). 
10 Iriye, Global Community, 42. 
11 Political scientist Inis Claude located one of the most important sources of difference 
between the League and the United Nations in the changes that had occurred within the 
political philosophy of liberalism: “if the liberalism which inspired the League was 
essentially a nineteenth-century phenomenon, the doctrinal foundation of the night-
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international system constituted an intricate, complex, and altogether more expansive 
system that integrated the actions of individual states, intergovernmental organizations, 
and international nongovernmental organizations in ways scarcely imaginable before.12 
Understanding the nature of these networks and their connection to the project of postwar 
“development” is a central focus of this dissertation. I show the ways in which 
“development” was the product of a postcolonial order that replicated, even as it altered, 
the structures of the American welfare state abroad and that combined the unilateral and 
bilateral action of sovereign states with an institutional matrix of multilateral programs 
yoked to the United Nations.13 The ILO’s Andean Indian Program was one of the first 
watchman state, the liberalism which underlay the new system was the twentieth-century 
version, the theoretical support of the welfare state.” Inis Claude, Swords and Plowshares 
(New York, NY: Random House, 1956), 87-88. See also Burley, “Regulating the World.” 
12 For two very different perspectives on the consequences of this new system see 
Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2005) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). For Borgwardt, the new international 
institutions created in the wake of the Second World War ushered in a new era of 
multilateral institutionalism. Tracing this new institutionalism primarily to the New Deal 
and the Atlantic Charter, Borgwardt argues that it represented “one expression of [a] 
transition toward a more pluralistic vision of modernity,” the creation of a world in which 
universal human rights could be protected via the exercised will of an international 
community “capable of reaching through a nation’s so-called veil of sovereignty.” 
Borgwardt, New Deal for the World, 73 & 75. In contrast, Hardt and Negri associate the 
post-World War II era with the emergence of a new kind of imperial sovereignty, 
“composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic 
of rule” and structured by the globalization of production and the weakening of nation 
states. Lacking definite territorial or temporal boundaries, for the Hardt and Negri the 
new global system should be seen in a much more sinister light than the one presented by 
Borgewardt, i.e. as a hegemonic form of “biopower” that seeks to define all aspects of 
human existence for the purpose of establishing a system of perpetual order. I would 
argue that a more accurate and realistic description of the postwar international system 
occupies a middle ground between these two extremes. 
13 Besides bilateral and multilateral aid, which functioned through the participation of 
states either individually or via institutions such as the United Nations, the activities of so 
called non-governmental organizations or NGOs (such as multinational corporations and 
not-for-profit philanthropic organizations) constitute another arm of development. While 
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postwar attempts to support multilateral economic and social development through the 
auspices of the United Nations.  
The International Labor Organization in Historical Perspective 
The idea of creating an international forum for discussing labor and social policy 
dates back (at least) to the International Workingmen’s Association or First International. 
Formed in 1864, the First International drew attention to the problems faced by the 
working classes of Europe, especially the need for an international system of labor 
standards. Similar efforts by a transnational cadre of labor organizations and social 
reformers followed: including the Second International (1889), the International Bureau 
for the Protection of Labor (late 1890s), the International Association for Labor 
Legislation or IALL (established at the Paris World’s Fair in 1900), and the International 
this is an important aspect of the history of development, the activities of such 
organizations and entities are addressed in this project only in so far as they intersected 
the activities of the U.S. and/or the ILO programs. See for example Darlene Rivas, 
Missionary Capitalist: Rockefeller in Venezuela (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002); Gilbert M. Joseph, et al, (eds.), Close Encounters of Empire: 
Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1998); Elizabeth A. Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and 
Kaiser in Brazil (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Deborah Fitzgerald, 
“Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953.” 
Social Studies of Science 16 (1986): 457-83; Edward Berman, The Ideology of 
Philanthropy: The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on 
American Foreign Policy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1983); 
Landrum R. Bolling, Private Foreign Aid: U.S. Philanthropy for Relief and Development 
(Bolder, CO: Westview Press, 1982); Robert F. Arnove, Philanthropy and Cultural 
Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad (Boston, MA: G.K. Hall, 1980); 
Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1963); James Gray Maddox, Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin 
America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Raymond B. Fosdick, The 
Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York, NY: Harper, 1952). On the relationship 
between philanthropy and government social policy in the United States see Judith 
Sealander, Private Wealth and Public Life: Foundation Philanthropy and the Reshaping 
of American Social Policy from the Progressive Era to the New Deal (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
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Federation of Trade Unions (1913).14 Between 1900 and the First World War, the IALL 
became the most important international mechanism for the promotion of labor 
standards.15 In the United States, while the organized labor movement (dominated by the 
AFL) rejected the strategy of government legislation advocated by the IALL, by the time 
of the St. Louis exposition of 1904, reformers such as social scientist Richard Ely 
(president), labor economist John R. Commons (executive secretary), and Hull House 
founder Jane Addams helped form the first American chapter of the IALL.16   
Two main circumstances limited the impact of the IALL, and it was not until after 
the First World War that substantial international support emerged for the creation of an 
international labor commission along the lines of the ILO. First, the International 
Association for Labor Legislation lacked the imprimatur of an official intergovernmental 
body, which left it dependent on cooperation between national chapters, such as the one 
organized by Ely, Commons, Addams and others in the U.S. Perhaps more importantly, 
the First World War effectively circumvented the kind of voluntary international 
cooperation required by the IALL. Indeed, unlike the IALL and its predecessors, under 
the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, the ILO was formally recognized as the 
14 Edward C. Lorenz, Defining Global Justice: The History of U.S. International Labor 
Standards Policy (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 42. Lorenz’s 
study examines the capacity of different interests groups situated within the United States 
to shape international labor standards, especially through the ILO. For Lorenz, the most 
important groups include consumers, churches and religious organizations, labor 
organizations, business groups, academics, and other elements of civil society. Although 
the issue of labor standards is not ignored, I focus specifically on the ways in which the 
ILO attempted to translate a general orientation toward the promotion of social justice 
into a set of concrete practices and strategies for social and economic development.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, 48. The efforts of the IALL paralleled and overlapped the national efforts of other 
organizations in the United States, such as the National Consumers League. See Lorenz, 
Defining Global Justice, especially Chapter 2 and Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 236-237. 
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“permanent machinery” for executing the “General Principles” embodied by Article 427 
of the treaty, which insisted that “there are methods and principles for regulating labor 
conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply.” 17 Although the 
ILO did not require membership in the League of Nations from its members, membership 
in the League did “carry with it” membership in the International Labor Organization.18 
With the sanction of the Versailles Treaty and the newly configured international 
community represented by the League, throughout the 1920s and 1930s the ILO 
developed a reputation as a vocal defender of workers’ rights and a promoter of labor 
standards.19  
From its origins in the contentious peace settlements that ended World War I, 
what made the ILO unique among international institutions was its tripartite governing 
structure, an administrative and policymaking apparatus that (at least in theory) gave 
equal representation to national governments, organized labor, and business.20 Along 
17 The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, “The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919,” 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/partxiii.htm (accessed October 30, 2012). 
Among the nine principles specifically identified in Article 427 were the belief that labor 
is not “a commodity or article of commerce,” the right of free association by workers and 
employers, the payment of a living wage, support for the eight hour day and forty-eight 
hour week, the abolition of child labor, and equal pay for equal work between men and 
women. 
18 Despite this provision, the United States did not become a member of the ILO until 
1934. For a discussion of the events surrounding the U.S. decision see Gary B. Ostrower, 
“The American Decision to Join the International Labor Organization,” Labor History 
16, no. 4 (1975): 495-504.  
19 See Anthony Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization (New York, 
NY: Octagon Books, 1971), 35; James T. Shotwell, The Origins of the International 
Labor Organization, 2 vols (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1934).  
20 As the administrative structure of the ILO charter was negotiated in 1918 and ratified 
in 1919, the ILO General Conference had a different voting system than the more 
specialized committees created to address specific problems by the organization. In the 
General Conference, member governments possessed two votes, and employers and labor 
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with more direct support and involvement from the United States’ government, it was this 
pluralist approach to institutional governance that enabled the ILO to survive the 
tumultuous years of World War II and rejuvenate itself in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. 
The ILO offered a readymade, already established structure for supporting postwar 
development in a forum for international exchange that promised something for 
everyone.  Governments in the “developing” world could seek international expertise to 
promote their own agendas and projects, while business leaders sought to limit the 
restrictions that the organization’s resolutions could place on international trade. Labor 
sought ILO expertise and resources to offset limitations in their domestic markets. Yet, 
the survival of the ILO as an institution was not certain. With Europe under siege after 
1939, the organization entered a turbulent and uncertain period. U.S. support of the 
organization was critical to the organization’s future, and, indeed, American John Winant 
took up the task of steering the organization as its new Director-General, from 1939 until 
his appointment as the U.S. ambassador to London in 1941.21 It was under Winant’s 
leadership that the ILO evacuated and abandoned its headquarters in Geneva for the 
duration of the war. In this context, Franklin Roosevelt’s address to the organization in 
1941 (cited above) came at a crucial moment in the organization’s future, as the ILO 
struggled for survival and sought to make the case for its own continued relevance.  
one each, while the committees provided for 1-1-1 representation. See Alcock, History, 
28.  
21 Anthony Alcock notes that upon his resignation as the ILO’s Director-General in 1938, 
Harold Butler told the press that his resignation and Winant’s ascension as the new head 
of the ILO marked a “shift in the ILO’s center of gravity away from Europe and toward 
the United States.” Butler’s comments originally appeared in the April 28 and 29 editions 
of the New York Times. Alcock, History, 156. Winant previously helped to establish the 
U.S. Social Security System. 
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Convening its Annual Conference at Philadelphia three years later, in 1944, the 
organization charted a course for a new era and simultaneously reaffirmed a set of core 
principles established at its creation, including the belief that “Labor is not a 
commodity,” that “freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained 
progress,” and that “poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere.”22 
These were ideals that reflected the (primarily European) social democratic roots of the 
organization—its willingness to combine socialist critiques of capitalism with the liberal 
concern for liberty and individual rights. Equally striking, in 1944 the ILO delegates for 
the first time committed the organization to “full employment and the raising of standards 
of living,” to “the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining,” to “the 
cooperation of management and Labor in the continuous improvement of productive 
efficiency,” and to “the collaboration of workers and employers in the preparation and 
application of social and economic measures.” 23 These measures reflected the influence, 
I would argue, of a U.S. model of industrial relations that emphasized the development of 
institutional mechanisms for the neutralization of social and economic conflict.24 
22 General Conference of the International Labor Organization, “Declaration Concerning 
the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization (Declaration of 
Philadelphia),” Twenty-Six Session, Philadelphia, 1944. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See for example, Charles S. Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of 
American International Economic Policy after World War II,” International Organization 
31 (1977): 607-633. For an assessment of the different perspectives that informed the 
ILO’s Philadelphia Declaration see Oliver Liang, “Governing Globalization: Labor 
Economic Paradigms and International Labor Standards at the International Labor 
Organization, 1919-1998.” Paper presented at Interactions: Regional Studies, Global 
Processes, and Historical Analysis, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., February28-
March 3, 2001. http://www.historycooperative.org/proceedings/interactions/lian.html. 
(accessed September 20, 2012). 
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Incorporated within the United Nations (U.N.) umbrella in 1946, the International 
Labor Organization became an important component of the new system of international 
order crafted after the Second World War. Under the agreement, the ILO remained an 
autonomous organization; the UN General Assembly possessed “no power of the purse” 
with which it could control ILO policy. Yet, as with other intergovernmental institutions, 
the ILO was limited by the boundaries of its mandate. Under the formal agreement 
ratified by the UN General Assembly and the ILO’s General Conference, the 
International Labor Organization was required to consult the UN on matters of policy and 
agreed to cooperate on “measures to co-ordinate the activities of the Specialised [sic] 
Agencies.”25 It could pass resolutions and it could exercise indirect pressure for 
compliance, but the organization still lacked the wherewithal to directly enforce the 
standards ratified by its General Conference.  
The machinery of technical assistance and development suggested one way 
around these limitations. Indeed, after the launching of the U.N’s Expanded Program of 
Technical Assistance (UNEPTA) in 1949 and under the leadership of its new Director-
General, American David A. Morse, the ILO became an active agent and purveyor of 
development strategies and practices. UNEPTA provided the financial wherewithal and 
Morse provided the strategic framework that pushed the ILO to expand its field 
operations. As historian Anthony Alcock noted the change, “from being an organization 
devoted, before the Second World War, to protecting the worker in industrial life through 
Labor legislation, it would now turn to preparing the worker for participation in industrial 
life. From working, before the Second World War, mainly with the highly industrialized 
25 Alcock, History, 202-203. 
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countries, it would now give the wealth of its experience to the rest of the world.” 26 A 
believer in the promise of “technical assistance” and “development” in general, in his 
capacity as Director-General, Morse brought a wealth of experience and connections to 
the ILO. Following a larger pattern of Americans who transferred their homegrown skills 
and reputations to the international setting, Morse began his career working for the U.S. 
Department of the Interior and then as a Special Assistant to the United States Attorney 
General, before becoming an attorney for the National Labor Relations Board in the 
1936. His work for the NLRB began a long career as an expert in policy matters relating 
to labor and industrial relations. During World War II, he was stationed in Europe and 
appointed Chief of the Labor Division of the Allied Military Government. Morse put in 
place the labor policy of the U.S. military in the occupied territories of Italy and 
Germany. In 1946, he became Assistant Secretary of Labor, then Under Secretary of 
Labor, and finally served a brief stint as acting Secretary. In the Labor Department, 
Morse continued to engage in work that required his attention to international conditions, 
serving as Deputy Chairman of the International Social Policy Committee. In 1948, he 
was elected as the new Director-General of the ILO. 
Although Morse adopted an internationalist perspective when it came to labor and 
social policy, he also believed that the United States had a special role to play in the 
international system. Drawing on his experiences during the war and believing domestic 
and international social conditions to be part of a seamless web of relations, Morse 
26 Alcock, History of the International Labor Organization, 217. See also, George A. 
Johnston, The International Labor Organization: Its Work for Social and Economic 
Progress (London, UK: Europa Publications, 1970), especially Chapter 12 and Victor-
Yves Ghebali, The International Labor Organization: A Case Study on the Evolution of 
U.N. Specialised Agencies (Dordrecht, Germany: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989).  
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argued that the means by which the United States could best fulfill its long list of postwar 
obligations was the diffusion of American technical knowledge.27 No advocate of 
American unilateralism, Morse argued that via its membership in the ILO the U.S. was “a 
part of the economic and social machinery for world collaboration in the development of 
labor standards and the promotion of justice.”28 Even so, Morse espoused a version of 
American exceptionalism that pre-positioned the United States as a universal model of 
development. Armed with the vision of a postwar world order in which the spread of 
American technology and “know-how” was essential to the achievement of peace, 
stability, and social justice, Morse, I would argue, viewed the ILO as an important 
mechanism for the transmission of U.S. influence “throughout the world.”29  
Although supportive of the ILO’s traditional role as an arbiter of international 
labor standards—Morse likened the organization to a university, in which governments, 
employers, and labor could learn “the thinking and experience of their colleagues in other 
countries”—he pushed for an expanded view of the International Labor Organization as a 
kind of international “laboratory through which experiments [in social and economic 
development] can be accessed and evaluated.”30 When he announced a new and 
unprecedented venture into technical assistance by the ILO in 1948, Morse labeled the 
organization’s plans “the most important program of its kind that has ever been attempted 
on a coordinated, universal basis.”31 Looking backward from the 1960s, he wrote that the 
27David A. Morse, “The United States and World Labor,” U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Standards, (June 25, 1948), 8. 
28 Ibid, 10. 
29 Ibid, 8. 
30 Ibid, 12. 
31 “ILO to Push Plan to Utilize Labor,” New York Times, November 30, 1948. Anthony 
Alcock describes Morse’s speech outlining the new program before the ILO’s governing 
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organization’s traditional function, as a clearinghouse for the development of universal 
labor standards, was “not enough.” “It seemed to me,” he explained, “that one of the 
major issues in the world was the problem of underdevelopment, and that the traditional 
methods of ILO action were inadequate to deal with that problem.” “[T]o have the impact 
it should have on social policy in the world,” Morse continued, “[the ILO] would have to 
become an operational organization.”32 Promoting an ambitious expansion of the ILO’s 
activities from the 1940s until his retirement in 1970, Morse was instrumental in 
reshaping it into a paragon of postwar developmentalism and sought to use the 
organization as a tool of international reform. 
Development and The Andean Program 
“A gradual transformation has been working in the mind of the 
Indians. They know now that it is not inevitable that a newly-born baby 
dies in a short time; they demand schools for their children; the alphabet 
is no longer a murky mystery to them; they have learned that the crops 
will be better if they use proper techniques, and that wages are higher for 
those with a profession or trade. They know that they can assimilate like 
the rest of the world the lessons of modern technology. They are within 
reach of a situation hitherto inconceivable. The word ‘possible’ has 
entered their lives. 
This evolution is not only inevitable; it is desirable”33  
-International Labor Office Report (1958) 
 
body in December of 1948 as “opportune.” Less than a month later, in January of 1949, 
President Harry Truman would make public his plans for a new program of technical 
assistance and development aid known as “Point Four.” Point Four was the basis for the 
expansion of U.S. bilateral aid programs in Latin American and elsewhere and for the 
creation of the United Nation’s Expanded Program for Technical Assistance. Alcock, 
History, 214. 
32 David A. Morse, The Origin and Evolution of the I.L.O and Its Role in the World 
Community (Ithaca, NY: W.F. Humphrey Press for the New York State School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations, 1969), 46. 
33 International Labor Office, The Andean Programme (Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Labor Organization, 1958). 
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Several factors recommend the ILO’s Andean program as a case study for 
illustrating the possible ways in which a transnational development discourse that 
evolved after the Second World War could be translated into practice and just how David 
Morse and others sought to turn the ILO into a conduit for a new liberal internationalism. 
While during the 1940s and 1950s the ILO helped to internationalize a social and 
economic model that emanated primarily from the United States, beginning in 1952, the 
ILO’s Andean Indian Program targeted the indigenous populations of the Andes region 
with the stated goal of promoting their social “integration” and of supporting regional 
economic development. With the focus of increasing production and efficiency in the 
region, the Andean Program sought to address practically every aspect of daily life, 
including regulation of health and hygiene, vocational education, road construction, 
housing, agricultural development, and industrial and technical training. Even more 
ambitious, the colonization project at Cotoca in the Santa Cruz region of Bolivia (and at 
Puno, Peru) relocated hundreds of individuals and families from their homes in the 
Andean highlands with the goal of establishing entirely new communities “from scratch” 
in the plains near the Amazon basin.34 Moreover, the ILO’s “mission to the Andes” 
represented one of the earliest programs of its kind executed by the ILO and the United 
Nations, and thus was a benchmark for later multilateral development initiatives; the 
extent of the project’s influence as a model for future efforts remains to be studied. The 
breadth, diversity, and longevity of the program (1952-1972) make it possible to observe 
change over time, particularly the effect of shifting local and international circumstances, 
such as the 1952 Bolivian Revolution and the exigencies of the Cold War. Finally, the 
34 Rens, “The Andean Programme,” 435. 
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ILO’s focus on the rural peasants of the Andean region stretched the capacities and 
flexibility of an organization (and a development model) primarily focused on industrial 
relations.  
The expansion of ILO activities into the area of technical assistance illustrates the 
circulation of “development” ideas and models from the United States through a process 
of translation. But, as the history of the ILO itself suggests, the International Labor 
Organization was never a blank canvass upon which U.S. policy or American influence 
could simply be inscribed, no matter how strong the currents in that direction.  Likewise, 
no matter how “inevitable” or “desirable” a particular project may have seemed, the 
nations and communities targeted by the ILO and by the larger postwar development 
apparatus possessed reasons of their own for supporting or opposing such programs; 
these must be considered as well. In order to assess the impact of development strategies 
“on the ground,” the focus of the dissertation moves from consideration Depression era 
and wartime influences on ILO reform efforts to the deployment of technical assistance 
and community development programs during the Cold War. The bilateral and 
multilateral programs aimed at the indigenous populations of the Andes Mountains in 
South America were among the first attempts to implement these plans after the Second 
World War. Indeed, among a handful of early efforts at international collaboration in the 
field of social and economic development, one of the most audacious but least well 
known was the ILO administered Andean Indian Program. 
Described by Morse as “one of the most exciting developments imaginable,” the 
ILO’s “mission” to the Andes involved participation from other United Nations’ 




United Nation’s Education, Science, and Culture Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O.), and the 
World Health Organization (W.H.O).35 Although the ILO’s Andean program was 
inaugurated in 1952, the impetus for such a program appeared earlier. In 1936, for 
example, the first regional conference of ILO members from the American States was 
held in Santiago, Chile. One of the topics discussed at the conference was the need to 
study the situation of the indigenous peoples who resided in the Andean region of several 
Latin American nations. The relocation of the ILO offices from Geneva, Switzerland to 
Montreal, Canada during the war and the strategic importance of the Latin American 
states to the war effort may have encouraged further interest in the region and its 
problems. In 1943, the International Labor Organization and the Bolivian and United 
States governments conducted a joint study of Bolivia’s economy and social structure. 
Although the study produced few concrete results, its authors recommended that the ILO 
constitute a central component of a new “far-reaching program in the Labor field,” a 
program that would especially address the integration of Bolivia’s indigenous 
population.36 Yet, despite the active involvement of the Institute of Inter-American 
Affairs and the Institute of Social Anthropology (both U.S. government agencies) in the 
region during the 1940s, no direct action was taken by the ILO until the 1950s. In 1952, 
35 “Andeans Respond to U.N. Assistance,” New York Times, October 26, 1958. 
36 The ILO representative on the Bolivian commission was David Blelloch.  The citation 
of the ILO report, Labor Problems in Bolivia (Montreal, 1943), appears in Jef Rens, 
“Latin American and the International Labor Organization,” International Labor Review 
80 (July, 1959), 10. See also Rens fuller treatment of the project in Jef Rens, Le Plan 
andin: contribution de l’OIT a un projet-pilot de cooperation technique multilaterale 
(Brussels, Belgium: Emile Bruillant, 1987). See also Daniel Maul, Human Rights, 
Development and Decolonization. The International Labor Organization, 1940-1970 
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and Luis Rodriguez-Pinero, Indigenous 
Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime (1919-1989), 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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the UN’s Technical Assistance Board authorized a survey mission to the Andes region 
for the purposes of gathering information and outlining proposals for a more permanent 
program. The resulting report became the basis for ILO and UN action in the Andes. 
The ILO’s interest in rural economic and social development in the Andes, not to 
mention the ambitious scale of the program, is not easily reconciled with the goals of an 
organization otherwise focused on industrial relations. Why would the ILO become 
involved in a multilateral enterprise aimed at rural peasants, let alone take primary 
responsibility for its overall execution?  Undoubtedly, part of the explanation must 
consider the dynamics of the Cold War and the international social politics that grew into 
the postwar “development apparatus.” The more precise ways in which the Cold War 
mattered in the case of the ILO and the project of development in the Andes are 
elaborated through this study. The Cold War was a global struggle, and it was in this 
sense that technical assistance and liberal economic development came to be seen as a 
weapon in the arsenal of the United States and its European allies (both of which figured 
prominently in the membership of the United Nations and the ILO). However, an 
explanation emphasizing the impact of the Cold War has its limitations. It can suffice 
only if we ignore the earlier chronology of developmentalism and minimize the direct 
importance of World War II as the catalyst for a new international social politics. 
Equally important is the fact that, from very early in its history, the ILO had laid 
claim to the problems of “indigenous workers.” As international legal scholar Luis 
Rodriguez-Pinero points out, dating back to the 1920s the ILO’s interest in matters 
affecting non-industrial workers was reflected in the “Colonial Code” adopted by the 




standards specifically aimed at disciplining the conditions of exploitation of ‘indigenous 
workers.’”37 “From its very inception,” he writes, “the organization considered ‘native 
labor’ according to notions of trusteeship prevailing in the international law of the time in 
its relations with [non-Western] societies.”38 In the period before the Second World War, 
Rodriguez-Pinéro explains, the term “indigenous worker” referred almost exclusively to 
“the legal status of populations subjected to formal colonial domination.”39 The modern 
use of the term “indigenous” would take on a different meaning, referring specifically to 
“culturally distinct groups living within the borders of independent states that are the 
descendants of the peoples that inhabited the region prior to colonization and the 
subsequent establishment of postcolonial states.” 40 Even so, he contends, that modern 
definition evolved from the ILO’s own “colonial history.” For Rodriguez-Pinero, this 
colonial lineage factored heavily in the construction of international law targeting 
indigenous peoples after the Second World War, explaining (at least in part) why the ILO 
“became the first international body concerned with indigenous issues, and eventually 
ended up drafting the international standards in the field of indigenous peoples’ rights.”41 
If one adds to this reality the internationalization and standardization of development 
discourse that occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War, the desire of David 
Morse and others to turn the ILO into an “operational” organization, and the Cold War 
emphasis on stopping the spread of communism in the “Third World,” the sources of ILO 
interest in the Andean region can be more clearly understood 
37 Rodriguez-Pinero, Indigenous Peoples, 18. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, 333. 
40 Ibid, 40. 
41 Ibid, 332. 
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Projections of United States Hegemony in Latin America: An Historiographic 
Perspective 
 
In the case of Latin America as a whole and the Andes Mountain region in 
particular, the history of “development” is very much tied to the history of United States 
involvement in the region. Indeed, the Andean program administered by the ILO 
paralleled similar efforts undertaken by missionary and private philanthropic 
organizations as well as agencies of the United States government in Latin American and 
elsewhere, dating back to the late 1930s and continuing into the 1960s with the Kennedy 
sponsored Alliance for Progress.42 Beginning in the 1930s, as a result of growing concern 
with the threat of Nazis influence in Latin America and in order to secure the raw 
materials needed for the war against the Axis Powers, individual U.S. government 
agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture and Labor fashioned programs aimed at 
the United State’s strategic allies in Latin America.43 In 1939, the coordination of the 
42 For example, under the auspices of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) and 
the Point Four program, documents located in the National Archives demonstrate that the 
U.S. government considered a settlement program along the lines of those implemented 
by the ILO at Cotoca, Bolivia and Puno, Peru. The proposed initiative was named the 
“Montero Project.” In a memorandum dated June 14, 1950, the Associated Chief of Field 
Party for the IIAA in Bolivia, John Hanlon, discussed the “movement of altiplano Indians 
to the more productive lowlands” of the Santa Cruz region. Ultimately, Hanlon 
concluded, “it would be best for the future of the country if the altiplano people did not 
populate the lowlands” and that any attempt on this score “would be inadvisable, 
impractical, dangerous, and doomed to failure.” His reasoning seems to have hinged on 
an evaluation of the Aymara people “physically and physiologically,” as well as 
perceptions about their cultural adaptability. “They are not the kind of people to make a 
success of it,” Hanlon surmised. “If those lands [in the Santa Cruz area] are to have a real 
future,” he continued, “I feel that it must preferably be in the hands of other types of 
people, probably new people from the outside.” John J. Hanlon, M.D. to Paul S. Fox, “La 
Paz, June 14 1950,” file “Bolivia Montero Project,” Box 5 “Bolivia: Livestock- Public 
Administration,” RG 469 “Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961,” 
National Archives, College Park, Maryland. 
43 In addition to the self-interested character of such activities, I would argue that (for 
good or ill) the increasing focus on government sponsored programs of technical 
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individual departmental programs was brought under a single administrative umbrella, 
the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics or IDC.44 
Together with the newly created Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs 
directed by Nelson Rockefeller, the IDC represented a new attempt on the part of the 
United States government to deploy American expertise and technology abroad, in such 
areas as public health and administration, rural education, child care, labor relations, and 
agricultural development, among others. 45 This effort was intensified after 1949, when 
President Harry Truman announced the creation of a new program, dubbed “Point Four,” 
which accelerated the institutionalization and expansion of the international 
assistance overseas also betrayed a growing faith in the wider efficacy of domestic 
models and constituted a temporary departure from the recurrent military occupations 
that historically characterized U.S. relations with Latin America. 
44 This committee went through numerous name changes over the years reflecting the 
widening scope of U.S. development programs from the 1930s onward. It began in 1938 
as an interdepartmental committee concerned solely with U.S.-Latin American relations, 
but subsequently expanded its purview, becoming the Committee on Scientific and 
Cultural Cooperation and finally the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance. 
45 Some of these bilateral programs are discussed generally in Emily Rosenberg, 
Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-
1945 (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1982), 202-228; David Green, The Containment of 
Latin America: A History of Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago, 
IL: Quadrangle Books, 1971) 37-58; Curti and Birr, Prelude to Point Four; and Edward 
O. Guerrant, Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy (Albuquerque, NM: The University of 
New Mexico Press, 1950), 128-134. In addition, the National Planning Association 
sponsored the publication of a series of books and pamphlets on the subject of technical 
cooperation in Latin America in the 1950s, which describe the U.S. programs in more 
detail. See Phillip M. Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the 
Americas (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Arthur T. Mosher, Technical 
Cooperation in Latin American Agriculture (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1957); James Gray Maddox, Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin 
America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956). The pamphlets include NPA 
Special Policy Committee on Technical Cooperation, Organization of the U.S. 
Government for Technical Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: National Planning 
Association, 1955) and NPA Special Committee on Technical Cooperation, Technical 
Cooperation in Latin America—Recommendations for the Future (Washington, D.C.: 
NPA, 1956).   
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“development apparatus.”46 Simultaneously declaring that the “old imperialism—
exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans,” Truman described the 
initiative as “a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” 
Point Four, he said, would become “a program of development based on the concepts of 
democratic fair-dealing.”47  The U.S. government’s interest in countering the spread of 
communism in the “Third World” also constituted a principal motivation for the program.  
46 Labeled the “Point Four” program because it was introduced as a fourth “point” in 
Truman’s January inaugural address, the stated goal was to provide financial and 
technical assistance to the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, 
Asia, and Africa. Passage of the Act for International Development (1950) to carry out 
the objectives of Point Four continued the process of centralizing U.S. government aid 
and assistance programs under the umbrella of a single executive agency. Numerous 
reorganizations and legislative addendums transformed the original legislation over the 
next decade—as policymakers, congress, and the President fought to reshape the 
program—culminating in the creation of the U.S. Agency for International Development 
under the auspices of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961. Despite the torturous 
uncertainty of this policy trajectory, at least one author has explained the expansion of 
U.S. aid and assistance programs as a product of a timeless “liberal tradition” in America. 
See Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development 
Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1973). 
47 Harry S. Truman, “Truman’s Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949,” President Truman 
Museum and Library, www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural 
20jan1949.htm (accessed April 21, 2012). In contrast to this favorable description, critics 
of development such as Gilbert Rist have gone so far as to describe the Point Four 
paradigm as little more than an updated version of imperialism or what he describes as 
“anti-colonial imperialism.” While not unsympathetic to this view, I believe that it over 
simplifies the relationship between the United States and the postwar international 
development regime. The concept of hegemony more accurately describes the influence 
of the United States over development programs such as the AIP. See Gilbert Rist, The 
History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (London, UK: Zed 
Books, 1997), 75. On hegemony see for example Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London, UK: 
Verso, 2001) and Slavoj Zizek, Ernesto Laclau, and Judith Butler (Contingency, 





                                                 
 
In stark contrast to the assertions of President Truman and other U.S. officials 
over the years, much of the historiography on the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations 
emphasizes the exploitative and expansionist nature of U.S. policy. A great deal of this 
literature draws upon the work of so-called revisionist historians, such as William 
Appleman Williams. In what is perhaps his best know book, The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy, Williams argued that the history of American foreign relations reflected the 
dominance of the policy of the “Open Door.” Referring specifically to a series of “notes” 
written by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay to the European powers regarding the 
creation of “spheres of influence” in China, Williams adapted the concept of “the Open 
Door” as a as an all-encompassing metaphor for American foreign relations (and U.S. 
history)—i.e. the influence of capitalist economic expansion on the development of the 
United States and specifically U.S. foreign policy. Williams’s Open Door thesis indicted 
the actions and ideology of American business and policy-making elites for their cynical 
devotion to developing and maintaining access to new markets for American capitalism, 
whatever the cost. For Williams, the continued reliance on (territorial and economic) 
expansionism was entirely unsustainable over the long term and drew attention away 
from pressing problems at home. At the same time, it exposed the fallacy of 
exceptionalist claims concerning the special course and purpose of American history, 
which conceived the United States as a beacon of liberty and democracy. As Williams 
famously concluded, “[t]he tragedy of American diplomacy is not that it is evil, but that it 
denies and subverts American ideas and ideals.”48 In this way, the true cost of empire 
48 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, NY: 
Dell Publishing, 1962), 291. 
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came “in the loss of our vitality as citizens,” leading to the decline of strong and healthy 
communities, the eclipse of civil society, and the erosion of democracy.49 
While Williams tended to focus on the origins and domestic consequences of 
“empire as a way of life,” his students continued to flesh out the details of his thesis while 
remaining true to its central arguments about the importance of economic expansion to 
American history. In the context of U.S.-Latin American relations since the 1930s, most 
recent attempts to analyze the Roosevelt administration’s “Good Neighbor Policy” echo 
the conclusions of Williams and his student Lloyd C. Gardner. Arguing against the grain 
of scholars such as Samuel F. Bemis, who saw the Good Neighbor policy as a corrective 
to earlier imperialistic policies in Latin America, Gardner concluded that Roosevelt’s 
foreign policy existed comfortably within in the “mainstream” of American foreign 
49 William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and 
Character of America’s Present Predicament, Along with a Few Thoughts about an 
Alternative (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980), 13. The legacy of various 
domestic reforms fared little better in Williams’s analysis, following a familiar pattern of 
profit-driven manipulation and squandered opportunities. In the case of turn-of-the-
century progressivism, for example, Williams concluded simply that “[r]eform at home 
justified empire abroad.” Ibid, 119. Williams’s analysis of the New Deal was more 
nuanced, but nevertheless resulted in similar conclusions. On the one hand, he observed 
that a profound change had occurred with the inauguration of the New Deal in the 1930s. 
Whereas nineteenth-century liberalism associated individual liberty with limited 
government and expansion across the continent, after the New Deal the expansion of 
liberty came increasingly to rely “upon the imperial police power of the ever more 
awesome state.” Ibid, 114. The key moment in the formation of this “new” empire had 
come with the Spanish-American War, which initiated the globalization of U.S.-
American aspirations. Nevertheless, it was the New Deal that consummated the new 
situation, saving capitalism with a dose of statism. While the New Deal and the Second 
World War resulted in the formation of the American welfare state, Williams observed 
that the New Deal legacy of expanded social services was imaginable only as the 
continuation of well worn expansionist policies. Ibid, 157. entering the great 
historiographic debate surrounding historians’ attempts to come to grips with the nature 
of the New Deal, Williams concluded that it was “revolutionary” to the extent that it 
redefined American liberalism and legitimated a new role for the state as an instrument of 
“reform,” but that it did so under the restrictive conditions of a highly developed, global 
capitalist political economy. 
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relations. Following the trail blazed by his mentor, for Gardner the Good Neighbor Policy 
was primarily concerned with expanding U.S. markets and creating new outlets for 
American business. “New Deal foreign policy was not unique,” he wrote, it “did not 
magically or morally climb from isolation to world leadership, and does not give us a 
guide to the future.” At the same time, he noted that, “from 1938 to 1941 the United 
States was developing a way to give Latin America a meaningful share,” in the form of 
“aid for the establishment of basic industries, programs to absorb agricultural surpluses, 
and the ‘delousing of South America to rid it of Axis pets.’”50 However, Gardner 
maintains, with the exception of the war years, the overriding emphasis was on 
promoting stability in the face of revolution, resulting in coercive economic policies that 
crippled the independence and economic development of many Latin American states.  
Similarly, R.A. Humphreys’s two-volume treatment of the region during World 
War II argues that the goodwill of the war years was squandered when the United States 
50 Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 112. See also, David Green, The Containment of 
Latin America: A History of the Myth and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1971); Dick Stewart, Trade and Hemisphere: 
The Good Neighbor Policy and Reciprocal Trade (Columbia, MO: University of 
Missouri Press, 1975); Frederick Adams, Economic Diplomacy: The Export-Import Bank 
and American Foreign Policy, 1934-1939 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 
1976); Michael J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with 
Argentina and Chile during World War II (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1977); Gary Frank, Struggle for Hegemony in South America: Argentina, Brazil, 
and the United States during the Second World War (Miami, FL: Center for Advanced 
International Studies, University of Miami, 1979); Michael Grow, The Good Neighbor 
Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay: United States Economic Expansion and Great 
Power Rivalry in Latin America during World War II (Lawrence, KS: University of 
Kansas Press, 1981). Historian Bryce Wood has taken a slightly different view of postwar 
relations between the United States and Latin America, arguing that the deterioration 
happened only very gradually until the U.S. invasion of Guatemala in 1954. Bryce Wood, 
The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1961); 




                                                 
 
failed to provide Latin America with its own Marshall Plan.51 U.S. agencies such as the 
Institute for Inter-American Affairs did continue to operate in the region until the 
announcement of Point Four, but such activities paled in comparison to the levels of aid 
provided to war torn Europe. In the same way, despite the pronouncements of American 
presidents and other U.S. officials to the contrary, for Samuel Bailey, U.S. policy in Latin 
America acted as a major obstacle to “modernization” and “development,” and “has 
frequently distorted, frustrated, and undermined the South Americans’ efforts to 
overcome their poverty.”52 In this way, attitudes about development in Latin American in 
51 R.A. Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, 1938-1945, 2 vols. 
(London, UK: Athlone, 1981-82). On the effects of shifting priorities on U.S. policy 
immediately after the war see also Robert Freeman Smith, “United States Policy-Making 
for Latin America during the Truman Administration,” Continuity 16 (Fall 1992): 87-
111; Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, eds., Latin American Between the Second World 
War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Bethell and Roxborough, “Latin American between the Second World War and the Cold 
War: Some Reflections on the 1945-48 Conjuncture, “ Journal of Latin American Studies 
20 (May 1988): 167-89; Stephen G. Rabe, “The Elusive Conference; United States 
Economic Relations with Latin America, 1945-1952,” Diplomatic History 2 (Summer 
1978): 279-294. 
52 Samuel L. Bailey, The United States and the Development of South America, 1945-
1975 (New York, NY: New Viewpoints, 1976), 14. See also James W. Park, Latin 
American Underdevelopment: A History of Perspectives in the United States, 1870-1965 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1995). Gerald K. Haines similarly 
emphasizes the ways in which U.S. policy was driven by its own self-interest in 
stabilizing the world economic system, with devastating consequences for Brazil and the 
rest of Latin America. Gerald K. Haines, The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. 
Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945-1954 (Wilmington, DE: University of 
Delaware Press, 1989). On the general attitudes that defined U.S. thinking about Latin 
America see Frederick B. Pike, The United States and Latin America: Myths and 
Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1992) and 
Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York, NY: Hill 
and Wang, 1994). Both Pike and Smith emphasize that U.S. officials based policy in the 
region on the perception that Latin America was largely a stage for playing out the drama 
of the Cold War. See also Thomas Zoumaras, “Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 
The Case of Latin America,” in Reevaluating Eisenhower, eds. Richard A. Melanson and 
David Mayers (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1987); Stephen G. Rabe, 
Eisenhower and Latin America: the Foreign Policy of Anti-communism (Chapel Hill, NC: 
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the United States have been characterized by a belief in the superiority of the U.S. 
system, a failure to recognize or admit the negative consequences of U.S. policy for the 
region, and a perspective that sees development as “essentially an economic or 
technological matter.”53 
Building upon the insights of this literature, I nevertheless believe that U.S. 
activities in Latin America should be understood within the wider context of an 
international social politics that came to define the period during and after World War II. 
While previous studies have focused on U.S. foreign policy and bilateral aid, the role of 
international institutions and networks has received less attention. Under the postwar 
order inaugurated with the end of World War II, the U.S. increasingly relied upon a 
newly created network of international institutions—including the United Nations and 
specialized organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
the International Labor Organization—to maintain the stability of the international 
system. In this new “world system,” American capitalism was ascendant, but the 
mechanisms for organizing order and stability and for exercising power became 
enmeshed in a matrix of international organizations, institutions, and laws. Thus, I would 
contend, both the U.S. and ILO programs were part of an evolving local, regional, and 
international “development apparatus.” In order to understand the circumstances and 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the 
World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: 
Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism,” in 
Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, eds. Thomas G. 
Patterson (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jerome Levinson and Juan de 
Onis, The Alliance Than Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress 
(Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1970). 
53 Bailey, United States, 14. 
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forces that gave rise to the age of development we need to rethink the standard 
periodization of U.S. and international development which tends to treat the period before 
the late 1950s and 1960s as a mere prologue to the Cold War. In contrast, I argue 
throughout this dissertation that World War II was the primary catalyst or engine for the 
developmentalist turn that followed. It formed the basis for a network of institutions, 
ideas, and responsible personnel that made projects such as the Andean Indian Program 
possible. 
International Social Politics and the Age of Development 
Although this dissertation certainly is relevant to the study of U.S. foreign 
relations and foreign policy, it does not fit neatly into either of these historiographic 
traditions. Indeed, because I am interested in the ways in which power circulated through 
a global network of institutions devoted to the shifting and amorphous concept of 
“development,” my project necessarily complicates finite distinctions between United 
States history, the history of other peoples, and of international institutions such as the 
ILO. In this way, my dissertation addresses problems and themes located at the 
intersection of two broad areas of analysis: social politics or what is sometimes referred 
to a political economy and international history. Constituted as an expanding matrix of 
bilateral and multilateral strategies and practices, I conceive “development” as a 
“complex, contradictory phenomenon, one reflective of the best of human aspirations and 
yet, exactly because great ideas form the basis of power, subject to the most intense 
manipulation and liable to be used for purposes that reverse its original ideal intent.”54 In 
54 Richard Peet with Elaine Hartwick, Theories of Development (New York, NY: 
Guilford Press, 1999), 2. Peet and Hartwick argue for a critical modernism that 
incorporates the insights of postmodernism, but reject its tendency to define development 
as simply imperialism by other means. From this perspective, “development has 
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this section, after outlining the dominant theoretical perspectives that have defined 
postwar development discourse, I then situate the current project within the established 
literature and suggest ways in which it adds to our understanding of “development” as 
both a discourse and a system of social relations.  
After the Second World War, modernization theory represented perhaps the most 
important effort to formally define “development” in the non-Western world, achieving 
its greatest influence in the late 1950s and 1960s. For its chief proponents, however, it 
also represented much more. Drawing upon the insights of Darwinian biology and 
Weberian sociology, modernization theorists in the United States and elsewhere sought to 
systematize the study of human societies under the rubric of a single, universal model of 
social and economic development. From this basis, assumptions and conclusions about 
what constituted “progress” or “development” rested upon distinctions between 
“traditional” and “modern” societies. 55 Eschewing the explicit biological and racial 
determinism that underwrote an earlier age of empire and colonialism, from the 
perspective of modernization theory democracy, western technology, and liberal 
capitalism were the criteria for modernity. As one of modernization theory’s chief 
unrealized potential, and radical analysis should be dedicated to extracting those notions 
of modern developmentalism that can be used to further the interests of peasants and 
workers, rather than dismissing the entire venture.” Ibid, 161. 
55 Nick Cullather, “Development? It’s History,” Diplomatic History, 24, no. 4 (Fall 
2000): 644. Although differences certainly existed between the numerous authors who 
contributed to the modernization synthesis, they shared certain general characteristics. 
Among the “founding” texts of modernization theory are Daniel Lerner, The Passing of 
Traditional Society (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958); W. W. Rostow, The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960); Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics 
(Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1960); Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involutions: The 




                                                                                                                                                 
 
architects explained, in the “traditional” society the efficiencies of production derived 
from “modern science and technology were either not available or not regularly 
applied.”56 Furthermore, such societies devoted “a very high proportion of their resources 
to agriculture,” possessed a hierarchal social structure defined by familial or clan 
loyalties, and had a value system oriented toward “a long-run fatalism.”57 Lacking the 
high levels of production and efficiency found in the West, the “traditional” society 
rested upon more “primitive” means of production and social organization, which 
explained its “backwardness.” In stark contrast, what were termed the “high mass 
consumption” societies of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were urban and 
highly industrialized. As a sign of their modernity, these societies of abundance 
increasingly allocated resources to “social welfare and security,” “to the production of 
consumers’ durables,” and “to the diffusion of services on a mass basis.”58 Modernization 
theory understood economic and social “development” as a by-product of “the 
penetration of technology, capital, trade, democratic political institutions, and attitudes 
from the ‘developed’ into the ‘developing’ countries of the world.”59 In this way, as non-
western societies moved through a series of historical stages on the road to modernity, the 
West in general and the United States in particular represented a timeless, universal 
56 Rostow, Stages, 4. For a discussion of Rostow’s influence and contributions to 
modernization theory and U.S. policy see Mark H. Haefele, “Walt Rostow’s Stages of 
Economic Growth: Ideas and Action,” in Staging Growth: Modernization Development, 
and the Global Cold War, eds. David C. Engerman, et al. (Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusettes Press, 2003); Gilman, Mandarins of the Future; Latham, Modernization 
as Ideology. 
57 Rostow, Stages, 5. 
58 Ibid, 11. 
59 Gilbert M. Joseph, “Close Encounters: Toward a New Cultural History of U.S.-Latin 
American Relations,” in Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of 
U.S.-Latin American Relations (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1998), 10. 
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model in which progress equaled westernization. Development became a process of 
economic and technological diffusion. 
Despite its widespread influence, as a description of reality modernization theory 
was justly criticized for its teleological pretensions, for its flattening of historical 
contingency into evolutionary certainty, and for its obfuscation of powerful coercive 
forces such as western colonialism and imperialism. Indeed, emerging largely in response 
to the pretensions of modernization theory, dependency and world systems theorists 
attack modernization theory on the basis that it distorts and conceals the true dynamics of 
the world economy. For the proponents of dependency and world systems theory, rather 
than benefiting the non-western world, the economic growth of the “center” (or 
developed western “core”) depends upon the active destruction and conquest of the 
“periphery.” As the radical dependency theorist Andre Gunder Frank explained in the 
1960s, “underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the 
existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of 
world history.” Rather, “underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same 
historical process which also generated economic development: the development of 
capitalism itself.”60 For Frank, the unfolding of this historical process resulted in the 
“development of underdevelopment;” what western modernizers labeled the 
“backwardness” of “traditional” society was in fact the predictable byproduct of market 
capitalism. According to this view, modernization theory was (at worst) a crude defense 
of western expansionism and exploitation, and (at best) a farcical distortion of reality. 
60 Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York, 
NY: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 9. 
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Although both theories are highly critical of modernization, there are also 
important differences between the perspectives of dependencia and world systems theory. 
On the one hand, because they perceive underdevelopment as a consequence of the 
infiltration of global capitalism, for dependency theorists the solution is for countries in 
the periphery to revolt against the economic system controlled by the West, replacing 
dependence on foreign imports with local production. After the Second World War, many 
Latin American countries adopted “import-substitution” as the foundation of an economic 
model that internalized and nationalized their economies. In contrast, for world system 
analysts such as Immanuel Wallerstein, the capacity of societies in the “periphery” and 
“semiperiphery” to create independent and self-sustaining economies—to resist the 
dominance of the core countries—is significantly diminished. Social movements that 
revolt against the world system have a limited capacity to alter or even challenge the 
status quo. Indeed, countries in the periphery and semi-periphery are better off 
participating in the world system rather than backing away from it.  
Since the late 1980s, critics influenced by the insights of postcolonialism, 
postmodernism, and poststructuralism have challenged modernization, dependency, and 
world systems models on the grounds that these theories ignore the ways in which 
development operates as a discourse.61 According to postmodern critics of development, 
61 The insights of Edward Said were especially influential in this regard. Said’s analysis 
of “Orientalism” as a “a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, 
scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” 
examined the ways in which the East was quite literally imagined and constructed by 
western colonialism. Edward Said, Orientalism (London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1979), 2. See also, Said, “Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors,” 
Critical Inquiry 15 (1989): 205-225. Also important was the body of literature associated 
with the Subaltern Studies Group, which began as an attempt to recapture the voices of 
subordinate classes of rural peasants. See for example, Ranjit Guha, Elementary Aspects 
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even the radical critiques of modernization (represented by dependency and the world 
systems perspective) share its uncritical acceptance of the notion that all societies move 
along a more or less universal, linear path toward “modernity.” Dependency and world 
systems theorists merely substitute one totalizing explanatory mechanism (capitalism) for 
another (modernization), charging it with an omnipotent power as the motor of economic 
and social development. From this perspective, if modernization theory views isolation 
from the global system as the source of “underdevelopment,” then dependency and world 
systems theory relocate the causes of “underdevelopment” externally. In contrast, critics 
such as anthropologist Arturo Escobar conceive development as a “historically produced 
discourse,” an apparatus of knowledge and power that constructs “the poor and 
underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the 
representers.”62 Escobar demonstrates that, as a discourse, development “form[s] 
systematically the objects of which it [speaks], to group them and arrange them in certain 
ways, and to give them a unity of their own,” producing knowledge about the “Third 
World” that is deployed as a means of exercising power over it.63 In this sense, 
of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1983); 
Homi Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” 
October 28 (1984): 125-133. From the perspective of poststructuralism, Michel 
Foucault’s observation that knowledge and power operate together to create diffuse 
systems of discipline and control is especially important. See Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings translated by Colin Gordon 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1980); Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the 
Prison translated by Alan Sheridan (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1977); Foucault, 
History of Sexuality translated by Robert Hurley (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1980). 
See also Arturo Escobar, “Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and 
the Relevance of His Work to the Third World.” Alternatives 10 (1984-1985): 377-400. 
62 Escobar, Encountering Development, 6, 53. 
63 Ibid, 40. For a further sampling of writing on the subject of development from the 
postmodern or post-development perspective see Majid Rahnema with Victoria Bawtree, 
(eds), The Post-Development Reader (London, UK: Zed Books, 1997); Wolfgang Sachs 
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“[e]verything [is] subjected to the eye of the new [development] experts: the poor 
dwellings of the rural masses, the vast agricultural fields, cities, households, factories, 
hospitals, schools, public offices, towns and regions, and, in the last instance, the world 
as a whole.”64  Rather than a way of describing the path to a universally experienced 
modernity, Escobar and others see development as a modern system(s) of surveillance, 
power, and domination. 
The emphasis on “development” as discourse makes possible a critical appraisal 
of the knowledge-power nexus that has enabled the West to historically construct the 
“Third World” as a “backward” outlier of modernity. But, taken to its logical extreme, 
the postmodern turn also represents a cynical rejection of modernity in its entirety, not to 
mention the very capacity to improve the conditions of human existence more generally. 
Describing “development” as a socio-cultural version of the AIDS virus, for example, 
former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations and editor of The Post-Development 
Reader Majid Rahnema argues that development not only serves to conceal the true 
intentions of the West, “giving a human face to an even more pernicious form of 
colonialism,” but as it works its way through the host society, “[it] aims at colonizing 
from within.” It sets “out to change every vernacular person into an economic agent, able 
(ed.), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (London, UK: Zed 
Books, 1992); Marc DuBois, “The Governance of the Third World: A Foucaldian 
Perspective on Power Relations in Development,” Alternatives 16, no. 1 (1991): 1-30; 
Frederique Apffel Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin, Dominating Knowledge: 
Development, Culture, and Resistance (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990); Ashis 
Nandy (ed.), Science, Hegemony, and Violence: A Requiem for Modernity (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
64 Escobar, Encounter Development, 42. 
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to produce and make more money.”65 Just as AIDS turns the body’s defenses against 
itself, development “aspires to make its target populations ‘freely participate’ in their 
mutation.” Perceived in this way, as a virus that lays waste to the social body, 
“development” becomes little more than a “deceitful mirage,” an imperialist plague.66 
Adapting the notion of development as discourse, while hesitating to dismiss 
outright the modernist goal of social and economic improvement, some historians and 
social scientists have taken the further step of historicizing “development,” and in the 
process have brought into focus the pivotal actions of particular individuals, institutions, 
and states.67 In this way, Timothy Mitchell’s study of British colonialism in nineteenth-
century Egypt describes the ways in which the imperial machinery of representation 
constructed Egypt as a terrific spectacle or exhibition to be ordered via institutions such 
as the Egyptian army, national schooling, and other “civilizing innovations.” In the 
colonial context, the principal purpose of this conception of the “world as exhibition,” 
was to make the unfamiliar world of nineteenth-century Egypt “legible” to colonial 
65 Majid Rahnema, “Development and The People’s Immune System: The Story of 
Another Variety of AIDS,” in The Post Development Reader, eds. Majid Rahnema and  
Victoria Bawtree (London, UK: Zed Books), 120. 
66 Rahnema, “Development,” 119. 
67 See for example Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology 
and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, NY: Columbia University Press, 1989); 
James Ferguson, The anti-politics machine: “Development,” depoliticization, and 
bureaucratic power in Lesotho (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1991); M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, Doctrines of Development (London, UK: 
Routledge, 1996); James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve 
the Human Condition have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); 
Christopher Simpson (ed.), Universities and Empire: Money Politics in the Social 
Sciences during the Cold War (New York, NY: New Press, 1998). Historian Nick 
Cullather provides a useful summary of this literature from the perspective of the history 
of foreign relations and diplomatic history. Cullather, “Development? Its History.”  
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officials and to British society.68 Similarly, anthropologist James C. Scott emphasizes the 
ways in which the technocratic “high modernism” practiced by states in the twentieth 
century has failed to achieve its utopian goals and frequently ended in tragedy. According 
to Scott, the architects of such ventures ignored the importance of local or “improvised 
knowledge” in favor of the “generalized knowledge” of experts, which supposedly 
facilitated the integration of previously marginalized regions and groups. Although Scott 
is certainly skeptical of the developmentalism practiced by modern regimes, he restricts 
his critique to “certain kinds of states, driven by utopian plans and an authoritarian 
disregard for the values, desires, and objections of their subjects,” stopping short of a 
total condemnation of modernist planning in its entirety.69 
A few scholars have undertaken a similar analysis of the United States during the 
Cold War. In his analysis of modernization theory, Nils Gilman argues that the 
construction of a universal model of social and economic development by social 
scientists in the 1950s had just as much to do with their attempts to define America as it 
did their attempts to understand the postcolonial world. According to Gilman, above all 
else, modernization theory represented a scholarly consensus about the way societies 
“evolve.” Thus, he describes the ideas and relationships that connected Harvard 
sociologists, members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science 
Research Council, MIT economists, and even so called consensus historians in the United 
States and shows how (after the Korean War) they gradually came to exercise direct 
influence over government policy. For Gilman, modernization theory itself also reflected 
wider cultural and intellectual trends common to the 1950s and 1960s: a paradoxical 
68 Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, 175. 
69 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 7. 
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combination of unfettered “confidence” in the American model of development and 
nagging anxiety about the uncertainties of a larger conflict with the Soviet Union and the 
spread of communism. Frustrated by the obstacles to reform at home, Gilman argues, the 
promotion of modernization “in countries emerging from colonialism allowed American 
liberals to retain their self-image as progressive reformers, even as they acquiesced to a 
conservative domestic agenda.”70 In this way, modernization theory was a “manifestation 
of American postwar liberalism,” and “its history cannot be understood apart from the 
fate of that liberalism.”71 
The Cold War context explored by Gilman is critical to our understanding of how 
and why modernization theory appealed to some researchers and policymakers in the 
1950s and 1960s. But Gilman’s study is less useful as a means of understanding the 
global nature of postwar development discourse. This is because Gilman, while 
privileging the texts of modernization theory, pays less attention to the ways in which the 
concept of development and modernization possessed much deeper roots not only in 
American liberalism but also in the economic and social upheavals of the 1930s and 
1940s. I would argue that the proliferation of ideas about development owe as much to 
the Second World War as to the Cold War. What needs to be better understood is the 
70 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, 19 & 20. 
71 Ibid, 4. Gilman’s analysis illustrates the ways in the discourse of development (in this 
case the formation of a particular theory of development at a singular moment in the 
history of the United States during the twentieth century) was tied to a system of social 
relations that connected researchers and academics in the United States. In a similar 
fashion, Michael Latham’s recent study of modernization and development during the 
Kennedy administration demonstrates that it represented more than just “propaganda 
employed to legitimate and rationalize genuine intentions.” According to Latham, it also 
constituted “a broader worldview, a constellation of mutually reinforcing ideas that often 
framed policy goals through a definition of the nation’s ideals, history, and mission.” 




                                                 
 
difference that the Cold War made in terms of shifting and/or redirecting the focus of 
international development. To account for the international proliferation of ideas about 
economic and social development before the formal emergence of modernization theory 
at the height of the Cold War, we must also look beyond the United States. Building on 
existing efforts to historicize postwar development strategies and practices, I want to 
examine the power of development discourse as a global phenomenon by drawing 
attention to international networks of experts, policymakers, and institutions. From this 
perspective the United States was still an important producer and distributor of 
development strategies and practices, but possessed no monopoly on outcomes. Hence, 
the thrust of the present study is not to question the status of development as a discourse 
of power, but to recognize and understand the ways in which it “may be transformed and 
appropriated in ways that were unintended.”72 As anthropologist James Ferguson 
concludes in his path breaking study of the southern African nation of Lesotho, “[w]hen 
we deal with planned interventions by powerful parties, it is tempting to see in the 
discourse and intentions of such parties the logic that defines the train of events.” The 
problem emerges when such a view “inevitably misrepresents the complexities of the 
involvement of intentionality with events.” Drawing on this insight, I share Ferguson’s 
conclusion that “[i]ntentions, even of the most powerful actors or interests, are only the 
visible part of a much larger mechanism through which structures are actually produced, 
reproduced, and transformed.”73 As important as the articulated goals and purposes of 
specific development projects may be for assessing the intentions of its participants and 
72 Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, (eds.), International Development and the 
Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1997), 23. 
73 Ferguson, The anti-politics machine, 276. 
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for fitting them into a larger historical context, I am just as interested in the potentially 
unintended consequences of “development” for the people of the Andes, the region, and 






Chapter 2: The Second World War and the Formation of International 
Technocracy 
 
After the Second World War, the activities of organizations involved in the field 
of economic and social “development” were guided by an increasingly global network of 
civil servants and technical experts—what I term the International Technocracy (ITC). As 
already suggested in the introduction, many recent studies of postwar “development” 
focus attention on the circulation of “development discourse,” especially its deployment 
by countries in the West as a technique of power and domination. Yet, by conjuring up a 
monolithic “discourse of development” that systematically removes every obstacle and 
assimilates all resistance, the individuals who actually managed and executed such 
projects are largely ignored. Human action dissolves into a play of signs and 
significations. The orientation of this chapter is different. It begins to fill a gap in the 
historiography of postwar development studies by examining the forces and 
circumstances that contributed to the emergence of the ITC, especially those individuals 
responsible for the technical assistance and community development operations of the 
ILO’s Andean Indian Program (AIP). This chapter examines the roots of the ITC in the 
Second World War, with special emphasis on how those individuals that would go on to 
influence and direct the ILO’s postwar development activities were shaped by the war 
and its aftermath in ways that made the Andean Indian Program possible. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the ITC’s formation and the ways in which the experience of 
the Second World War resulted in a set of guiding principles that would structure its 
activities. A comprehensive explanation and defense of the ITCs existence is beyond the 




on to drive the ILO’s postwar transformation, as represented by the Andean Indian 
Program. Of the individuals discussed below, the American David Morse did more 
perhaps than any other to define and direct the ILO’s postwar path. Using the origins of 
the ITC and the Andean Indian Program as a lens, the goal is to build the foundation for 
an epistemologically more intricate, less preordained, history of “encounters,” which 
refocuses attention on the individual subjects who moved within and sometimes struggled 
against the parameters of established discourses about social and economic change. In the 
case of the AIP, a hierarchy of relations defined the spaces in which the ITC functioned. 
From officials at the United Nations and the ILO who superintended and administered the 
program to the mission experts deployed to run its day-to-day operations, this chapter 
considers some of the ways in which World War II and the Cold War engaged the talents 
of, created a niche for, and made the ITC into a force for international reform and 
regulation.  
Of course, singling out a particular group for its historical significance is a very 
different thing from providing a proof of its existence. The question remains: who or 
what is meant by the phrase “International Technocracy”? Since the 1960s, technocracy 
has been conceptualized in three distinct ways, which are relevant to this question and to 
my analysis of the ITC. First, there are those scholars who define technocracy as a 
consequence of modernization. Authors who identify technocracy in this way treat it 
primarily as a mechanism evolved to facilitate the expansion of the modern state, i.e. to 
manage the enlarged powers and authority of growing state bureaucracies.1 As a 
1 See for example Jean Meynaud, Technocracy, trans. Paul Barnes (New York, NY: Free 
Press, 1969); Frank Fisher,  Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage Publications, 1990); Robert D. Putnam, “Elite Transformation in Advanced 
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comprehensive description of technocracy this explanation is too narrowly construed and 
ultimately unsatisfying. While it is certainly true that technocratic groups often do 
emerge during periods of rapid social, economic, or political change, it does not 
necessarily follow that such groups are a mere by-product of “modernization.” In fact, if 
technocracy serves merely as a stand-in for an inevitable process of modernization––if, 
like the modernization theory that dominated development discourse throughout the 
1950s and early 1960s, technocracy functions simply as a conceptual analogue to social 
and economic change––it ceases to be a useful analytical tool. Put simply, the 
technocracy-as-modernization argument ignores or subsumes other forces that can 
support or prevent the rise of technocratic groups and institutions, such as political 
corruption, ideology, civil strife or war, and class, ethnic, and racial conflict.  
Second, technocracy is sometimes understood more precisely as accompanying a 
process of post-industrial de-politicization, a result of the decline of political ideologies, 
or even as the consolidation of powerful forces within government hostile to the 
democratic political process.2 Sharing many of the assumptions and weakness of studies 
in the first category, authors who adopt this perspective nevertheless add greater 
emphasis to the evolution of an elite “expert” class, which comes to fill the space 
Industrial Societies: An Empirical Assessment of the Theory of Technocracy,” 
Comparative Political Studies, 10, no.3 (Oct. 1977): 383-412. 
2 See for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the 
Technetronic Era (New York, NY: Viking, 1970); Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-
Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973); 
Alvin Ward Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New 
York, NY: Continuum, 1979); Frank W. Heuberger and Hansfried Kellner, Hidden 
Technocrats: The New class and New Capitalism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1992); Steven G. Brint, In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of 
Professionals in Politics and Public Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994); Harold James Perkin, The Third Revolution: Professional Elites in the Modern 
World (London, UK: Routledge, 1996). 
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formally occupied by what the scholar Jürgen Habermas has described as the bourgeois 
public sphere. As the process of modernization moves irresistibly forward, these authors 
contend, new specialized groups emerge to manage the complexities of modern life. The 
scientific certainty provided by the “rule of experts” replaces less predictable but free and 
open public debate, disputation, and discussion. Once set upon this course, politics and 
political life, indeed history itself, ceases to have meaning. Like the authors who 
emphasize technocracy as the handmaiden of modernization, analysis in this vein 
becomes more an indictment of the present or a prediction of the future than an analysis 
of a contingent past.  
A third and final perspective introduces a different set of concerns to the study of 
technocracy as a historically determined, but by no means inevitable, subject of analysis. 
The more recent work by historian Patricio Silva and others specializing in the study of 
Latin America attends more to the historical forces “facilitating the rise of technocratic 
groups,” such as the balance of political forces within a country at a given moment in its 
history.3 In contrast to the first two approaches outlined above, this third approach deems 
the emergence of technocratic groups (i.e. classes of experts whose authority becomes, in 
some way, integrated with the structures of power that govern a society) less as an 
evolutionary process and more as a political or an historical one. The concerns of this 
3 Patricio Silva, “State Public Technocracy and Politics in Chile, 1927-1941,” Bulletin of 
Latin American Research 13, no. 3 (1994), 282. See also Eduardo Dargent, Technocracy 
and Democracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Miguel Angel Centeno, “The New Leviathan: The 
Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy,” Theory and Society 22, no. 3, (June, 1993): 307-
335; Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico, 2nd edition 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Miguel Centeno and 
Patricio Silva (eds.), The Politics of Expertise in Latin America (New York, NY: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998). 
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chapter share a common methodology and set of interests with this final body of 
scholarship. The contingency favored by Silva and others to analyze the configuration of 
technocratic groups is, frankly, more useful and appropriate for a historical examination 
of International Technocracy. At the same time, I also draw insights from all three 
approaches to the study of technocracy. In sum, this chapter and the dissertation as a 
whole synthesizes aspects of all three approaches to explore the formation of the ITC, its 
relationship to different types of governmental power, and its use of social-scientific 
discourse to produce normative international social policy standards.  
As a group, the ITC facilitated the practices of technical assistance and 
community development, which (in turn) generated a particular status and type of 
authority. Expertise was the International Technocracy’s greatest political asset and the 
source of its collective identity4. With knowledge in fields such as labor law and 
industrial relations, agriculture, economics, medicine, and anthropology, the faith of the 
ITC in the capacity of science and technology (or “know-how,” as it was often described) 
to radically transform society for the better was a source of group cohesion, as well as 
individual and collective identity.  Individual members of the ITC, no doubt, rarely 
thought of themselves as being engaged in a struggle with other “classes.” The very idea 
went against everything that they purported to believe about themselves, the 
organizations they represented, and the work to which they dedicated their professional 
lives. Nevertheless, the “ITC” remains a useful category for describing and analyzing the 
existence and the mechanics of an international network of people, policies, and 
institutions defined by their relationship to a particular form of political rationality and 
4 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York, 
NY: Bedminster Press, 1968). 
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mode of capitalist expansion. For, together with its indefatigable faith in the capacity of 
technology to remake the world, the ITC’s defense of political and economic liberalism 
represented a potent fact of postwar international relations. It is in this sense that my use 
of the concept “technocracy” differs dramatically from scholars, such James Scott, who 
have tended to decouple the technocratic enterprise from political ideology. In the case of 
the ITC, international liberalism was essential to the expert’s sense of self. 
As suggested above, the emergence of the ITC was a complicated process that 
involved the interaction of multiple events and larger historical forces. Yet, no event 
proved more important to the emergence of the ITC than the Second World War. The 
destruction, death, and hope unleashed by that terrible conflict is the starting point for any 
attempt to come to grips with the ITC and its significance. Besides leading directly to the 
creation of the United Nations and its system of specialized organizations, the war 
spurred interest in and encouraged a demand for technical assistance and economic 
development projects as never before. Nowhere was this more evident than in the effect 
that the war had on the foreign aid and technical assistance programs of the U.S. 
government, which expanded exponentially from 1939 onward. Moreover, the intensity 
and success of its own wartime mobilization and contributions to the collective Allied 
victory granted the United States a powerful voice and assumed moral authority with 
which it attempted to shape postwar development and technical assistance priorities. The 
United Nations and its specialized agencies would become important nodes for the 




projects (including the Andean Indian Program) can be detected in some of the wartime 
programs initiated by the United States government.5   
In a calibrated campaign to mobilize resources and defeat its enemies, the U.S. 
government deployed soldier and civilian experts to supervise reconstruction in occupied 
territories and to assist its allies. It was as an American soldier, for example, that future 
ILO Director-General David Morse first confronted the problem of social and economic 
development, a subject that would garner unprecedented attention from the ILO during 
his tenure. As an Army Captain stationed in the European theater, Morse was one of the 
first experts on the ground charged with the task of reconstituting Italian labor unions 
after the collapse of Mussolini’s fascist regime. Similarly, to support and gain the 
cooperation of its Latin America neighbors, the United States government provided 
military support and organized technical assistance projects up and down the South 
American continent. Conducted primarily under the auspices of the Office of the 
Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), these early “development” projects 
accompanied an extensive propaganda campaign that sought to secure the Western 
Hemisphere against Nazi Fifth Column activities, ensure access to valuable war resources 
5 It is perhaps ironic that the best known (and certainly one of the most thoroughly 
researched) examples of postwar aid and assistance is the European Recovery Plan 
(ERP), launched by the United States government in 1947 to help rebuild the economies 
of Western Europe. Although historians still debate the economic and symbolic 
significance of the ERP or “Marshall Plan” for rebuilding Western Europe, there is no 
disputing the fact that, by the 1950s, supporters of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid 
and technical assistance in the United States faced increasingly staunch opposition from 
Congress and the American public against such programs. The enactment of multiple 
“Marshall Plans,” for different regions of the world did not materialize. The ERP’s 
importance as a symbol of a new postwar order is more certain, especially its 
demonstration of the ways in which international aid and technical assistance would 
become another critical front in the Cold War. Still, the efforts to plan for and manage the 
postwar reconstruction discussed in this chapter provide a more detailed picture of what 
technical assistance during the Cold War would actually look like. 
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such as rubber and tin, as well as continue the reset of U.S.-Latin American relations 
begun under the Good Neighbor diplomacy of the 1930s.6  Indeed, it was as a Special 
Advisor to OCIAA Director Nelson Rockefeller that the first Regional Director of the 
ILO’s Andean Indian Program, Enrique Sanchez de Lozada first argued for a new 
approach to economic development in Latin American by the United States and the rest 
of the international community. For Morse, de Lozada, and other contributors to the 
ILO’s expanded field operations, the war focused personal and collective energies in new 
directions, introduced an anti-totalitarian rhetoric and moral perspective that continued to 
be useful when fighting ceased, and provided stark evidence of the need for an 
unprecedented expansion of international technical assistance. The example offered by 
the experience of these men suggests the important ways in which the war channeled 
reformist energies in new ways and in new directions and is critical to understanding the 
ultimate goals and aspirations of the both the ILO and the Andean Indian Program. 
6 American intervention in Latin America encompasses a long and frequently tragic 
history dating back to the 19th century.  Nevertheless, the advent of the Good Neighbor 
Policy and the exigencies of the Second World War marked a new chapter, characterized 
by a temporary move away from the direct military interventions of the past in favor of a 
new multilateral approach.  The various Pan-American conferences that occurred during 
the 1930s and a new willingness on the part of the U.S. government to become directly 
involved in economic development through such agencies as the Export-Import Bank, 
which provided the initial capital outlays for Brazil’s Volta Redonda steel mill project 
and other endeavors, signaled this change. Enrique de Lozada captured this notion of a 
new Pan-Americanism supported by the Good Neighbor Policy, as having “injected the 
human element into the policies the United States.” Enrique de Lozada, “On World 
Regionalism,” 1942, Folder 52, Box 6, CIAA Sub-Series, Washington File Series, 
Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, 
Sleepy Hollow, New York. 
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History as Biography: Origins of the ITC 
From 1948 until 1970, David A. Morse served as the ILO’s Director-General and 
guided it into a new era of its history. During that time, Morse oversaw the 
implementation of a new manpower utilization and migration program in the late 1940s, 
the tumultuous reentry of the Soviet Union into the ILO in 1954, the opening of the 
organization’s Turin industrial training center in 1964, and the launching of the 
organization’s World Employment Program in 1969. Despite the challenges that 
surrounded each of these initiatives, all of which occurred in the shadow of the Cold War, 
Morse was reelected to the Director-Generalship six consecutive times. He capped an 
already full career by accepting the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the ILO and its 
international staff, as the ILO celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1969. In his acceptance 
speech to the Nobel Committee, Morse acknowledged that in the wake of World War II 
the ILO had encountered many “significant new challenges.” Chief among them was the 
necessity of paring “rapid economic and social development with a system of distribution 
. . . [that would] result in improvement of the standard of living of all the people in the 
countries concerned, and particularly the most disadvantaged.” According to Morse, this 
objective was “what the development effort [was] all about.”7 By any standard, when his 
final term as the ILO’s Director-General expired the following year, Morse left the 
organization with an impressive list of accomplishments.  
It is safe to say that no other figure did more to reshape the ILO during the Cold 
War than David Morse. Indeed, his Nobel speech addressed an important, but often 
7 David Morse, "International Labour Organization - Nobel Lecture: ILO and the Social 
Infrastructure of Peace,” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/ 
1969/labour-lecture.html (accessed 21 November 2013). See also “Nobel Lecture,” 11 
December 1969, Z 5/8/2, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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neglected aspect of his tenure at the ILO: the ways in which he sought to merge the 
organization’s burgeoning postwar technical assistance programs with its broader mission 
of social justice. Beginning in the late 1940s, Morse had called for the ILO to expand its 
field operations into new areas around the globe and to become an active contributor to 
postwar discourses of social and economic development. His public championing of what 
he called “the gospel of production” provided strong encouragement and justification for 
the ILO’s experiments in rural and community development, particularly the Andean 
Indian Program. Yet, his embrace of a pro-production, pro-consumption, pro-
development agenda did not occur all at once. Over a period of many years and through 
the accretion of his experiences first as an official of the United States government and 
then as an officer in the U.S. military, Morse came to embrace what was then a still 
emerging international consensus about the relationship between social and economic 
development and international peace and stability. His wartime experiences in particular 
emphasized the need for a more robust American presence on the international stage. 
Morse attended Columbia University, successfully completed his degree, and 
matriculated at Harvard Law School, from which he graduated in 1932. At Harvard, he 
was a student and protégé of Felix Frankfurter, the law school professor and future 
Supreme Court Justice who guided many of his students to Washington, D.C. and Wall 
Street. After graduation, Morse clerked briefly at a private New Jersey law firm before he 
was recruited in 1933 to work at the Interior Department, first on the staff of the 
department’s solicitor and then as a Special Assistant to the United States Attorney 




Recovery Act.8 Things began to happen quickly after his move to Washington. As Morse 
recalled some years later, the Interior Department job opened up a “whole new world . . . 
of important people.” It was there, for example, that he first encountered some of the 
most influential persons atop the U.S. labor movement, including United Mine Workers 
president John Lewis and the leader of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, 
Sidney Hillman.9 Both Lewis and Hillman were instrumental in harnessing the grassroots 
energy of U.S. industrial workers to form of the Congress of Industrial Occupations or 
CIO. Morse was an eager and energetic addition to the legal staff of the Interior 
Department. After he took it upon himself to answer hundreds of letters from workers 
who had lost their jobs, he attracted the attention of the Secretary of the Interior, Harold 
Ickes.10 Ickes was then staffing the newly created Petroleum Labor Policy Board (PLPB).  
Although Morse confessed not to “know the difference between a collective agreement 
and a sack of potatoes,” he became Ickes’s choice to serve as General Counsel to the 
PLPB.11 
At the PLPB, Morse gained valuable first-hand experience mediating labor 
disputes, negotiating collective bargaining agreements, and enforcing the labor provisions 
of the National Recovery Act. William Leiserson, a Professor from Antioch College in 
Yellow Springs, Ohio, was selected to become the chairman of the PLPB. The first case 
Leiserson assigned to Morse involved the Champlin Oil Refining Company in Enid, 
8 Katie Louchheim, et al (eds), The Making of the New Deal: The Insiders Speak 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 89. 
9 Ibid., 93-94. 




                                                 
 
Oklahoma.12 The company refused to negotiate with the workers’ union representatives 
and the refinery’s workers went on strike. As Morse later remembered the case, “[i]n the 
Enid strike, there was a question of hours and wages, but . . . [t]he real issue at that time 
was recognition of the [Oil Field, Gas Well, and Refinery Workers’] Union as the 
representative of the workers in the refinery.”13 Morse met with representatives from the 
company and the union for weeks, but confessed to feeling out of his depth and frustrated 
by the lack of progress. Overcoming the feeling that he was “getting no place fast” and 
with his boss’s encouragement to stay the course, he eventually mediated a compromise 
between the two parties.14  
The agreement brokered by Morse between the union and the oil company created 
a closed shop at the Champlin refinery, brought an end to the strike, and helped establish 
his reputation as a skilled and resourceful negotiator.15 Even more importantly, the Enid 
case brought Morse to the attention of officials charged with implementing the provisions 
of the recently passed Wagner Act, especially his former law school professor Calvert 
Magruder. On leave from teaching duties at Harvard, Magruder served a brief tenure as 
the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) General Counsel, responsible for heading 
up the Legal Division. The NLRB was created in 1933 to go after violators of Section 7 
(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which guaranteed employees’ right to 
organize and bargain collectively. With the passage of the National Labor Relations Act 
12 Ibid., 91. 
13 Ibid. See also U.S. Petroleum Labor Policy Board, Decisions of the Petroleum Labor 
Policy Board . . . (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offices, 1935), 69. 




                                                 
 
(or Wagner Act) two years later, the NLRB moved to the center of New Deal industrial 
relations policy. In 1936, Morse became a Regional Attorney for the NLRB. 
After the Second World War, the NLRB would come to represent the triumph of 
the philosophy of “industrial pluralism,” championed most notably by the labor 
economist John R. Commons. Commons famously denied that relations between capital 
and labor necessarily entail an irrevocable class struggle, as in both Marxism and 
classical orthodox economics. Besides Commons’ efforts to do so himself, many of his 
students carried on his legacy as an economist, labor historian, and social reformer. 
Driving the narrative of Commons’ protégé Selig Perlman’s A History of Trade Unionism 
in the United States, for example, was his perception that American labor lacked the kind 
of radical, socialist inspired working class movements found in Europe.16 For Perlman, 
one had only to look at the history of American labor relations to see the truth of 
Commons’ argument. When combined with other indigenous factors (such as a 
decentralized form of government, ethnic and religious differences, and the prominence 
of liberal ideology) the nature of the capitalist marketplace produced an American 
working class devoid of class-consciousness, rich in job consciousness, and consumed 
with the bread and butter economic issues. Perlman’s work made him an important 
defender of industrial pluralism, and left a deep impression on the analysis of American 
labor relations that lasted for decades.  
Instead of an inevitable struggle between workers and their employers, the 
industrial pluralist school championed by Commons and Perlman insisted that capital and 
labor could resolve their differences orderly and peaceably. Commons and his followers 
16 Selig Perlman, A History of Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1922), 276. 
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emphasized the capacity of business and labor to settle their differences through 
negotiated settlements, otherwise known as collective bargaining. Indeed, because they 
remained suspicious of too much government interference, the industrial pluralist school 
defined the most important job of the NLRB as the creation of formal spaces and 
procedures for mediating and arbitrating disputes between workers and their employers. 
Through collective bargaining agreements, the supporters of industrial pluralism argued, 
the representatives of labor and capital could resolve their differences without violence or 
costly strikes–although critics point out that the emphasis on collective bargaining as the 
sole or primary means of resolving industrial labor disputes inevitably locked labor 
unions into a narrow field of action, while promoting industrial harmony at the cost of 
workers’ rights. Although his experiences during the Second World War would 
ultimately lead David Morse to outgrow industrial pluralism’s limited views on the role 
of government, it was important to Morse’s early development as a prosecutor and labor 
relations expert and would continue to inform his views about business and labor 
relations into the future.  
As of 1936, the NLRB was still a young, largely untested legal enforcement 
mechanism. Fresh off the Roosevelt administration’s confrontation with the Supreme 
Court over the legality of the National Recovery Act and the ensuing court packing 
scandal, the high court’s ruling on the NLRB’s constitutionality hung in the balance. 
Congress had granted powers to the NLRB that extended well beyond the promotion of 
collective bargaining, but the devil was in the details of the Wagner Act’s enforcement. 
Most importantly, although the law gave the Board authority to prosecute employers for 




after violators. Given the untested potential of the Wagner Act and the Board itself, 
interpretation of the law’s key enforcement provisions had significant consequences for 
big business and labor unions. Following a pragmatic middle path, throughout the late 
1930s the board’s administrators would construe the Wagner Act in terms that were more 
or less advantageous to the unions, but which stressed the ideal of cooperation.17  
During his tenure at the NLRB, Morse found the Board’s emphasis on bolstering 
business-labor cooperation with aggressive government regulation well suited to his own 
emerging pragmatic, progressive style. In his public attempts to defend the Board he 
spoke strongly of the need for workers and employers to continue to talk to each other, 
but defined the NLRB role assertively. In a 1938 speech he noted that, although NLRB 
policy sought first to encourage constructive dialogue between workers and their 
employers, the Board had a larger mandate before it. 18  “When it is not a question of 
misunderstandings which can be straightened out, nor hasty judgments which can be 
corrected by friendly counsel, but rather, deliberate, systematic, and ruthless disregard of 
the law by attempts to discourage [the] organization of labor,” Morse concluded that the 
NLRB had the authority and will to act. He insisted that, “the Board unquestionably will 
and must pursue the method most calculated to end such tactics with all the firmness at its 
command.”19 This usually meant at least the threat of prosecution. 
17 Gary Gerstle, Working Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 
1914-1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 311. 
18 See for example David Morse, “Speech, Unity Club, 1938,” Folder 2, Box 86, David 
A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, 
New Jersey. 
19 David Morse, “The Function of Government Agencies in Labor Disputes [statement 
before the Practicing Law Institute of New York],” March 1936, Folder 4, Box 81, David 




                                                 
 
Besides helping the new regional administrator, his friend Eleanor Herrick, 
establish the New York office of the NLRB, Morse worked to find a model case to test 
the Board’s constitutionality and publicly defended it against accusations that it was “un-
American.” Although compromise between labor and business would always be 
preferred, he understood the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act to be that of 
“correct[ing] great wrongs and grave injustices.” New laws created at both the state and 
federal level would, Morse conjectured, “democratize industry and give to workers 
opportunities for living which they have hoped for but never before realized.”20 Like 
many defenders of the Administration’s policies at the time, Morse’s argument in favor 
of strong coordinated government action rested not simply on a preference for union over 
business interests but upon an expanded definition of the public interest. Because the 
labor movement “still has a long way to go to provide for the industrial workers even a 
minimum of security and decency,” the inadequacy of the current level of protection 
provided to workers “stands as a challenge to the leadership of both industry and labor 
and effects the public interest in such a way that the hand of government [across 
different] agencies … must be clasped.”21 With the state as an honest broker, Morse 
conjectured, there was no reason why business and labor could not find common ground 
that promoted not only their own collective interests, but also those of society as a whole. 
At the NLRB, Morse worked on the celebrated Associated Press cases, which 
concluded with the Supreme Court upholding the federal government’s power to regulate 




                                                 
 
industrial relations via the Constitution’s interstate commerce clause.22 As the politically 
and constitutionally important AP cases illustrated, during Morse’s tenure at the Board, 
the defense of workers’ right to organize often went hand in hand with defending the 
NLRB from critics of the New Deal. In 1937, Morse left the National Labor Relations 
Board and government service for private law practice in his home state of New Jersey. 
In the years that followed his departure, the landscape of New Deal labor law and the 
function of the NLRB changed quickly. If, under the New Deal, the government sought 
to enforce a level playing field between capital and labor, then during and after World 
War II, orderly industrial relations, high productivity, and economic stability often 
superseded the goal of social justice. Increasingly, the Board and its wartime 
manifestation as the National War Labor Board (NWLB) emphasized collective 
bargaining less as a means of promoting industrial democracy and more as a tool for 
avoiding costly work stoppages and strikes. It is not clear what Morse thought about the 
direction the NLRB took in subsequent decades, but, given his own record, there is 
reason to suppose that he shared the view that future progress in the economic and social 
realms rested on greater cooperation between workers and business management.  
If the New Deal provided Morse with the credentials of an experienced negotiator 
and labor law expert, it was World War II that educated Morse about the international 
scope of issues he had previously confronted only as domestic labor problems. Like many 
of his fellow citizens, after Pearl Harbor he volunteered for and served in the United 
States military. He was stationed in Europe, appointed Chief of the Labor Division of the 
22 The key court decision was in Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 
U.S. 103 (1937). David A. Morse, interview by James R. Fuchs, July 25, 1977, transcript, 
Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO. 
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Allied Military Government, and made responsible for establishing labor policy in the 
occupied territories of Italy and Germany. The official American presence in postwar 
Europe, including both the military government and the civilian officials later installed 
under the Marshall Plan, reflected a diverse assortment of representatives from American 
labor unions, business, and government.23 In addition to Morse, much of the staff of the 
U.S. Office of Military Government’s Labor Division in particular was drawn from the 
American labor movement and various New Deal agencies.  The first Labor Relations 
director, Mortimer Wolf, was, like Morse, a former attorney for the NLRB. As director 
he supported organizing German workers at the grassroots level. A former Chicago 
electrician, Joe Keenan was an advisor on labor affairs to the U.S. military governor, 
General Lucius Clay. Keenan had worked his way up the union hierarchy to become an 
assistant to the American labor leader Sidney Hillman and then served as an official at 
the War Production Board, where Clay had singled him out.  Joseph Gould came from 
the CIO office workers union, Edward Fruchtman had worked in the Wages and Hours 
Administration, George Wheeler was with the NLRB and the United Federal Workers 
(CIO), Clarence Bolds was a member of the UAW, and Franz Loreiaux represented the 
Oil Workers International. Other officials with union ties included Henry Rutz (AFL), 
23 So much so, that historian Michael Hogan has concluded that the ERP should be 
viewed as an “international projection of the corporative political economy that had 
evolved in the United States” in the 1920s and 1930s. In other words, U.S. policy sought 
to remake Europe in the image of the United States, stressing multilateral trade, free 
markets, and Keynesian fiscal and monetary management. Michael Hogan, The Marshall 
Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), xii. 
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Newman Jeffery (CIO), Andrew Joseph Dunn (AFL), Paul Porter (AFL and CIO), Harold 
Francis Mullaney (AFL), and Murray Gross (AFL).24 
If Morse (and others) brought their own experiences to bear on the problems that 
confronted European labor at the end of the war, his exposure to the European context 
also marked him in important ways. His military service forced him to confront firsthand 
the challenges to social and economic development that existed in societies devastated by 
years of war, misrule, and fascist tyranny. It was in Italy that the question of 
reconstruction and “development” first arose for Morse. Concerning the important issue 
of what to do about the lingering influence of fascist institutions, Morse came down 
firmly on the side of “wip[ing] the slate clean” of fascist syndicalism.25 On at least one 
occasion, this approach brought him into conflict with military superiors who believed 
that retaining the syndicalist framework would accelerate the process of reconstruction.26 
Along with an independent union movement, Morse urged the cultivation of American 
style collective bargaining, both of which were anathema to the authoritarianism of the 
existing Italian labor system.  
24 American officials generally agreed on the need to include German laborers in the 
process of reconstruction, though they disagreed over the best means of rebuilding trade 
unionism in postwar Germany.  As historian Carolyn Eisenberg argues, OMGUS’s Labor 
Division consisted of two principle factions: radicals favoring a “bottom-up” approach 
and more conservative elements supportive of a “top-down” approach to rebuilding the 
German labor movement.  Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision 
to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
153.  See also, Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New 
York, NY: Random House, 1966) and John P. Windmuller, American Labor and the 
International Labor Movement, 1940-1953 (Ithaca, NY: Institute of International 
Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1954). 
25 David A. Morse, Journal, 1943-1945, Folder 6, Box 67, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley 




                                                 
 
As he surveyed circumstances on the ground, Morse noted that the promotion of 
free and independent labor unions would require outside aid and assistance, perhaps for 
some time into the future. He advocated “leaving the door open for self organization 
along the lines desired by the people,” yet he insisted that, “[i]t [was] not enough to say 
to a people, ‘You now have the right to organize,’ and then leave them to flounder with a 
principle which can well become meaningless.”27 Identifying the need for a worker 
exchange and technical assistance program to provide the necessary expertise, Morse 
doubted Italian labor’s capacity to succeed on its own. The answer to the 
“underdevelopment” of Italian labor relations, he concluded, was “aid by those 
experienced with life under such democratic principles.” Not surprisingly, he believed 
“this experience should be drawn from the United States and the United Kingdom.”28 As 
we shall see, Morse’s take on the Italian labor situation foreshadowed the approach that 
the ILO would adopt to expand its own technical assistance and community development 
programs in the 1950s, deploying teams of experts to fill the knowledge gap and promote 
a model for future development. 
When Morse returned home after the war, to accept a senior post with the 
Department of Labor, he arrived with a new appreciation for labor’s importance as an 
international issue, as well as a renewed sense of American exceptionalism.29 Amidst 
27 David A. Morse, Journal, 1943-1945, Folder 6, Box 67, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley 
G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. 
28 David A. Morse, “Some Comments on Labor Relations in Italy from 26 Nov. 43 to 
date,” Morse to Director, Labor Sub-Commission, ACC, March 1, 1944, Folder 1, Box 
68, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
29 In the Labor Department, Morse continued to engage in work that required his 
attention to international conditions, serving as Deputy Chairman of the International 
Social Policy Committee and head of the newly created Bureau of International Labor 
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worries of another postwar recession like the one that followed the First World War, the 
impact of strikes and work stoppages on productivity and employment were a chief 
concern among many policy makers in the United States. Morse was no exception. Like 
the industrial conflicts that confronted Morse as a young NLRB lawyer, the feud between 
America’s two largest unions, the AFL and CIO, threatened to stand in the way of steady 
economic growth after the war. Thus, after joining the Labor Department as an Assistant 
Secretary, he created a Trade Union Advisory Committee, which met “regularly to 
discuss problems together with the CIO and the AF of L.”30 The committee served as a 
venue for working out differences between the two powerful unions and for selling U.S. 
policies such as the Marshall Plan to their leaders.31 But Morse also believed that more 
was required. From his vantage point on the frontlines of the European reconstruction 
effort, he had concluded that “it would be necessary and helpful, really vital, for the 
United States to have someone in the U.S. Government authorized to be responsible for 
monitoring the labor developments in Europe and elsewhere in the world and if possible 
to influence those developments.”32 He was among the first officials to recognize that 
labor relations had important social and political implications for “the development of 
democracy” around the globe.33 He noted that, “[b]ecause the economies of the various 
countries of the world are becoming increasingly more integrated and interdependent and 
Affairs. By the time he left the Department of Labor for the ILO in 1948, he had also 
served as Assistant Secretary of Labor, Under Secretary of Labor, and a brief stint as 
Acting Secretary. 
30 David A. Morse, interview by James R. Fuchs, July 25, 1977, transcript, Harry S. 
Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO. 
31 Ibid. At a secret meeting of the committee attended by then Secretary of State Dean 






                                                                                                                                                 
 
because of closer communication between nations, foreign policy is today also a matter 
of economic and social policy.”34 The age of “development” had arrived.  
Morse was in contact with other U.S. government officials who shared his 
concerns and his ideas. Walter H. C. Laves, for example, was an Administrative 
Consultant on International Affairs with the Bureau of the Budget until 1947, when he 
left for a post with UNESCO. Laves was an outspoken proponent of expanding U.S. 
foreign relations into the economic and social realms.35 In their correspondence, Morse 
and Laves revealed themselves as kindred spirits: both men supported the doctrine, as 
Laves described it, which “recognizes that the State Department does not hold a 
monopoly of interest in the field of foreign policy.”36 With the emergence of the National 
Security State, described by historians such as Michael Hogan, statements like Laves’s 
would indeed rise to the level of an official heresy in a few short years. But for Laves 
and, I would argue for Morse as well, it was simply a statement of practical reality, a 
description of the new world emerging from the ashes of the old. It was perhaps no 
coincidence that both Morse and Laves gravitated toward the international orbit of the 
United Nations. Morse’s discussions with Walter Laves and other officials represent a 
serious, if ultimately unsuccessful, effort to recast the labor question as a critical facet of 
U.S. national security interest. More directly, they led to Morse’s appointment as the first 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs.  
34 David A. Morse, “Labor and American Foreign Policy,” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, October 1947, Folder 3, Box 87, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. 
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.  
35 Ibid. 
36 “Organizing the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Relations,” (Based on 
Memorandum from the Director to the President, January 1, 1945), Folder 3, Box 87, 
David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
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Morse’s embrace of internationalism over unilateralism was characteristic of a 
generation of American public servants, nurtured by the experimental pragmatism of 
New Deal liberalism and the bitter fruit of failed international cooperation and economic 
autarchy in the 1930s. Yet, as suggested in the introduction, his commitment to 
internationalism did not free Morse from the exceptionalist’s faith in America’s special 
mission. “It must be,” he suggested to an audience of utility workers in 1947, “that God 
has willed that [the American] formula shall be the eventual formula for the world at 
large – at the time when we on earth shall have finally recognized His will.”37 Although 
he invoked a less teleological tone, while speaking to the Commonwealth Club of San 
Francisco in 1948 his message was much the same. On the cusp of his election as the 
ILO’s new Director-General, he warned that the outcome of World War II and the 
“outstanding position of the American economy, of American industry and of American 
labor” had brought the United States “to a place where we must assume a role of 
leadership.”38 The need for American assertiveness on the international field was, Morse 
said, not just a factor of the country’s military might or economic preeminence.  The 
“fundamental basis of American prestige abroad,” he concluded, “is moral in 
character.”39   
It was in answer to the problem of how the United States could best use its 
supposed mantel of moral leadership that Morse located the importance of coordinated 
37 David A. Morse, “Address before the Utility Workers Union of America, CIO” by 
Under Secretary of Labor David A. Morse, (Buffalo, New York, October 24, 1947), 371-
381, Folder 5, Box 81, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, 
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.   
38 David A. Morse, “The United States and World Labor,” U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Standards, (June 25, 1948), 1. 
39 Ibid, 4. 
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international action, through organizations such as the United Nations or the ILO. He 
noted that, “good international relations are founded on accomplishments at home,” but 
feared complacency or an American retreat into isolationism.40 Drawing on his 
experiences during the war, he felt that the means by which the United States could best 
fulfill its long list of postwar obligations was the diffusion of American technical 
knowledge: “the techniques and ‘know-how’ of industrial hygiene, industrial safety, 
industrial efficiency and management—the shortcuts and savings we have contrived in 
the fields of distribution and of transportation; the programs we have devised for 
vocational guidance and the training and retraining of persons within industry; the 
economic and scientific research which is going forward daily in our factories, our 
universities and public laboratories.”41 At the same time, via its membership in the ILO, 
the U.S. was already “a part of the economic and social machinery for world 
collaboration in the development of labor standards and the promotion of justice.”42 
Armed with this vision of a postwar order in which the spread of technology and “know-
how” was essential to the achievement of peace, stability, and social justice, he viewed 
the ILO as an important mechanism for the transmission of a progressive American 
influence “throughout the world.”43  
As suggested above, the collapse of the international economy during the 1930s 
was linked in importance, for Morse, as for many of his generation, to the failures of 
international cooperation that had contributed to the Second World War. The frosting of 
relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, no doubt, altered the way in which 
40 Ibid, 6. 
41 Ibid, 8. 
42 Ibid, 10. 
43 Ibid, 8. 
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Morse talked and perhaps thought about the United State’s international commitments. 
With the dire consequences of another, potentially greater conflagration in mind—this 
time between the supporters of western-style democracy and Soviet communism—Morse 
set about nurturing the ILO’s capacities as a promoter of international social and 
economic “development.” As Morse himself put it, “[t]he world-wide depression of the 
[19]30s assisted in the rise of fascism,” but “[a]nother depression would assist in the rise 
of communism.”44 Echoing the conclusions of economists and sociologists then and now, 
Morse noted that “[p]overty has been a fertile breeding ground for both fascism and 
communism,” and that the greatest contribution the ILO could make was “in the removal 
of those conditions which lead to war.”45 As a member of what I have described earlier in 
this chapter as the International Technocracy, Morse conceived the ILO as an entity that 
could, through its global membership and tripartite structure, assist in the repair of 
international relations and promote the improved living and working conditions of all. 
Indeed, it was the belief in the capacity of technical expertise over traditional diplomacy 
to remake the world that makes Morse an illustrative case for demonstrating the 
underlying characteristics that motivated the ITC. Morse’s elevation to the position of 
Director-General of the ILO provided a unique platform for action; to test the ideas that 
he had developed during the war, to promote more vigorous international coordination, 
and to spread the “gospel of production.” Once elected, he focused on acquiring the tools 
that the ILO would need to accomplish this new mission. 
44 David Morse, “America’s Stake in the International Labor Organization [Statement 
before Industrial Relations Conference, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., New York 
City, March 11, 1948],” Folder 5, Box 81, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd 
Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. 
45 Ibid.  
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As the ILO’s Director-General, David Morse promoted and oversaw the 
implementation and expansion of the organization’s technical assistance programs, but he 
did not and could not act alone. Considered together, the career trajectories of several 
officials directly involved with the ILO’s administration of the Andean Indian Program 
further illustrate how World War II helped forge an identity and a purpose for the 
International Technocracy. The Belgian born Jef Rens, for one, served as the ILO’s 
Deputy Director in charge of operations throughout much of Morse’s tenure. He came to 
the ILO through his participation in the Belgian labor movement and began his career 
working in the Belgian automobile and diamond industries. Unlike Morse, Rens did not 
serve in the military during World War II. However, as an advisor to the Belgian 
government in exile he became a valuable operative and information source for agents of 
the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor agency to the CIA. 
Throughout the 1930s Rens worked for the Belgium Broadcasting System and 
then as the editor of the Belgian General Confederation of Labor or CGTB newspaper. 
The economic turmoil of that period, together with the rise of fascism across Europe, left 
an indelible impression on Rens. As a doctoral student, he was particularly concerned 
with the conditions that had allowed fascism to flourish and contributed to the 
disintegration of international cooperation. He wrote his thesis on “The Social 
Foundations of National Socialism in Germany.” It is safe to say that during these years 
Rens developed a deep, abiding interest in the social and economic problems that 
confronted international capitalism between the two World Wars. It was this interest that 
made the ILO a logical, if not inevitable, next stop for Rens. In 1938, Rens was elected 




advisor. He worked under three different administrations of the Belgium government, 
including (as mentioned above) during the war as an advisor to the Prime Minister of the 
Belgian government in exile and as General Secretary of the Belgium Planning 
Committee on Post-war Problems, a position he resigned to become an ILO Assistant 
Director. In 1941, Rens attended the ILO’s annual conference as a workers’ delegate and 
was elected a member of the Governing Body of the ILO three years later.46  
It was early in the fall of 1942 that Arthur Goldburg, George Pratt, and other 
agents of the American OSS stationed in London sought Rens’ assistance. Pratt and 
Goldburg were part of a team of officers assigned to gather intelligence in preparation for 
a long anticipated land invasion of the continent. As Pratt explained in a letter to Rens 
dated June 1943, reliable information on Belgian trade unionist living in London and 
Belgium was necessary, “in order to have available an organization which will enable an 
army occupation to possess accurate information for the prevention of sabotage, the 
detection of spies and saboteurs, and the re-constitution of civilian authority and 
organization in the shortest possible time.”47 As far as he was concerned, Pratt explained, 
the trade unionists were “our natural allies,” but he needed specific information “to sell 
the idea to the military forces.”48 Rens eagerly responded to these requests for assistance 
by providing information about the Belgian resistance and an index of individuals from 
the Belgium trade union movement who might prove useful for Pratt’s plans. Rens’ index 
46Appendix of “Questions Concerning the Organisation and Structure of the Office,” Jef 
Rens, Dossier de l’Office du Personnel, International Labor Organization Archive, 
Geneva, Switzerland. The ILO’s Geneva Archives are cited hereafter as ILOA. 
47 George C. Pratt to Jef Rens, 22 June 1943, Box 32, Entry 115, London Field Station 
Files, RG 226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services, National Archives and 




                                                 
 
included a description of the trade unionists’ technical abilities and expertise, current 
location, and an evaluation of their reliability or loyalty to the Allied cause.  
Besides an obvious desire to see Belgium and the rest of Europe freed from the 
Nazi yoke, Rens’ work for the Belgian government and the OSS powerfully 
demonstrated that the conditions necessary for a vibrant trade unionism were fragile and 
did not exist everywhere. To simulate those conditions on a global scale would require 
not just the defeat of National Socialism, but also a herculean effort of social and 
economic organization on an unprecedented scale. For Rens, the ILO might have seemed 
a natural outlet for such a project. In any case, it was in 1944 that he received an 
appointment as one of the organization’s Assistant Directors, a position in which he 
remained until 1951. In that year, he was promoted to Deputy-Director General, second 
in command at the ILO under David Morse. Along with the Director-General himself, Jef 
Rens became a driving force behind the postwar expansion of the ILO’s field operations, 
and especially the establishment of the Andean Indian Program.  
Summarizing the intent of the ILO’s Andean mission, Rens concluded that, “the 
Andean program amounts to a gigantic campaign of education and enlightenment among 
the Indian population designed to point the way to a better life.”49 For Rens, in practice 
this meant building a new class of workers that would contribute to economic growth, 
through both their increased productivity and rising levels of consumption. “The Indian 
population,” he wrote, “formed a reserve of manpower which would prove indispensable 




                                                 
 
in the economic development of the country.”50 In a somewhat different vein, he 
instructed the AIP’s Regional Director that, “[t]he important thing is to create a class of 
farmers having sufficient land so as to be able to live under conditions of ease.” By 
providing land to farmers instructed in the techniques of modern agricultural production, 
he concluded that the governments of the Andean countries would not only be 
performing “a great service to the economy of [their] countr[ies], but will also ensure a 
new policy for the future.”51 In short, Rens pressed for the implementation of policies 
that emphasized the participation of indigenous peoples as both producers and consumers 
of the region’s prospective wealth, with the promise of future benefits to national, 
regional, international economies.52 In doing so, it does not require too much imagination 
to suggest that Rens’s own trade unionist background––including his experience as a 
government advisor and informant during the recent war––played no small part in his 
diagnosis. Rens’s analysis of National Socialism seemed to demonstrate free labor as an 
essential ingredient of a peaceful international order. 
 The experience of Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, the AIP’s first Regional Director, is 
50 “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes, Andean Indian Project (Spring 1958),” Z 1/1/1/16 (J. 6), 
ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
51 Jef Rens to Enrique de Lozada, 25 February 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J. 3), ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
52 The AIP’s rhetorical emphasis on building-up the middle-class anticipated some of 
thinking that informed the U.S. sponsored Alliance for Progress. In 1961, Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. (a special assistant to U.S. President John F. Kennedy) urged that U.S. 
policy be directed toward “carry[ing] the new urban middle class into power and produce, 
along with it, such necessities of modern technical society as constitutional government, 
honest public administration, a responsible party system, a rational land system, an 
efficient system of taxation, mass education, social mobility, etc.” Arthur Schlesinger, 
“Report to the President on Latin American Mission February 12-March 3, 1961,” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. 
John P. Glennon, Edward C. Keefer, and Louis J. Smith (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1996), 11.  
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also illustrative of how the war helped create networks of expertise that provided a niche 
for and stimulated the growth of the International Technocracy. De Lozada was a 
Bolivian diplomat who fled the country for exile in the United States in the 1930s. He 
had served as a member of the Bolivian Diplomatic Corps in London from 1923 to 1926 
and then returned to Bolivia to serve as a professor of international law at the University 
of La Paz. From 1931 to 1936, de Lozada served as secretary of the Bolivian legation to 
Washington. As a prominent Bolivian ex-patriot, he became an outspoken proponent of 
the Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbor Policy and a close friend and associate of 
Nelson Rockefeller. A professor of international law who taught at the University of La 
Paz in his native Bolivia, as well as at Williams College and Harvard University in the 
United States, de Lozada became a Special Assistant to Rockefeller in 1941.53 As for 
Rockfeller himself, a scion of one of the world’s wealthiest families with his own 
personal political ambitions, his Republican credentials and his family’s business and 
philanthropic ties to Latin American made him a shrewd choice to fill the role of Director 
of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), a new agency created by U.S. 
President Roosevelt to strengthen relationship with the Latin American allies. De 
Lozada’s story, like that of Morse and Rens, suggests some of the ways in which World 
War II and the expansion of international institutions to which it contributed helped 
define the problem of “underdevelopment” and the disparate strategies adopted to address 
it. 
53 “Enrique Sanchez de Lozada,” 18 February 1965, Folder 64, Box 9, Countries File 
Series, Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives 
Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York. 
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When de Lozada joined Rockefeller’s staff at the OCIAA he was already a 
vocal advocate of a new approach to diplomacy on the part of the United States in 
Latin America, one that would help forge “the good will of the masses” and 
counteract Nazi efforts to infiltrate the region. Born into privilege and possessing 
all the advantages of education and social connection that it implied, he was 
convinced of the need for significant social and economic changes in his native 
Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America. In order to address long-standing class, 
ethnic, and racial conflicts, he predicted the growing influence of an incipient 
middle class in many Latin American countries that would wrest control from the 
ruling oligarchies. Essential to the recipe of reforms he proscribed were (public 
and private) investments from the United States in sanitation and public works, or 
“the kind of practical work you do in your own country,” as he told a U.S. 
audience in November 1940.54 As a means of gradually improving the level of 
common understanding that existed between the United States and its southern 
neighbors, he advocated an exchange program that prefigured the design of the 
U.S. Peace Corps created in the 1960s. Both of these measures were seen by 
Lozada as ways of “crystallizing” the identity of interest between the new middle 
class in Latin America and the United States.55 
 Lozada’s ideas paralleled the rhetoric of the Roosevelt administration’s Good 
54 Enrique de Lozada, Latin America: United Sates’ Achilles Heel (Chicago, IL: Lecture 
Reporting Service, 1940), 10.  
55 Enrique de Lozada, “Pan-Americanism at the Crossroads,” June 1942, Folder 52, Box 
6, CIAA Sub-Series, Washington File Series, Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family 
Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York. The document is a 




                                                 
 
Neighbor Policy, which he claimed “injected the human element into the policies of the 
United States” for the first time. During the war, he completed special reports for Nelson 
Rockefeller and the OCIAA on Pan-Americanism, rural education, and other subjects 
pertaining to Latin America. He also worked on training and literacy films contracted out 
by the OCIAA to Walt Disney Films. In his reports to and conversations with Nelson 
Rockefeller, Lozada advocated what he called “regional internationalism,” which he 
suggested could be achieved “by endeavoring to influence, through example, other 
sections of the world in the ways of peaceful international living” and “by actively 
eradicating totalitarian theories within the [Western] Hemisphere itself.” According to 
Lozada, regional internationalism was part of a “dynamic conception of the world of 
tomorrow...which will be universal in scope but which will tend to solve the problems of 
everyday life.”56 Indeed, it was the absence of a “regional unifying policy” that led 
Lozada to advocate changes in the way the U.S. State Department dealt with the region, 
and which looked to the OCIAA as a model.57  
 The OCIAA itself was created in 1939 by President Franklin Roosevelt as part of a 
U.S. government led effort to combat Nazi influence in South and Central America. It 
aimed to accomplish this goal through a variety of measures, including the application of 
diplomatic pressure directed by the State Department, a propaganda campaign operated 
through the OCIAA cultural information program, and the strategic commitment of 
56 Enrique de Lozada, “On World Regionalism,” 1942, Folder 52, Box 6, CIAA Sub-
Series, Washington File Series, Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, 
Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York.  
57 Eleanor F. Clark to Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, “Memorandum from Enrique de Lozada,” 
11 August 1945, Folder 53, Box 7, CIAA Sub-Series, Washington File Series, Record 
Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy 
Hollow, New York. 
 81 
 
                                                 
 
American financial and technical assistance. During the war, the OCIAA performed a 
number of functions in support of the Allied war effort, but was primarily an organ of 
U.S. government propaganda, which utilized press releases and radio broadcasts, as well 
as more substantive technical and financial aid projects. Toward the end of the war, the 
OCIAA’s focus shifted toward regional cooperation and collective security. For example, 
a special labor service feature printed by the OCIAA championed the benefits of labor-
management cooperation focused on raising production levels, which it claimed would 
produce a higher standard of living and full employment for all after the war. This 
perspective was hardly unique to the OCIAA. Indeed, it was consistent with an emerging 
international consensus, discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, which found 
expression in the work of economists, the actions of individual governments, and the 
arrangement of various international institutions.  
 Much like the American mobilization of weapons and war materials, the 
Administration’s Latin American campaign involved considerable public-private 
cooperation. Many Spanish language film and newsreel projects issued by the OCIAA, 
for example, were translations of educational and industrial films created by the likes of 
the TVA and the American Steel industry. Similarly, the OCIAA commissioned new 
films on subjects ranging from public sanitation to personal hygiene with the help of Walt 
Disney Studios.58  The OCIAA created the Inter-American Educational Foundation to 
facilitate cooperative education programs between North and South America, and the 
Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), which focused specifically on joint American 
58  
Edward O. Guerrant, Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy (Albuquerque, NM: The 
University of New Mexico Press, 1950),  124. 
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and Latin-American development projects.  The IIAA also elaborated on the activities of 
a pre-existing Inter-departmental Committee on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation with 
the American Republics, focusing its efforts initially on the development of health and 
sanitation services.   
American aid activities in Latin American during and after the war surely built 
upon the earlier efforts of private philanthropic entities as well, and especially the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yet despite 
such antecedents, the practice of providing technical assistance in the form of advisors 
from the public and private sectors intensified in the 1930s and 1940s.59  Such missions 
typically consisted of commissions of experts from the United States sent to observe 
conditions on the ground and provide (and sometimes implement) recommendations for 
reform.60  A number of agricultural and industrial development programs were 
implemented during this period, which established a fairly consistent pattern of action: 
the U.S. government and/or private U.S. firms supplied technical assistance and 
59 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural 
Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 202-228; David Green, The 
Containment of Latin America: A History of Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor 
Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971) 37-58; and Guerrant, Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor Policy, 128-134. 
60 In 1934, for example, at the request of Cuban President Carlos Mendieta, Raymond L. 
Buell led a committee sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association to provide a survey of 
possible economic, social, and political reforms.  The Commission on Cuban Affairs 
produced a 1934 report (Problems of the New Cuba), which drew on American 
approaches to similar problems.  Among the members of the commission were Frank W. 
Fetter, a finance specialist who also worked for the Export-Import Bank and served as a 
technical advisor to the Central Bank of Ecuador.  Although still employed by the federal 
government, Fetter and an undetermined number of other American officials and 
government experts were able to work as advisors to Latin American governments via 
Public Law 63, which authorized the American government to “lend” federal officials to 
South American governments. Fetter, Frank W. 1974. Interview with Richard D. 
McKinzie. transcript. Hanover, New Hampshire, July, 22. Truman Presidential Library 
and Museum. www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/fetterfw.htm, (accessed July12, 2013). 
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equipment, while the “Latin American nation would agree to furnish the land, buildings, 
labor, associate technicians, and funds for operation.”61 This relationship, later 
formalized via the IIAA’s “servicio system,” became an important foundation of future 
technical assistance operations managed by both the U.S. government and international 
institutions.  
 In some ways, observing the array of wartime activities that fell under the purview 
of the OCIAA is like looking into a crystal ball, as it reveals the future of international 
technical assistance. Many OCIAA programs reflected the same emphasis on “self-help” 
and the application of technical “know-how” as would the development programs 
conducted by the ILO and other international bodies during the Cold War. This was 
particularly true of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs, which began as a branch of 
the OCIAA focused on rural development and technical assistance projects, but which 
outlived the OCIAA itself to become an early pillar of the U.S. government’s foreign 
assistance program. Moreover, individuals who worked for the OCIAA went on to 
careers in the international civil service and/or worked for projects such as the Andean 
Indian Program. In this way, and despite its relatively short lived existence, the OCIAA 
also served as a training ground for the technocrats that constructed the postwar 
“development” programs of the ILO and other international organizations. Finally, the 
OCIAA and IIAA were early precursors to U.S. President Harry Truman’s announcement 
of the U.S. government’s Point Four program, as well as the United Nations own 
initiation of the Expanded Program for Technical Assistance or EPTA in 1949. 
61 Guerrant, Good Neighbor Policy, 132. Most of the agricultural missions were managed 
directly by the Department of Agriculture, and Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, and Cuba all completed agreements for agricultural technical 
assistance during this period. 
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 As suggested above, the OCIAA was a formative experiment proto-
developmentalism for individuals such as de Lozada and a foreshadowing of things to 
come. Indeed, of more lasting significance than any influence de Lozada may have had as 
an advisor and occasional speechwriter during the war, was the impression that Lozada’s 
service in the OCIAA left on him. De Lozada came to see the agency’s work as a 
prototype for how to bring less economically developed regions of the world into the 
international fold, to fight the spread of totalitarian ideologies and to promote global 
economic growth. In an August 1945 memo, for example, he wrote that all hope of 
influencing the masses and middle classes of the American republics “for constructive 
international purposes” must be abandoned “unless there is simultaneous action to uplift 
their present living conditions.”62 According to Lozada, the OCIAA was a “small but 
very significant” precedent for “this type of policy,” whether in the form of bilateral aid 
programs operated by the U.S. government or multilateral technical assistance projects 
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and other international 
bodies.63 
In the early 1950s, Lozada used the experience, skills, and contacts he acquired at 
the OCIAA to gain a position with the UN that led to his work on the ILO’s Andean 
Indian Program. With the help of several letters of introduction written by Nelson 
Rockefeller on his behalf, Lozada joined the staff of the United Nations Technical 
Assistance Program in 1951. The following year he was selected to serve on the survey 
62 Eleanor F. Clark to Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, “Memorandum from Enrique de Lozada,” 
11 August 1945, Folder 53, Box 7, CIAA Sub-Series, Washington File Series, Record 
Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy 




                                                 
 
mission, which examined the need for and outlined the basic framework of what became 
the Andean Indian Program. In 1954, Lozada became the first regional director of the 
AIP. Shortly after his appointment, he wrote that he believed the ILO had an interest in 
the issue of indigenous integration “from [a] purely technological point of view,” as well 
as a matter of “human relations.”64 Consistent with the new focus of the ILO on 
promoting economic growth, this meant that the success of the program would be 
measured by its contribution to steadily increasing productivity, especially improvements 
in agricultural yields. Increasing production (which could be quantified with relative 
ease) became a gauge of progress in the area of indigenous “integration” (which was 
much more difficult to translate into easily quantifiable terms). 
The Argentine economist David Efron, who would join the staff of the 
International Labor Organization in 1944, offers yet another example of the kind 
of networks upon which the International Technocracy relied. Efron had earned a 
doctorate at the National University of Buenos Aires, a Ph.D. in Social Science 
from Columbia University, and completed post-doctoral work at the Sorbonne 
and the College de France in Paris and the Friedrich Wilhelm Universistität in 
Berlin. When World War II began, he went to work promoting the Allied cause in 
Latin America as an author and analyst for the National Planning Association 
(NPA) and the OCIAA in Washington, D.C. To an astonishing degree, a book 
Efron co-authored for the NPA and published in 1945 provided a blueprint for the 
work the ILO would do after the war. The key to future peace and prosperity in 
Latin America, the book suggested, was the development of the region’s 




                                                 
 
productive capacity. “If employment grows from decade to decade, if production 
evinces a long-term trend to increase, and if new opportunities continue to be 
opened,” Efron and his co-authors concluded, “[then] other difficulties [will] 
become more manageable.”65 Economic productivity was the foundation, if not a 
prerequisite, of social transformation. The book also called upon international 
authorities to assist in creating the necessary administrative institutions to execute 
comprehensive national planning and noted that the ILO in particular would “gain 
effectiveness by being closely integrated with dynamic authorities which would 
provide the economic basis for advancing standards, instead of having to rely as 
in the past on purely legislative action in each country.”66 Throughout his career 
at the ILO, Efron worked in the office of the Workers’ Relations Service, the 
Conditions of Work Division, and the Rural and Indigenous Workers Division. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, together with David Morse and Jef Rens, Efron 
advocated for the ILO to take action on the subject of indigenous “integration” as 
vociferously as anyone.  He was also a key figure in the production of the ILO’s 
landmark 1952 study, Indigenous Peoples.67  
65 George Soule, David Efron, and Norman T. Ness, Latin America in the Future World 
(New York, NY: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1945), 297.  
66 Ibid, 328. Working for the NPA eventually brought Efron into contact with Nelson 
Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, for whom he 
completed two extended studies on Latin American resource development. During the 
war he contributed numerous pamphlets, articles, and speeches on the topics of Pan-
Americanism, Latin American democracy, and the fascist threat in South America. 
“Curriculum Vitae,” David Efron, Dossier de l’Office du Personnel, ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
67 See International Labor Office, Indigenous Peoples: Living and Working Conditions of 
Aboriginal Populations in Independent Countries (Geneva, Switzerland: International 
Labor Office, 1953). 
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The ITC and Postwar Liberalism 
The examples of David Morse, Jef Rens, Enrique de Lozada, and David Efron 
illustrate that there were many pathways into the International Technocracy. But the ITC 
represented more than just a complex of inter-governmental bodies, as the necessities of 
war and postwar reconstruction drew individuals with the right combination of expertise, 
political connections, and progressive instincts to the subject of “under-development.” 
From the late 1940s onward, the spectrum of projects that fell under the rubric of 
international “development” continued to grow and so too did the influence of non-
government organizations (NGOs) that sought to influence official policy at the UN, the 
ILO, and other inter-governmental bodies. Increasingly during the Cold War it was 
NGOs such as the Society for International Development (SID), which actively organized 
to solidify “development” as an engine of social change and a strategy for international 
economic growth.  
At its creation, SID was the brainchild of a small group of Americans who 
saw the need for a professional organization of those “employed or interested in 
the field of international economic development and technical cooperation.”68 As 
the Society for International Development described its membership in the first 
issue of the organization’s journal International Development Review, “these 
workers in international development may be thought of as the army—the land, 
sea, and air forces—the officers, the doughboys sloshing through the mud—who 
68 November 3, 1960. “Memorandum,” Marion Clawson to Michael Hoffman, Joao 
Goncalvez de Souza, A. Goldschmidt, Gove Hambidge, and Philip M. Glick. “Subject: 
Instruction Materials for Local Chapters,” Folder 1, Box 5, Accession Number 7491, 




                                                 
 
have volunteered for service in the real twentieth century war, a war to build, not 
annihilate civilization; expand, not extinguish life; engender, not repudiate 
love.”69 Appropriately channeling the wartime origins of the ITC and the broader 
developmentalist project with this martial theme, SID counted among its members 
hundreds of individuals who worked on international development projects at the 
UN and its specialized agencies, as well as through the bilateral programs of 
individual governments.70  Through its publications, numerous international 
conferences, and the organization of its numerous international chapters SID was 
part of a public-private development “industry” that grew in the United States and 
elsewhere after the Second World War. It was also one of many methods through 
which the International Technocracy organized itself and sought to shape the 
trajectory of “development” as a discipline and a technique for bringing about 
social and economic change.  
If the ITC possessed a coherent, solidifying ideology other than its valorization of 
expertise and its capacity for social change, then it was as part of a new synthesis 
regarding the link between economic rationalization and social integration. The key to 
this new synthesis combined aspects of the approach to industrial innovation associated 
with Henry Ford and commonly revered to as Fordism, and the ideas of economist John 
Maynard Keynes. Fordism is defined here as a technique and an ideology, as both a 
system of practices characterized by continuous innovation in the production process and 
as a powerful hegemonic idea that reached the height of its influence in the decades 
69 Society for International Development, “Introducing Ourselves,” International 




                                                 
 
immediately following the Second World War.71 As geographer David Harvey suggests, 
Fordism rose to prominence as postwar planners sought to develop “the proper 
configuration and deployment of state powers,” capable of “stabiliz[ing] capitalism, 
while avoiding the evident repression and irrationalities . . . that national socialist 
71 The system of production know as Fordism has historically and heuristically offered a 
rich vein of analysis for the study of capitalism and labor dating back to its birth in the 
American automobile industry of the early twentieth century. In his posthumously 
published Prison Notebooks, for example, the Italian Marxist author Antonio Gramsci 
described Fordism as a process of rationalization in which “the whole life of the nation” 
is made to “revolve around production.” Through “a combination of force . . . and 
persuasion,” Gramsci saw Fordism leading to the emergence of a “new type of man 
suited to [a] new type of work and productive process.” Antonio Gramsci, Selections 
From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, eds. and trans. Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971), 285. While 
Gramsci’s analysis rooted Fordism’s power in the creation of a new type of worker, 
subsequent analysis has attempted to historicize its rise and identify its key elements with 
greater precision. Beginning in the 1970s, the term “Fordism” acquired renewed 
significance in the work of the so-called “régulation school,” associated with such 
scholars as Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, and others. The distinction maintained by the 
régulation school–between a regime of accumulation and a mode of regulation–remains 
an immensely useful theoretical construct. The concept of a mode of regulation, in 
particular, provides a way to conceptualize the circulation of Fordism as a collection of 
normative standards, institutional networks, and practices to spaces or situations where 
mass production methods remained of relatively minor significance to patterns of work 
and everyday life; a move that is particularly helpful in distinguishing the web of ideas, 
people, and institutions that development projects such as the ILO’s Andean Indian 
Program. As a mode of regulation, Fordism obtained a power that extended beyond the 
shop floor, most especially as it informed and shaped the production of social knowledge 
relating to the so-called “underdeveloped” or “developing” world. Alain Lipietz, “New 
Tendencies in the International Division of Labor: Regimes of Accumulation and Modes 
of Regulation,” in Production, Work, Territory: The Geographical Anatomy of Industrial 
Capitalism, eds. Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin Inc., 
1986), 19. See also, for example, Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The 
US Experience, trans. David Fernbach (Thefford, UK: Lowe and Brydone Printes 
Limited, 1979).Alain Lipietz, “Towards Global Fordism?”, New Left Review, 1, no. 132 
(March-April 1982): 33-47; Robert Boyer  and Yves Saillard (eds.), Régulation Theory: 
The State of the Art (London, UK: Routledge, 2002); Bob Jessop (ed.), Regulation 




                                                 
 
solutions implied.”72 When combined with Keynesian ideas about the need for 
governmental institutions to balance production and consumption through monetary and 
fiscal policy, Fordism suggested a compelling alternative to decades of war and economic 
autarky. On the one hand, the Fordist-Keynesian fix prescribed an intensive and on-going 
rationalization of production—of the sort proven to be so powerful in the United States 
during the war—in order to maximize productivity and create conditions approaching full 
employment.73 On the other, it necessitated a new “mode of regulation,” an organizing 
narrative that promised to bring stability to the global economy.   
The technocrats that managed the field operations of the ILO were self-
assured of their capacity to serve as instruments of reform. The experience of 
World War II had convinced the ILO’s leadership in Geneva that projects such as 
the Andean Indian Program would highlight the organization’s relevance to the 
emerging postwar world. Yet, this is only part of the story. In addition to supreme 
confidence, the ILO’s development agenda was symptomatic of the same 
uncertainties and anxieties that plagued postwar liberalism everywhere. How, for 
example, to balance an individual and collective faith in the superiority of liberal 
economic and political models with the still resonant memory of globe economic 
collapse, the ensuing anti-Fascist struggle, and the uncertainty of an ongoing 
conflict with the Soviet Union? The practices of technical assistance and 
72 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of 
Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990) 129. 
73 Fordist innovation is characterized by the incorporation of “workers’ ‘know-how’ . . . 
in the form of machinery.” Lipietz, “Global Fordism,” 34. On the historical importance of 
the American model see for example Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of 




                                                 
 
community development that informed the Andean Indian Program were, at least 
in part, an attempt to answer to such questions.  
As the ITC emerged to confront the profound uncertainties that plagued postwar 
liberalism, its work had especially profound implications for the structure and function of 
international institutions such as the ILO. In his 1956 study Swords and Plowshares, the 
political scientist Inis Claude captured an important aspect of the change. “If the 
liberalism which inspired the League [of Nations] was essentially a nineteenth-century 
phenomenon, the doctrinal foundation of the night-watchman state,” Claude interposed, 
“[then] the liberalism which underlay the new [international] system was the twentieth-
century version, the theoretical support of the welfare state.”74 Perhaps most importantly, 
the shift from the schema of the “night-watchman state” to that of the “welfare state” 
implied a greater emphasis on the “security” of whole populations, i.e. the standard of 
living, quality of life, degree of liberty, etc. that could be found in a society. With the 
effort to, as one ILO official put it, extend “the concept of the Welfare State to cover all 
the economically significant portions of the earth’s surface,”75 populations on the 
margins of an expanding system of global trade and geopolitical maneuvering became the 
targets of international reform. “Development” was quickly becoming part of the altered 
framework of postwar liberalism and the foundation of a new form of government 
rationality that would seek to assert itself in a newly global and globalizing context.
74 Inis Claude, Swords and Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International 
Organizations (New York: Random House, 1956), 87-88. 
75 David Blelloch, “Technical Assistance: Programmes and Policies,” International 
Affairs 44, no. 1 (January, 1952), 50. Blelloch was an ILO representative on the initial 
survey mission approved by the UNTAB and which led to the establishment of the AIP.  
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Chapter 3: The ILO in the Age of Development 
 
As suggested in the last chapter, expertise was the International 
Technocracy’s greatest political asset and the source of its collective identity. But in 
addition to expertise, several other elements also proved decisive to the organization 
and goals of the Andean Indian Program. As the Bolivian case will illustrate, in 
response to the concerns of regional governments, the AIP offered a theory and a 
methodology of social and economic change. The politico-economic solution posed 
by the ITC through programs such as the AIP positioned “technical assistance” and 
“community development” as techniques by which states could individually and/or in 
partnership with international governmental and non-governmental organizations 
achieve economic growth and social integration. In the spaces of the Andean 
Program, these disparate elements transformed the ILO from an organization focused 
on research and standard setting to one concerned with “integration,” population 
security, and economic rationalization. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ILO’s interest in indigenous 
peoples and the decision to make them a test case and target of international 
development. While the ILO’s concern for the situation that confronted indigenous 
peoples across Latin America dated to very early in the organization’s history, the 
move toward a program of economic development and social integration began in 
earnest only after the Second World War. To understand the nature and timing of the 
ILO’s efforts during the immediate postwar period, this chapter briefly delves into the 
geographic and historical context that necessarily informed the ILO’s activities in 




some of the most important aspects of Bolivia’s geography and history is followed by 
a discussion of the circumstances and broader international currents which helped 
drive the ILO’s focus on indigenous peoples. Building on the concept of a Fordist-
Keynesian synthesis introduced at the end of the last chapter, I then examine the ways 
in which the strategy of economic rationalization and social integration generated by 
this synthesis was enacted by the ILO: first in the adoption of its 1944 Philadelphia 
Charter, which articulated the way forward for the ILO as organization after the 
Second World War, and then in the Andean Indian Program. Before the Second 
World War, the ILO’s preferred method of action was through the passage of 
resolutions dedicating member states (at least in theory) to an evolving international 
system of labor standards. However, with the adoption of the Philadelphia 
Declaration and the ILO’s subsequent inclusion into the UN system, this began to 
change. Accepted by the International Labor Organization’s General Conference in 
1944, the Philadelphia Declaration committed the ILO to “full employment and the 
raising of standards of living,” while promising that the organization would work 
with other international bodies to “expand production and consumption” so as to 
“promote the economic and social advancement of the less developed regions of the 
world.” In the coming years and decades, the new economic orthodoxy of full 
employment emphasizing expanded production and consumption, together with the 
determination of the ILO’s new Director-General (David Morse) to raise the 
organization’s international profile, encouraged a new emphasis on expanding the 
organization’s field operations.1 The chapter ends with a detailed discussion of the 
1 General Conference of the International Labor Organization, “Declaration 
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goals and purposes articulated for the AIP by the ILO, as well as the various and 
problematical discourses that informed the ILO’s “integral” method for promoting 
indigenous social integration.  
Bolivia, the ILO, and the Origins of the AIP 
To understand the specific circumstances reflected in the ILO’s focus on 
indigenous peoples and why Bolivia in particular drew repeated (if intermittent) 
attention from the international community, some basic background about the country 
and its history is essential. With an area of roughly 423,163 square miles, Bolivia is 
the fifth largest country in South America. Census records from the 1950s and 1960s 
suggest a rural population of approximately 66 percent, but the actual percentage of 
rural inhabitants may have been much higher, as evidenced by the Bolivian National 
Planning Council’s estimated of 71% in the 1970s and other estimates of closer to 
90% during the same period.2 While around three-fourths of the population worked in 
agriculture, agricultural production accounted for only one-third of the gross national 
product in 1964 and agricultural production was persistently below the standard 
required to feed the people.3 Bolivia’s chronic difficulty in producing enough food to 
feed its citizens is further demonstrated by the fact that over 40 percent of Bolivian 
imports throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s were constituted by foodstuffs.4 At 
the same time, the gap between the labor effort expended to produce food and the 
Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization 
(Declaration of Philadelphia),” Twenty-Six Session, Philadelphia, 1944. 
2 William J. McEwen, Changing Rural Society: A Study of Communities in Bolivia 





                                                                                                                                           
 
country’s ability to feed itself was not a result of exportation, because almost 95 
percent of exports during the same period were minerals such as tin, which were 
historically controlled by a small group of wealthy elites.5 
Bolivia’s population historically consisted of several different groups. 
National Planning Council estimates from the 1960s suggested that the population 
was approximately 53 percent indigenous peoples, 32 percent cholo or mestizo, and 
15 percent white.6  More recent figures suggest a similar distribution with an 
indigenous population that is 30 percent Quechua and 25 percent Aymara, a mestizo 
population of mixed white and Amerindian ancestry constituting 25 percent, and 15 
percent white. Quechua and Aymara are the two predominant indigenous cultural and 
linguistic groups found in Bolivia, although 36 distinct indigenous languages in 
addition to Spanish are officially recognized by the state of Bolivia.7 
As much or perhaps more so than any other country in the region, Bolivia’s 
history has been profoundly shaped by its geography, which frequently served as a 
barrier to communication and a critical factor in determining the distribution of its 
population. The climate of Bolivia is highly variable depending on elevation, but 
consists of three primary zones possessing different ecological characteristics, i.e. the 
high plateau, valleys, and lowlands. The high plateau or Altiplano region constitutes 
approximately 12 percent of the country’s landmass and has historically been home to 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 CIA World Fact Book, “Bolivia,” http://www.ciaworldfactbook.us/south 
america/bolivia.html (accessed November 13, 2014). 
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the majority of the country’s population.8 While never easy given the condition of 
local roads, travel overland through the Altiplano was aided by the relatively flat and 
dry conditions. Although rail transport came to this region of Bolivia relatively early, 
as the ILO ramped up the first AIP projects in the 1950s the railroad still only 
serviced a few cities and was designed primarily to support mineral extraction rather 
than as a principle means of overland travel.9 Mountains making up the Cordillera 
Occidental to the east and the Cordillera Real in the west run north and south through 
the country, surrounding the Altiplano. The cordillera were historically the primary 
source of Bolivia’s mineral resources—for example, the tin found there was highly 
sought after before and during the Second World War, but declined significantly as a 
source of national wealth thereafter as cheaper, higher quality tin could be harvested 
elsewhere.10 While the mountains flanking the region rise to 23,000 feet, elevations in 
the Altiplano vary from 12,000 to 13,000 feet above sea level. The climate is arid and 
cool with scant trees and frequent, piercing winds. Annual rainfall amounts decrease 
as one moves further south toward Bolivia’s border with Argentina.11 La Paz, 
Bolivia’s capital, is located near the northern tip of the high plateau region and 
approximately 100 miles from Lake Titicaca on the border with nearby Peru. 
8 McEwen, Changing Rural Society, 17. See also Dr. Raul R. Vera, “Country 
Pasture/Forage Resource Profiles: Bolivia,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, 
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof/Bolivia/Bolivia.htm (accessed 
November 13, 2014). 
9 McEwen, Changing Rural Society, 17. 
10 James F. Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the 
Present (College Station, PA; Penn State University Press, 2011), 37.  
11 Vera, “Bolivia,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
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The eastern Cordillera contains a series of habitable valleys that bridge the 
divide between the Altiplano region in the west and the isolated lowlands farther east. 
The valleys found in this region can be quite narrow, but extend in some cases for 
miles in the direction of the eastern lowlands. Undulating between jagged peaks and 
vales, elevations alternate rapidly from 16,000 feet verticals to sweeping valley floors 
that descend to 2,000 feet above sea level.12 The highly variable terrain contributes to 
significant travel and communication barriers, by rail or by air. Roads throughout the 
region are highly susceptible to erosion. In total, Bolivia’s valleys make up about 15 
percent of total land and historically supported approximately twenty percent of the 
population.13 The upper valleys are characterized by cloudy, humid, wet conditions of 
the semitropical Yungas region, and the drier, mild temperatures of the more 
sheltered valleys of the Cordillera Oriental. Farther east, as one approaches the 
eastern lowlands the climate is able to support foodstuffs such as coffee, bananas, 
citrus, and coca.14  
The large flatland region that stretches from the foot of the eastern Cordillera 
to the Brazilian border is the Llanos del Oriente, which makes up over two thirds of 
the total area of the country. The lowlands have been historically the most isolated of 
Bolivia’s three primary ecological areas, with travel throughout the region largely 
conducted by foot, horseback, or small boat. With elevations between 300 and 1,500 
feet, the northern portion of the Oriente is especially hot and wet.15 Heavy seasonal 
12 McEwen, Changing Rural Society, 16. 
13 Vera, “Bolivia,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
14 Ibid. 
15 McEwen, Changing Rural Society, 17. See also Vera, “Bolivia”, Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
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rains that begin in October and last until April create lush vegetation and characterize 
the tropical environment alternating with forest and grasslands throughout the region. 
The band surrounding the central lowlands is somewhat hillier and drier than in the 
north and is the location of what is today Bolivia’s largest city, Santa Cruz. Further 
south is the Chaco region that continues across the border with neighboring Paraguay. 
The Chaco receives almost no rainfall for most of the year, followed by heavy, 
swamp-inducing rains for three months. Despite high moisture, the population of the 
Oriente has historically represented a small percentage of Bolivia’s total, roughly 15 
per cent through the late twentieth century.16 Development since the 1980s, including 
the growth of urban centers such as the city of Santa Cruz, expansion of commercial 
crops such as soybeans, and the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves has 
contributed to increased population growth in recent years. 
In addition to Bolivia’s complex geography, the racial, ethnic, and cultural 
consequences of the Spanish conquest have imposed a legacy on Bolivia’s historical 
development that confronted the AIP and its teams of international experts.  During 
the colonial era, almost all of the indigenous peoples of what is present day Bolivia 
were brought under Spanish administrative control, largely through the use of forced 
labor and special grants, known as repartimiento and encomienda respectively.17 
16 McEwen, Changing Rural Society, 17. Vera, “Bolivia,” Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
17 Nacy Grey Postero, Now We are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural 
Bolivia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 30; Ann Zulawski, They Eat 
From Their Labor: Work and Social Change in Colonial Bolivia (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 101; Willemina Kloosterboer, Involuntary 
Labour Since the Abolition of Slavery: A Survey of Compulsory Labour Throughout 
the World (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 99. See also Victor Bulmer-
Thomas, John Coatsworth, and Roberto Cortes-Conde (eds.), The Cambridge 
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These and other provisions under colonial law provided Spanish whites with legal 
sanction and enforcement by the Spanish crown to exact tribute and labor from 
indigenous peoples under their control. The historical legacy of repartimiento and 
encomienda are beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, these and other 
practices that originated during the colonial period clearly helped to define the 
conditions under which the AIP operated. Perhaps most significantly, the subsequent 
development of encomienda and the hacienda or latifundia labor system evolved in 
response to the Spanish crown’s attempts to reign in repartimiento and landholders’ 
attempts to secure large, private landholdings in perpetuity and without interference 
from the crown. As an illustration of the historical impact of these practices, by 1950 
less than 4 percent of privately held land made up over 81 percent of all arable 
property in Bolivia.18 As discussed further in subsequent chapters, the agrarian 
reforms introduced after the 1952 Bolivian Revolution by the Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) took direct aim at the semi-feudal hacienda 
system and the legacy of national economic stagnation, failed state administration, 
and accelerating popular discontent that was a legacy of Bolivia’s difficult colonial 
and postcolonial past.  
A variety of historical, environmental, political, and economic circumstances 
contributed to the conditions that were ultimately targeted by the ILO’s Andean 
program. It remains to be seen how Bolivia and the Andes region more widely were 
selected for the ILO’s first significant experiment in social and economic 
Economic History of Latin America: Volume 1, The Colonial Era and the Short 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
18 McEwen, Changing Rural Society, 22. 
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development. From early in its history, the ILO laid a claim to the problems of 
“indigenous workers” that seemed to foreshadow its involvement with the Andean 
Indian Program during the new era of colonial expansion that encompassed the early 
20th Century. As the legal scholar and historian Luis Rodríguez-Piñero suggests, 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, ILO interest in matters affecting “indigenous 
workers” was reflected in what he describes as the organization’s “Colonial Code.”19 
The ILO’s implementation of this code “consolidated the organization’s formal 
competence in ‘indigenous’ affairs, at a historical moment when the difference 
between the status of colonial peoples and indigenous groups living in independent 
countries was irrelevant in international law.”20 Drawing on notions of colonial 
trusteeship, the ILO drew up “a different set of international labor standards 
specifically aimed at disciplining the conditions of exploitation of ‘indigenous 
19 Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International 
Law: The ILO Regime (1919-1989), (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
12. As with much of the existing literature that examines the work of the ILO in the 
area of indigenous affairs, Rodríguez-Piñero’s interest in the AIP and the ILO stems 
from its relationship to evolving international legal standards concerning the rights of 
indigenous peoples. Indeed, to the extent that ILO Convention No. 107 (passed in 
1957) and Convention No. 169 (passed in 1989) informed international efforts to 
promote and protect the rights of indigenous populations, the ILO played a pioneering 
role. See also S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2004); Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism: 
Human Rights and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2003); and Chris Tennant, “Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions and 
the International Legal Literature from 1945-1993.” Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 
1 (1994): 1-57. Setting aside the relative importance of the ILO conventions, my 
interest in the Andean Indian Program lay in the matrices of relations it contained. 
The AIP was (at least nominally) meant to address the material conditions/standards 
increasingly defined as necessary for the enjoyment of rights that indigenous peoples 
already possessed as citizens of a sovereign state. It was not concerned, per se, with 
the creation of new rights.  
20 Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples, 12.  
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workers.’”21 While these early efforts did not directly lead to Andean Indian Program, 
the organization’s attentions to the conditions affecting “indigenous workers” prior to 
the Second World War made subsequent declarations of a special area of interest all 
the more appropriate and convincing.  
Even as the organization sought to regulate the exploitation of indigenous 
labor, the ILO’s interest in the Andes region percolated through a broader web of 
international conferences and meetings. In 1936, for example, delegates to the first 
regional conference of ILO members from the American States first discussed the 
need to study the situation of indigenous peoples that resided in several Latin 
American nations.22 In 1943, the ILO, together with the Bolivian and United States 
governments, conducted a study of Bolivia’s economy and social structure. Neither 
the conference nor the study resulted in a concrete plan. However, the authors of the 
joint investigation recommended that the ILO organize a “far-reaching program in the 
Labor field” to address the integration of Bolivia’s indigenous population.23 Perhaps 
such a program would have materialized earlier had not the Second World War 
21 Ibid., 18. As Rodríguez-Piñero notes, largely as a result of decolonization, the 
modern definition of  “indigenous” has since taken on a different meaning, referring 
to “culturally distinct groups living within the borders of independent states that are 
the descendants of the peoples that inhabited the region prior to colonization.” Ibid., 
40. 
22 Through the conferences, “the growing saliency of the organization’s colonial 
policy during [the 1920s and 1930s] interacted with the American states’ official 
discourse on the ‘Indian problem’ to create a specific policy within the ILO’s regional 
policy without questioning the organization’s competence–either in formal or 
technical terms.” Ibid., 333. The importance of Indigenist discourse to the formation 
of the AIP is discussed below. 
23 The citation of the ILO report, Labor Problems in Bolivia (Montreal, 1943), 
appears in Jef Rens, “Latin American and the International Labor Organization,” 
International Labor Review 80 (July, 1959), 10. See also his fuller treatment of the 
project in Jef Rens, Le Plan andin: contribution de l’OIT a un projet-pilot de 
cooperation technique multilaterale (Brussels, Belgium: Emile Bruillant, 1987). 
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intervened, but ultimately it would be another decade before the AIP was 
implemented. By that time, the nature of the program and the ILO’s interest in 
promoting development had taken on increased international importance in the 
context of the Cold War and in the ensuing wake of the 1952 Bolivian Revolution. 
As already suggested, despite sporadic interest in the Andes region and its 
people by the ILO, serious planning for a permanent program did not occur until 
1949. In that year, a conference resolution on the “conditions of life and work of 
indigenous populations” (at the Fourth Conference of ILO American States Members) 
again addressed prospects for an ILO sponsored program. This time the resources of 
the newly created United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program 
(UNETAP) were cited as the basis for action. The UNETAP proposal received further 
impetus three years later, when the ILO’s Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labor 
(meeting in La Paz, Bolivia) urged the creation of a “joint field working party” to 
assess conditions on the ground for a permanent Andean mission.24 The geography, 
make-up of its population, and history of Bolivia were considerations with which the 
international planners of the Andean Program were forced to grapple. The leader of 
the initial survey mission that led to the AIP’s establishment, Ernest Beaglehole, 
described it as “a region of violent contrasts.” In the high plateau region, he 
suggested, “the Indian inhabitant struggle to gain a precarious livelihood by 
agriculture and animal husbandry.” Meanwhile, in the valleys of the eastern 
24 “Collaboration of the United Nations with the International Labour Organisation on 
Resolution Vii of the Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour in accordance with 
the recommendation of the Social Commission on the Andean Indians,” 6 July 1951, 
TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. See also Rodríguez-Piñero, 
Indigenous Peoples, 78-82. 
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Cordillera, “life is superficially pleasanter but still hard because of increasing 
population pressure on an already overpopulated land.”25 Writing shortly after the 
survey team finished its work in 1952, Beaglehole summarized the need for and 
purpose of the AIP by pointing to the indigenous populations lack of social and 
economic integration:  
The problem placed before the Andean Indian Mission was […] 
deceptively simple: to plan action programmes [sic] with the tripartite 
co-operation of Governments, Indians and international organisations 
[sic] that would accelerate the integration of Indians into the national 
political, social and economic life of the three Andean countries; such 
integration to be orientated towards a democratically-phrased 
integration/in place of the present prevailing master-subordinate 
integration; such integration finally to be regional in scope, integral in 
approach, organic in growth, based upon consent rather than upon 
coercion, and to be achieved without destroying for the Indian his 
present satisfying community organisation [sic] and valued way of 
life.26 
 
From the outset, overcoming the challenges that geography and history imposed on 
Bolivian development was a primary aim of the AIP. For this reason and as illustrated 
in Figure 2, the ILO targeted communities in all three of Bolivia’s primary 
geographic and climatic regions, represented by the base of operations established at 
Playa Verde, Pillapi, Otavi, and Cotaca. These four centers were, in turn, designed to 
serve as a model for like communities elsewhere in the region and around the world, 
wherever the problem of “underdevelopment” existed.  
25 Ernest Beaglehole, “A Technical Assistance Mission in the Andes,” International 
Labour Review 67 (October 1953), 553. 
26 Ibid, 523. 
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Figure 2: Sites of AIP Action Bases in Bolivia 
The ILO’s historic interest in the problems affecting indigenous peoples forms 
a backdrop to the Andean Program, but ultimately it does not address the question of 
why an organization which had made establishing international labor standards the 
focus of its existence before the Second World War suddenly entered the field of 
international development nor, when it chose to do so, why it concentrated those 
efforts on the plight of indigenous peasants. As discussed in the last chapter, the 
historic emergence and consolidation of an International Techncracy is posed here as 
part of the answer to the question of why the ILO pursued the Andean Indian 
Program. Members of the ITC became important promoters and distributors of 














around the world. It is also true that, by the early 1950s, a new sense of urgency 
seemed to be pushing some sort of Andean program to the top of the ILO’s agenda. 
David Efron, the Argentine economist discussed in the previous chapter who joined 
the staff of the International Labor Organization in 1944, was chief among those 
experts who insisted that “now is the time for the [International Labor] Office to take 
the initiative” and intensify its work on indigenous populations.27 From Efron’s 
perspective, hesitation on the part of the ILO risked the creation of a situation in 
which other organizations or governments would take the initiative ahead of the ILO. 
Given the organization’s previous efforts to subject the conditions of “indigenous 
workers” to critical international scrutiny, Efron feared that inaction would be taken 
as a sign of the ILO’s increasing irrelevance. To send the opposite message, he 
counseled that the programs of other organizations “should not be permitted to 
develop without immediate appropriate coordination [with] the ILO.”28  
Reinforcing David Efron’s passionate appeals for action, the failure of 
previous efforts in the region also suggested an opportunity to reshape the ILO’s 
international profile and portfolio. Throughout the 1940s, the governments of Peru, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador had rejected a number of United Nations (UN) proposals, 
including a series of seminars on child and community welfare sponsored by the UN 
Department of Social Affairs, on the grounds that they were “piecemeal, provincial, 
27 Memo from David Efron to Mr. Fano and Mr. Alvarado, 22 August 1951, TAP 6-
01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. “Curriculum Vitae,” David Efron, Dossier de 
l’Office du Personnel, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
28 Memo from David Efron to Mr. Fano and Mr. Alvarado, 22 August 1951, TAP 6-
01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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over-simple, unscientific and impractical.”29 Intensification of the Cold War and the 
priority it gave to aiding social and economic development in the “Third World” 
urged a different strategy. In contrast to earlier proposals, the multilateral program 
envisioned by the ILO and presented to the UN Technical Assistance Board 
(UNTAB) in the early 1950s would be “integrated, organic, regional, scientific and 
practical.” The mission would “develop every approach and technique which 
seem[ed] practically useful in breaking down obstacles to integration.”30 Thus, the 
notion that half-measures had limited past efforts in the Andes region was an 
important backdrop for ILO action and made the AIP into much more than a project 
in “the Labor-field.” 
Indeed, the problem of indigenous “integration” was an extension of the more 
broadly conceived mandate that drove the ILO’s postwar turn toward 
developmentalism. As discussed in the last chapter, the priorities that rose to 
prominence at the ILO in the 1940s and 1950s addressed several areas critical to 
sustaining the Fordist-Keynesian model, including improvements in labor 
productivity, technological efficiency, and administrative organization. Moreover, the 
29 “Collaboration of the United Nations with the International Labour Organisation on 
Resolution Vii of the Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour in accordance with 
the recommendation of the Social Commission on the Andean Indians,” 6 July 1951, 
TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
30 “Technical Assistance to Latin American Countries on the Problems of Indigenous 
Populations,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. In 
1952, UNTAB authorized a survey mission to the Andes region, which became the 
basis for the Andean Program. Although the ILO successfully fought to lead the 
Andean mission, and was responsible for planning and directing the AIP’s day-to-day 
operations, the project would also rely upon expertise from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (F.A.O.), the United Nation’s Education, Science, and Culture 
Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O.), and the World Health Organization (W.H.O). Over 
time, UNESCO would become the epicenter of UN community development 
programs, but as of the early 1950s institutional pathways were more fluid. 
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ILO’s 1944 “Philadelphia Declaration,” a general statement of the organization’s 
postwar aims and purposes adopted by the ILO General Assembly in the same year, 
articulated the organization’s commitment to acting on these goals. The Declaration 
echoed the ILO’s social democratic heritage, stressing a commitment to labor 
regulation and the extension of workers’ protections, but it also heralded ambitious 
new priorities.31 It addressed the need “to expand production and consumption, to 
avoid severe economic fluctuations, to promote the economic and social advancement 
of the less developed regions of the world, to assure greater stability in world prices 
of primary products, and to promote a high and steady volume of international 
trade.”32 The call to address this expanded program of economic and social concerns 
both built on and went well beyond the organization’s earlier focus on labor 
regulation. The Declaration’s call for the ILO to promote consumption and social 
advancement implied and was interpreted to require a level of technical and 
administrative responsibility that went well beyond the organization’s traditional 
standard setting activities; it summoned new organizational capacities into being. 
31 Under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, the ILO was formally recognized as 
the “permanent machinery” for executing the “General Principles” embodied by 
Article 427 of the treaty, which insisted that “there are methods and principles for 
regulating labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to 
apply.” Among the nine principles specifically identified were the belief that labor is 
not “a commodity or article of commerce,” the right of free association by workers 
and employers, the payment of a living wage, support for the eight hour day and 
forty-eight hour week, the abolition of child labor, and equal pay for equal work 
between men and women. The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, “The 
Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919,” 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/partxiii.htm (accessed October 30, 2013). 
32 General Conference of the International Labor Organization, “Declaration 
Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization 
(Declaration of Philadelphia),” Twenty-Six Session, Philadelphia, 1944. 
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At the same stroke of a pen, the Philadelphia Declaration also repositioned the 
organization’s historic commitment to social justice around the centerpiece of an 
abstract humanism.33 The document’s sole human rights provision affirmed that “all 
human beings . . . have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their 
spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and 
equal opportunity.” While the Declaration’s defense of human rights represented an 
important departure from Fordism’s focus on productivity and efficiency, discussed 
in the previous chapter, it also served as the basis for a new, expanded program of 
action, which included commitments to achieving “full employment and the raising of 
standards of living,” the promotion of “the right of collective bargaining,” “the 
continuous improvement of productive efficiency,” and “the collaboration of workers 
and employers” to facilitate economic and social development.34 Reflective of an 
emerging international consensus (at least within the non-communist bloc of 
countries that included the United States and its allies), the Declaration looked to a 
future in which economic growth and efficiency, along with the promise of full 
employment, would neutralize social and economic conflicts.35 High productivity 
33 Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, 
Kitsch, Postmodernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 41. 
34 ILO, “Declaration,” 1944.  
35 On the formation of this consensus see Charles S. Maier, “The Politics of 
Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World 
War II,” International Organization 31 (1977): 607-633; Anne-Marie Burley, 
“Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the 
New Deal Regulatory State,” in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of 
an Institutional Form, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1993); Rupert, Producing Hegemony; and Victoria De Grazia,. Irresistible 
Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2005). Anthony Endres and Grant 
Fleming emphasize the cautious approach adopted by economists at international 
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combined with mass consumption would be a rising tide that lifted all boats.  At the 
same time, the ability to neutralize social strife was a strategic goal of 
developmentalism in the Cold War, i.e. an intervention designed to disrupt conditions 
that led to political and economic instability and/or provided an opening to leftist 
forces that served as proxies for the Soviet Union.   
While the Philadelphia Declaration constituted a vision that had yet to be 
implemented, the “primary purpose” of the technical assistance program adopted by 
the International Labor Conference in 1949 was to help fuel “increase[s] in 
production and in opportunities for employment in the less developed countries of the 
world.”36 Along with improvements in production, the ILO’s new program defined as 
“vital” the need “to raise steadily and progressively the level of consumption” in the 
developing world.37 In this way, expansion of the organization’s field operations was 
deemed “essential to the raising of living standards in [developing countries],” while 
organizations toward the rise of Keynesianism, at least until the mid 1940s. Anthony 
M. Endres and Grant A. Fleming, International Organizations and the Analysis of 
Economic Policy, 1919-1950 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
For an assessment of the different perspectives that informed the ILO’s Philadelphia 
Declaration see Oliver Liang, “Governing Globalization: Labor Economic Paradigms 
and International Labor Standards at the International Labor Organization, 1919-
1998.” Paper presented at Interactions: Regional Studies, Global Processes, and 
Historical Analysis, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., February28-March 3, 
2001, http://www.historycooperative.org/proceedings/interactions/liang.html 
(accessed December 12, 2013).  
36 “Technical Assistance: ILO Programme, Notes for Opening Statement,” Z 6/1/7/1, 
“Technical Assistance Supplementary Files,” Documents 1949, David Morse Cabinet 
Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
37 “Statement of Mr. Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Before the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5615, ‘The International Technical 
Cooperation Act of 1949,’” Z 6/1/7/1, “Technical Assistance Supplementary Files, 
Documents 1949,” David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. Kaiser 
cited the ILO report in his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
regarding the “The International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949.”  
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helping “at the same time to raise standards of living in the world as a whole.”38 The 
ILO would continue to rely on “research and standard setting.” But, as one official 
put it, “now there [is] a new spirit in the development of practical operational 
programmes [sic].”39 Through its publications and expanded field operations, and 
drawing on the Philadelphia Declaration as a blueprint, the ILO would preach what 
David Morse called “the gospel of increasing productivity.”40 
Tactics of “Integration”: The AIP as Social Reform 
As an initial thrust of the ILO’s strategy to extend its field operations, the 
Andean Indian Program gave a privileged place to the technique of economic 
rationalization through increasing productivity and consumption. This can be 
observed in, among other places, the three phases of the AIP. The program’s first, 
“experimental,” stage constituted “an effort to determine the best methods of 
38 “Technical Assistance: ILO Programme, Notes for Opening Statement,” Z 6/1/7/1, 
“Technical Assistance Supplementary Files,” Documents 1949, David Morse Cabinet 
Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
39 “Report on the Technical Working Group on Migration,” 23 and 24 March 1949, Z 
6/1/7, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The comment was 
that of the ILO representative to the meeting, R. A. Metall. Metall was describing the 
preparedness of the ILO to carry out “inquiries and projects for economic 
development,” in cooperation with other international organizations. The meeting 
discussed the results of an Economic Commission for Latin America report on 
migration to the region. See also Memo to D-G and Eric Hutchison, “Observations 
concerning the Memorandum of Mr. [Wendell] Hayes…,” unknown date, Z 6/1/7, 
David Morse Cabinet Files, ILO Archives, Geneva. The unknown author of the 
memo wrote that, “From now on, the I.L.O., without diminishing its legislative 
activities, should however consider it to be of the same (if not greater) importance to 
have for each matter within its competence a general programme [sic] of technical 
assistance to governments. This is an entirely different application of the activities of 
the I.L.O. but through it the I.L.O. should be in a better position to fulfill its 
objectives.”  
40 David Morse, “Broadcast over WCFM, 26 September 1952,” Folder 2, Box 82, 
David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
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achieving [the AIP’s] objectives.”41 In this initial stage, as in those that followed, the 
“action base” became the focal point of activity. It was to be a dynamic space, 
comprising multiple operations: it was an experimental agricultural station, a 
vocational training center, a rural school for fundamental education, a medical clinic, 
and a research site for generating new knowledge about the region and its people. The 
basic administrative unit of the ILO’s Andean program was a series of “action bases” 
located in the areas targeted for reform. The action base served as the forward 
operating center for the AIP’s personnel deployed to villages across the region. A 
technical lead was assigned to each base by officials who managed the program from 
the ILO’s regional headquarters with frequent input and instruction received directly 
from the Director-General’s office in Geneva. The staff located at these operational 
sites across Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador constituted the core of technical expertise for 
the program, living and working among the indigenous peoples and communities that 
were the targets of the Andean Program. The first of these bases was located at the 
village of Pillapi. In the characterization of the ILO’s Deputy-Director Jef Rens, the 
action bases were the “linchpins of the whole Andean program,”42 the take-off point 
for the AIP’s broader objectives. 
A tactical variation on this model was the AIP’s colonization or “community 
resettlement” projects, designed to bring indigenous groups into regions where labor 
was relatively scarce, especially for agricultural production. For some ILO officials, 
colonization or “the transfer of a great percentage of [the indigenous] population to 
41 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” Z 11-10-8, 
David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 




                                                 
 
areas that [would] ensure them better living conditions” constituted the “true solution 
to the problem of the Andean populations.”43 At the AIP’s first colony, located at 
Cotoca, Bolivia, land titles were promised to individuals, but the focus was on 
developing cooperative systems of agricultural production. As Jef Rens explained, 
Cotoca utilized “a combination of private ownership to supply individual stimulus to 
the Indians and large-scale exploitation [of land] to meet the economic needs of the 
community as a whole.”44 Similarly, a memo on the use of cooperatives concluded 
that, “[t]he basic idea [was] to take advantage of the traditional communal 
organization and mutual aid system of the Indians and attempt to change it into 
modern market-oriented cooperatives.”45 The cooperatives were meant to boost 
production and serve as an alternative method of rural economic organization and 
administration to the hacienda system, which was a target of the MNR led 
government in Bolivia after the revolution.  
The deployment of this model will be discussed further in later chapters, but 
the AIP’s colonization program had the practical objective of combining traditional 
forms of communal organization with an emphasis on “self-help” and a market-based 
approach to introducing new seed varieties, irrigation systems, and cultivation 
methods. In this way, indigenous labor would be incorporated into the national labor 
market to overcome a traditional reliance on subsistence agriculture. Indeed, from the 
43 Enrique de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 12 April 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
44 Jef Rens, “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO, Paris, 26 
November 1955,” Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
45 Memo, “Special Comment on Cooperative Farming,” 13 March 1959, TAP-A 1-1-
0 (J.2), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The memo was a list of recommendations 
generated by specialists at the Food and Agriculture Organization to be added to an 
AIP Special Fund proposal for Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. 
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perspective of some Bolivian government officials, the implementation of the 
cooperatives made it possible for the state to prioritize agricultural production 
“destined for consumption in the markets of the cities.” This was a necessary step, 
argued one state minister, given “the present tendency of the farmer to return to a 
self-sufficient agrarian economy.”46 From the moment the first AIP expert set foot in 
the country, the Bolivian government was desperate to break the system of 
subsistence agriculture that kept production low and forced the country to rely on 
imports to feed its population. The appropriation of indigenous labor to raise 
production levels was the point at which “integration” and the AIP’s goal of long 
term economic rationalization intersected. 
During the Andean Indian Program’s second phase, “the work of the action 
bases was extended over an increasing number of surrounding communities and 
emphasis was placed on training at the community level through the organization and 
follow-up of courses for indigenous social promoters and auxiliary workers.”47 This 
phase also sought the “development of material facilities in the indigenous 
communities (irrigation, roads, school buildings, improved housing, etc.),” as well as 
the construction of new action bases and the “strengthening of those already in 
existence.”48 The shift in focus represented by phase two of the program came in 
1956, as administrators in Geneva determined, “that the initial and experimental stage 
46 Nuflo Chavez Ortiz, Ministro de Asuntos Campesinos to Alejandro Oropeza 
Castillo, Representante en Bolivia de la Junta de Asistencia Técnica de Naciones 
Unidas,” 7 February 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.  
47 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” Z 11-10-8, 
David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
48 “Tentative Suggestions Relating to a Possible Expansion of the Andean Indian 




                                                 
 
should now come to an end and that it is high time for our programme [sic] to enter 
its consolidated and expanding phase.”49 With an emphasis on increasing the 
influence of the program by deepening connections with local communities, stage two 
represented the ILO’s effort to secure the AIP’s institutional presence and importance 
in the regions where it operated. 
The third phase of the program represented a move toward “gradual 
‘nationalisation’ [sic] of projects.” As an aspect of the larger goal of economic 
rationalization, the principal objective of phase three was to “link more effectively all 
the projects with national economic development plans,”50 so that they would 
“gradually be integrated into the national programmes [sic] and become the 
responsibility of national administrative machinery, depending as little as possible on 
external assistance.”51 To do so, even on paper, was no easy task and required 
“coordinated action” between “the different [ministerial] departments, in all the 
regions inhabited by the indigenous populations.”52 Nationalization would mark a 
culmination: the successful integration of AIP practices into civil society and the 
apparatus of the Bolivian state.  
ILO officials such as the program’s first regional director, Enrique Sanchez de 
Lozada, saw this threefold process as a rational plan of action. However, there was 
always the potential for misunderstanding and tension between the AIP’s technocratic 
49 Abbas Ammar to Enrique de Lozada, 10 October 1956, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
50 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” Z 11-10-8, 
David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
51 Abbas Ammar to Enrique de Lozada, 10 October 1956, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. 




                                                 
 
operators and the population targeted by the program. In 1956, for example, a group 
of settlers at the AIP’s Cotoca colony discovered the distance that existed between 
their conception of the project and the priorities of the program’s international experts 
and administrators. On March 29, 1956 the Chief of Mission for Cotoca hurriedly 
informed the AIP’s Regional Director that, “a meeting of the colonists had been held 
without his permission and that he had discovered it by chance.”53 Though non-
violent, their actions set off alarm bells among the settlement’s group of international 
experts. According to the only know record of the incident, the colonists themselves 
claimed that they had formed the ad hoc committee to air grievances and to negotiate 
the terms of the cooperative with the AIP’s Regional Director, Enrique de Lozada.54 
Responding to the pleas for assistance from Cotoca Mission Chief, Lozada 
met with the colonists to share his vision of the settlement’s overarching purpose. 
“[T]he Cotoca Project,” he asserted, “was a shared endeavor between the Andean 
Mission and the colonists that had not been designed for their benefit only[,] but also 
was to help to define, in an experimental way, the aspects that it was advisable to 
multiply, in the future, to the usefulness of a great number of campesinos.” Thus, he 
continued, “[t]hey were ‘pioneers’ who, in common with the mission, were to create 
53 Enrique de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 29 March 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. Cotoca was the AIP’s premiere “community resettlement” 
project, in which volunteers were selected to relocate from the Andean highlands to 
build a new community cooperative in the eastern department of Santa Cruz, Bolivia. 
In addition to the organization of an agricultural cooperative, the bargain the settlers 
struck with the AIP and the Bolivian government involved the issuance of individual 
land titles. When these titles failed to materialize as promised, some of the settlers 




                                                 
 
the prototype of a form of colonization likely to multiply.”55 Representatives from the 
committee organized by the colonos replied that, “it was precisely because of [its 
wider significance] that they believed they had the right to express their opinions with 
the administration and to ask for explanations of all the problems encountered by the 
Project.”56 Indeed, in a moment of absolute candor the Cotoca Mission Chief 
confessed that the anger and frustration “of the colonists [was] perfectly justified 
since their reclamations [of the mission lands] were founded on the promises which 
had been made to them,” to receive titles for their own land and to participate in 
organizing the cooperative.57 The colonists had done their part to turn Cotoca into a 
place where they could live with their families, but the government and the mission 
had not fulfilled its obligations. For his part, de Lozada believed that the program 
could succeed “only insofar as the members of the colony [took] an active part in [its] 
achievements.” Thus, on this occasion he “did not find it convenient to contradict” 
the views expressed by the colonists, for fear that, if he “attack[ed] the interest that 
[they] expressed in the project,” the settlement would collapse from within.58  
As the Cotoca example suggests, the AIP’s design targeted the Bolivian state 
and nation as a whole, providing social services to rural populations while attempting 
to catalyze the levers of national economic growth. The international technocrats who 
administered the Andean Indian Program could point to any number of factors that 
prevented the “integration” of indigenous peoples, including racial and ethnic 
prejudice, the legacy of centuries-old legal servitude and discrimination, illiteracy, 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 




                                                 
 
difficulties of geography and climate, lack of economic diversity, among others. 
However, at its core, the AIP was an experiment in institution and nation building, 
which emphasized the spread of scientific and technical “know-how” through the 
deployment of its action bases and colonies. “The underlying problem,” which the 
AIP was meant to address, was defined as “an administrative one.”59 This premise 
disciplined the practices of the AIP from its inception. 
After World War II, the ability of international organizations and communities 
of experts to deliver knowledge and administrative resources to the periphery of 
international capitalism was an important measure of their success. At the ILO, this 
meant dramatically expanding the organization’s field operations, which in turn 
placed a high value on the capacity of experts to, as one observer put it, reform “the 
social world through economic growth and administrative rationalization.”60 As the 
organization’s Director-General, David Morse, explained in 1949, “nothing could 
more gravely jeopardize the usefulness of an organization like the International Labor 
Organization than the failure to take account of historical trends and where necessary 
to adapt quickly its methods and procedures to changing circumstances.” Indeed, the 
ILO’s Fourth Conference of American State Members in Montevideo, where Morse 
announced his intentions with regard to technical assistance, was a watershed for 
articulation of his vision as Director-General, for the direction of the  ILO, and for the 
prospects of the Andean Indian Program. With “new States in being and on the 
59 “Collaboration of the United Nations with the International Labour Organisation on 
Resolution Vii of the Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour in accordance with 
the recommendation of the Social Commission on the Andean Indians,” 6 July 1951, 
TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
60 Henry A. Giroux, Border Crossings: Cultural Workers and the Politics of 
Education, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 36. 
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horizon,” Morse predicted that there would be demand “for industrialization, for 
increasing production , for a quickening in the pace of improving standards of 
living.”61 “The ILO must legislate,” advised Morse, “but [it] must also act!” 62 
Morse’s words, much like those of David Efron and others discussed above, did not 
mark a wholesale departure from the ILO’s roots. Nevertheless, the emphasis on 
actively promoting “development” urged the ILO into a new era in which the 
organization’s standard setting mission was increasing overshadowed by a new focus 
on production, under-consumption, social integration, and nation building.  
Adding to the urgency of the moment, the link between technical assistance, 
community development, and execution of the ILO’s international reform goals came 
just as much of the world’s attention shifted toward a struggle for “hearts and minds” 
in “developing countries.” Indeed, a few months into his first term as Director-
General, Morse confessed to a friend that, “I see now where the efforts which I am 
making in the field of technical assistance . . . in under-developed countries, 
especially in Asia and Latin America, is an indispensable part of the total effort to 
insure that democracies survive.” The ideological fight with the Soviets and their 
allies would be, Morse wrote, “extremely difficult,” largely because the agents of 
communism “have such absolute control” over their people. In the West, he 
concluded, “[o]ur greatest card is our productive capacity; our freedoms, but above 
61 David Morse, “Report to Fourth Conference of American State Members [of the 
International Labor Organization]: Montevideo, 1949,” Folder 1, Box 17, David A. 





                                                 
 
all, the need to maintain a healthy social and economic system.”63 He and others 
hoped that projects such as the Andean Indian Program would enable the ILO to 
navigate successfully between the aspirations of its “Philadelphia Declaration” and 
the uncertainties imposed by the Cold War.  
Indigenism, Integration, and the Problem of Expertise 
Earlier sections of this chapter have examined the ILO’s interest in indigenous 
peoples and the contours of a broader shift in focus toward field programs that 
promoted economic development with the application of technical expertise, or what 
David Morse termed the “gospel of production.” This section explores more 
particular aspects of literature, politics, and the social sciences that specifically 
informed AIP development discourse in Bolivia. As the primary expression of the 
ILO’s turn toward programmatic efforts in support of economic development, social 
integration, and nation building, the AIP and its endorsement by the Bolivian 
government benefited from the intersection of two separate streams of thought within 
the social sciences. The first of these influences was an “Indigenist” movement 
promoted by organizations such as the Inter-American Indian Institute (III), which 
was formed in 1940 out of the first Inter-American Indigenist Congress in Pátzcuaro, 
Mexico and became a component of the Organization of American States in 1953, but 
also related to an older indigenista literary tradition. As a method of studying and 
categorizing indigenous peoples and cultures, Indigenism or Indigenismo had its 
origins before the turn of the century. Influenced by late nineteenth century European 
63 David Morse to Elinore Herrick, January 31, 1949, Folder 141, Box 53, David A. 




                                                 
 
positivism, a diverse group of Latin American authors helped make what they called 
the “indigenous problem” into a defining element of a new nationalism. The synthesis 
of “Indigenism” with the indigenista tradition structured and informed the discourse 
of social integration and development pursued by the ILO and the new revolutionary 
regime that ruled Bolivian politics between 1952 and 1964.  
The Bolivian diplomat, author, and social critic Alcides Arguedas (1879-
1046) was among the earliest authors who tied Bolivia’s ongoing social and economic 
problems to its unfortunate geography and, most controversially, to a historical 
process of miscegenation. In response to the country’s humiliating defeat in the 
Pacific War (1879-1884) with Chile, Arguedas voiced the anxieties of a traditional 
white ruling elite, even as he criticized the country’s existing social system for 
exacerbating the situation of “the Indian.” Influenced by the race theories of the 
French psychologist Gustave Le Bon, Arguedas openly mourned the declining 
“purity” of caste in Bolivian society and asserted that, “the white race [had been] 
invaded by the blood of the Indian.” In his scathing social commentary Pueblo 
enfermo (1909), he blamed the rise and triumph of “Creole” politicians and the “entry 
into power of a lower class mestizo” for many of the country’s social and economic 
problems.64 Perhaps most significantly, Arguedas’s Social Darwinian critique of 
Bolivian society sparked a renewed discussion among the country’s intellectual 
classes about the place of Bolivia’s indigenous population in the life of the nation.  
64 Josefa Salmón, “El discurso Indigenista en Bolivia (1900-1956),” PhD Dissertation 
(University of Maryland, 1986), 62. Alcides Arguedas, Pueblo enfermo (Santiago, 




                                                 
 
Writing at the same time as Arguedas, the journalist Franz Tamayo also 
viewed Bolivia’s history and the struggles of its people in racial terms, but his 
conclusions differed significantly from his more politically conservative countryman. 
In direct contrast to Arguedas, Tamayo’s Creación de una pedagogía nacional (1910) 
argued that in seeking to modernize and unify Bolivian society, the country’s political 
leaders would do well to look closely at Bolivia’s own autochthonous culture and 
traditions, rather than blindly attempting to copy European models.65 Also countering 
Arguedas’s bleaker analysis, Tamayo concluded that the vitality of the country’s 
indigenous population could be harnessed with a new focus on the education of “the 
Indigenous race.” Only after “the Indian” had been “civilized,” Tamayo argued, could 
he contribute to the regeneration of Bolivian society and the formation of a new 
Bolivian nationalism.66 Tamayo’s writing was still heavily influenced by the racial 
theories of the time, but he was at the forefront of a group of writers who emphasized 
the need to combine Bolivia’s indigenous heritage with what could be usefully 
borrowed from the West. 
The socialist writer-diplomat Tristán Marof represented a third option when it 
came to assessing Bolivia’s difficult past and uncertain future. In contrast to both 
Arguedas and Tamayo, Marof emphasized the need to strengthen the power of the 
state to take on the traditional mining and landowning oligarchy. In his La justicia del 
inca, published in 1926, Marof proposed a new economic orientation that emphasized 
65 Javier Sanjinés C., Mestizaje Upside-down: Aesthetic Politics in Modern Bolivia 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 50. Franz Tamayo, Creación 
de una pedagogía nacional (La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Educación, 1944). 
Creación was a collection of articles that Tamayo published in the Bolivian 
newspaper El Dario during 1910. 
66 Salmón, “El discurso,” 94. 
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raising the material standard of living of indigenous peoples as part of a broader effort 
of “development” and modernization.67 Marof stressed the need to capture the power 
of the state from the oligarchs, nationalize the country’s mineral wealth, and 
redistribute land. In 1934, he attempted practical steps in this direction by helping to 
organize a new radical political party, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario or POR.68  
From the early 1900s to the late 1930s, the viewpoints represented by 
Arguedas, Tamayo, and Marof constituted the three main perspectives from which 
Bolivian intellectuals attempted to connect the “indigenous problem”—recall that the 
indigenous population constituted over 50 percent of Bolivia’s total population and 
was completely disenfranchised, exploited for its labor, and experienced extremely 
high rates of poverty and illiteracy—to a broader, popular discussion of Bolivian 
nationalism. In the 1940s, the elite discourse of Indigenism intersected with a 
grassroots uprising that gave rise to a new political coalition and paved the way to 
Bolivia’s 1952 revolution. The National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) had first 
appeared during the Second World War as a political party tinged with fascist 
sympathies. However, as the old ruling oligarchy attempted to reassert its weakening 
grip on power after the war, the MNR was reborn under the leadership of economist 
Paz Estenssoro. It emerged as a left of center political party supported by middle class 
intellectuals, mine workers, and student radicals. Over time, the MNR’s commitment 
to universal suffrage and economic reform also helped it win favor among the 
67 Salmón, “El discurso,” 45. Tristán Marof, La justicia del inca (Brussels, Belgium: 
Librería Falk Fils, 1926). 
68 Herbert S. Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 185; Klein, Bolivia the Evolution of the Multi-Ethnic Society 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 198. 
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country’s large, primarily indigenous class of rural peasants. As historian James Kohl 
notes, as early as 1942 MNR “recognized the need for a study of the land tenure 
problem [in Bolivia] and the necessity of incorporating the peasantry into the national 
life and restructuring the agricultural economy.”69 After coming to power in 1952, 
MNR demonstrated its willingness to work for change (and to court political support 
in rural areas) by passing the Agrarian Reform Law (1953) and creating a Ministry of 
Peasant and Indian Affairs. The ministry had the authority to address a range of issues 
related to the “broad tasks of incorporating the Indian masses into the national 
culture.”70 Under the leadership of its first minister, Ñuflo Chávez, the ministry made 
plans to overturn the old feudal system of latifundios, substituting a new system based 
upon wage labor.71 In the face of chronic economic stagnation, the MNR platform 
echoed the call of Marof and others to use the power of the state to support economic 
“development” and made it a willing, if somewhat unpredictable, ally in the ILO’s 
implementation of the Andean Indian Program.  
As a grassroots mobilization against centuries of exploitation slowly brought 
dramatic change to Bolivian politics, interest in the living conditions of indigenous 
peoples also expanded across Latin America. Beginning in 1940, a series of regional 
conferences led to the creation of the Inter-American Indigenist Institute (Instituto 
69 James V. Kohl, “Peasant and Revolution in Bolivia, April 9, 1952-August 2, 1953.” 
The Hispanic American Historical Review 58, no. 2 (May, 1978): 245. Kohl notes 
that that the party’s views on the subject were outlined in its political manifesto, 
“Program and Principles of Action.” For a view that places “rural mobilization” itself 
at the heart of the Revolution in 1952 see Laura Gotkowitz, “Revisting the Rural 
Roots of the Revolution,” in Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative 
Perspective, eds. Merilee S Grindle and Pilar Domingo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003). 
70 Kohl, “Peasant and Revolution,” 246. 
71 Ibid, 247. 
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Indigenista Interamericano or III), based in Mexico City and which became an 
important arena for the discussion and study of indigenous peoples throughout the 
Americas. Significantly, the Pátzcuaro Congress that resulted in the formation of the 
III in 1940 was not a meeting of indigenous groups, rather it was a conference of 
academics, politicians and public officials from across the Americas. This pattern of 
participation and membership held for subsequent congresses, which periodically 
occurred up through the 1990s, when the Institute was closed and ceased to act as a 
specialized organization of the Organization of American States. The Pátzcuaro 
Congress itself is often credited with raising the level of public awareness about the 
need to address Indigenous issues.72  
The III itself emphasized a process of ethnic, cultural, and political 
acculturation suited to individual national conditions and provided resources and 
expertise in support of state sponsored “integration” programs. Under the auspices of 
the III, the practitioners of Indigenism merged the concerns of their discipline with a 
broader discussion about the nature of social and economic “development.” As 
Alejandro Marroquín, a former chief of the III’s Anthropological Section, described 
the link between Indigenism and integration: “the objective of Indigenism is the 
integration of the indigenous population of the nation, meaning by nation, the 
prevailing socio-economic system in a given country, with its own expanding cultural 
center that seeks to ideologically unify the entire society.”73 Through the III’s efforts 
in this direction, the organization did more than perhaps any other to promote 
72 Marc Becker, “Indigenismo and Indian Movements in Twentieth-Century 
Ecuador,” Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C., September 28-30, 
1995. 
73 Marroquín, Balance del indigenismo, 18. 
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Indigenism and to secure government support for “integration” policies.  
The III’s promotion of cultural and political “integration” served as a useful 
discursive frame for Latin American political elites eager to execute their own state-
building and national unification projects.74 Yet, if the III advanced the cause of 
indigenous “integration” in the region, new work in the fields of sociology, 
anthropology and ethno-psychology provided a less direct, but no less powerful, 
theoretical justification for the implementation of state policies encouraging 
“integration.”75 A growing body of work in the field of sociology (and often 
associated with Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons) elaborated new theories about 
the process of “social integration” that informed the ILO’s Andean Program. As 
perhaps the most eminent and influential sociologist of the postwar era, Parsons 
published several seminal works during the 1940s and 1950s, including The Structure 
of Social Action (1949), Toward a General Theory of Action (1951), and Economy 
and Society (1956). The increasing popularity of his work and its influence occurred 
just as the ILO embarked on a new era of expansion and experimentation.76 
Throughout his lifetime, much of Parson’s oeuvre was devoted to the 
development of a single, grand theory for the study of all social systems. Many of his 
writings from 1949 onward tackled, either directly or indirectly, what he considered 
to be the fundamental problem of all social systems: the structural weaknesses 
produced by the process of social and cultural “differentiation.” For Parsons, all 
74 Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples, 58. 
75 Ibid., 176. 
76 General Conference of the International Labor Organization, “Declaration 
Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization 
(Declaration of Philadelphia),” Twenty-Six Session, Philadelphia, 1944. 
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social systems were “differentiated and segmented into relatively independent units.” 
On the one hand, “differentiation” within a society was extremely beneficial, as it 
facilitated adaptation to new conditions and circumstances and made change or 
“progress” possible. While differentiation was inherent and necessary to the structure 
of every social system, Parsons concluded it also posed a threat that had to be 
addressed through a process of “integration.” “The functional problem of 
integration,” he concluded, “concerns the mutual adjustments [of individual] ‘units’ 
or sub-systems from the point of view of their ‘contributions’ to the effective 
functioning of the system as a whole.”77 In Parsonian theory, “integration” was the 
systemic remedy for a “disintegrating” social fabric, particularly where the root cause 
of the system’s weakness or collapse was tied to the presence of unassimilated 
cultural or ethnic groups.  
Parsons noted that “integration” could entail an array of social processes, but 
he emphasized the “institutionalization of normative culture” as the most important 
stabilizing force. Internalized norms (e.g. common values) together with “explicit 
prescriptive or prohibitory role-expectations” (e.g. laws), he argued, constituted the 
principal institutions that offset the imbalances created by differentiation.78 As a 
theoretician, Parsons did distinguish between his models and the “concrete” world, 
and he insisted upon the “imperfect integration of all actual social systems.”79 
Generally speaking, he remained aloof from the concerns of policymakers who might 
wish to use his work for their own purposes. Even so, his contention that the 
77 Leon H. Mayhew (ed.), Talcott Parsons on Institutions and Social Evolution: 
Selected Writings (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 163. 
78 Ibid., 126. 
79 Ibid., 128. 
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acceptance of collective norms by individuals and groups within a social system not 
only facilitated “integration” but also made economic differentiation (i.e. 
“development”) possible, became an important component of modernization theory 
and postwar development discourse in general. The work of Parsons and his students 
suggested a strong relationship between the processes of “integration” and economic 
“development” that were central to the discourse that structured the ILO’s “Andean 
Program.”80  
As Indigenism and the structural functionalist sociology championed by 
Parsons rapidly gained influence after the Second World War, each contributed to the 
integration discourse that informed the policies of the AIP. Indeed, the association of 
“integration” with Indigenism and modernization theory has led many scholars to 
define the term almost synonymously with “acculturation.” The social scientist Luis 
Rodríguez-Pinero, for example, has argued that the “crux” of Indigenist “integration” 
rested upon “the underlying assumption of the need to foster cultural change in 
cultural groups as a necessary precondition for the successful introduction of 
economic, technological, social, and political changes in indigenous societies.”81 As 
the Bolivian context outlined above illustrates, this was not simply a “neutral goal,” 
of purely scientific interest. Rather, “[it] was ultimately grounded on the political 
model of the nation-state and its ideal of homogeneity of the social fabric.”82 As 
Rodríguez-Piñero suggests, “integration” was also a prominent justification for 
80 Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples, 176. 
81 Ibid., 178. 
82 Ibid., 178.  
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international intervention on the part of the ILO and other organizations that 
participated in the Andean Program.  
From the beginning, the administration of the AIP program rested on the 
temperament, organization, and management skills of international experts. Until the 
AIP’s initiatives could be turned over to national authorities and because of the 
relative isolation and difficulty of transportation to and communication with the 
AIP’s Bolivian action bases, success and failure depended on the judgment of the 
experts in charge. The orientation toward integration and technocratic expertise that 
came to define the AIP at multiple institutional levels can be traced back to the initial 
survey mission that led to the establishment of the AIP. That mission was organized 
in 1952 and led by the New Zealand social scientist Ernest Beaglehole. Because of 
Beaglehole’s influence on the establishment of the AIP, it is worth pausing to 
understand how his own interests intersected with and contributed new elements to 
the discourse of social integration.  
Beaglehole’s experience and reputation was based on his work as an 
anthropologist and consultant to the government of New Zealand regarding the 
indigenous Maori. During the 1930s, he had worked in a similar capacity as a 
consultant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the United States, but it was his New 
Zealand experience that made him the ILO’s pick to oversee the mission and to draft 
recommendations for the Andean Program. An ethno-psychologist and anthropologist 
by training, Beaglehole brought a diagnosis of Bolivia’s current situation that 
reflected his own wide-ranging interests. While his doctoral work had examined the 




on acculturation and the disappearance of traditional native practices. He published 
his findings in 1946 as Some Modern Maoris followed by Social Change in the South 
Pacific in 1957. Some Modern Maoris was particularly notable for what Beaglehole 
(channeling Freud) described as the “character-structure” of Maori society, past and 
present. Beaglehole had developed his methodology in an earlier article published in 
the multidisciplinary journal Psychiatry. In the article, titled “Character Structure: Its 
Role in the Analysis of Interpersonal Relations”, Beaglehole articulates a theory of 
integration in which “every culture orders the interpersonal relations of its carriers on 
the basis of a set of universals and alternatives.” It remains for the individual “to 
understand and to control this system[,] mak[ing] it possible for him to order both his 
formal and his more informal or intimate social and private relations with other 
people.” He goes on to distinguish between the “primary” or original character 
structure and “secondary” character structures, which an individual may develop to 
enable “a person to react dynamically and adaptively to a new set of major 
directives.”83 The need to wrestle with new cultural, political, economic directives 
was especially problematic for indigenous groups confronted with a Faustian choice 
between acculturation and cultural separatism. The article itself is a fascinating 
example of Beaglehole’s roving and imaginative intellect, which (much like Talcott 
Parsons) he applied across disciplines in search of a grand theory of social 
integration.  
While Beaglehole was perfectly willing to appropriate the concept of 
“character structures” from psychoanalysis, the primary focus of his work was not the 
83 Ernest Beaglehole, "Character Structure : Its Role in the Analysis of Interpersonal 
Relations," Psychiatry, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1944),145-162. 
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“internal drives” that preoccupied most Freudians. As already stated, Beaglehole’s 
concern was the issue of social integration and adaptation. Yet, his analysis dictated 
that any attempt to address the issue of underdevelopment or to improve the way of 
life by introducing new economic techniques would be slow without first changing 
“the action and thought patterns of human beings who have been accustomed to a 
given way of life, a culture as the anthropologist terms it, for many generations.”84 
Put somewhat differently, but still in terms Beaglehole himself recognized, “[c]ultural 
integration without economic integration can never be successful; conversely 
economic integration may fail because of the blockages and resistances human beings 
place in the way of an economic integration that may do violence to their cherished 
values.”85 The ILO deployed Beaglehole as the chief of mission for the 1952 
expedition to map out the possibilities for a permanent program in Bolivia and, in 
1954, he became the head of the ILO’s Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour. 
The choice of Beaglehole to lead the Andean Indian survey mission and the 
subsequent enactment of the plan Beaglehole prescribed illustrates the fact that the 
AIP necessitated the creation of “new techniques of administration and policy making 
in the field of technical assistance.”86  The need to pair economic development with a 
thorough plan of social integration was essential to the integral method that would 
come to define the ILO’s approach to development in the Post-World War II era. 
84 Beaglehole emphasized that many different types of experts were needed for such 
an effort to be successful. Beaglehole, “A Technical Assistance Mission in the 
Andes,” 416. 
85 Ibid., 417. 
86 Ibid., 553. 
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The need for a new approach was of paramount concern to Beaglehole and to 
the officials at the ILO who were committed to making the AIP into a demonstration 
of a new and improved ILO. Beaglehole himself summarized the issue neatly in an 
article published shortly after the competition of his mission, as fundamentally a 
question of expertise. According to Beaglehole, an “integral” approach necessitated 
the establishment of a team made up of “experts in different fields—health, 
education, labour [sic], agriculture and so on—so that it would be possible to evaluate 
solutions already suggested while at the same time keeping in view the necessity for a 
integral solution and not a piecemeal nibbling at the problem.”87 Requisite expertise 
for the survey mission and the subsequent field operations of the AIP were provided 
by the ILO and its UN sister agencies (e.g. UNESCO, UN, FAO, WHO, etc.). Once 
on the ground, the survey team met with officials from the Bolivian government to 
develop a schedule for completing the mission survey of key regions, establish 
contact with the indigenous communities, and plan the new ways in which 
administrative action would be organized “when [AIP] action programmes [sic] were 
commenced.”88 The recommendations of Beaglehole and his team led directly to the 
organization of the AIP and made the case for a pilot program that would be used to 
encourage migration from the Andes to the lowland areas in and around the province 
of Santa Cruz.  
The technocrats who managed the technical assistance operations of the ILO 
were confident in their ability to act as change agents, and the experience of World 
War II convinced the ILO’s leadership in Geneva that projects such as the Andean 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., 529. 
 132 
 
                                                 
 
Program were needed to make the organization relevant for the new postwar world.89 
When AIP officials and experts deployed the term “integration,” they generally 
referred to a process of social and economic transformation that was, at least initially, 
under the direction of international technocrats. Backed by numerous social scientific 
studies, “integration” elevated state sponsored cultural assimilation to the level of 
evolutionary certainty. The ILO asserted, for example, that the Andean Program 
would “integrate” the indigenous peoples of Bolivia in a “peaceful process of 
evolution,” such that, “two ethnic groups may fuse into one national economic and 
social life.”90 The “two ethnic groups” of this binary consisted of indigenous peoples, 
on the one hand, and Bolivia’s politically and culturally dominant mestizo population, 
on the other.  
The ILO’s division of Bolivian society into two groups dramatically 
underestimated or intentionally downplayed the actual ethnic diversity of Bolivia, as 
well as other Andean countries. Besides differences in language (between Aymara 
and Quechua for example), indigenous peoples who lived on the Altiplano possessed 
89 As the technical assistance programs administered directly by the U.S. Point IV 
program, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and other entities, 
threatened to overlap and/or supercede ILO initiatives, officials urged in internal 
discussions that “now is the time for the [International Labor] Office to take the 
initiative in order to prevent the crystallization of an undesirable situation.” In the 
scramble to stay ahead of the pack and establish a foothold in the new era of 
“development,” part of the explanation for the timing of the Andean Program must 
include doubts about the ILO’s continued relevance in a new era. In the case of the 
Andean Program, at least one official counseled that the programs of other 
organizations “should not be permitted to develop without immediate appropriate 
coordination [with] the ILO.” Such council urged the organization to take decisive 
action or be left behind by history. Memo from David Efron to Mr. Fano and Mr. 
Alvarado, 22 August 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
90 “Technical Assistance to Latin American Countries on the Problems of Indigenous 
Populations,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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different interests from the so-called “ex-comunarios” who had previously relocated 
to urban areas. While the farmers and mine workers that lived in the Andean 
highlands made up the vast majority of Bolivia’s indigenous population, the country’s 
indigenous peoples were hardly a monolithic constituency. Similarly, the country’s 
non-indigenous population divided along economic, political, and racial fault lines. 
Echoing Bolivia’s own indigenista literary discourse and the social scientific theories 
of Indigenism, the assumptions that lay behind the ILO’s use of the term “integration” 
reified a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society into categories of “developed” and 
“underdeveloped” citizens. In a strategy leveraged repeatedly by western 
governments and international experts to promote development and stabilize 
politically weak allies during the Cold War, the Andean Program embodied the ILO’s 
goal of shaping Bolivia into a homogenous state that could effectively control and 
contain ethnic and social conflicts within its own borders.  
To the technocrats and experts who shaped the policy discourse of the AIP, 
indigenous “integration” was a grand experiment designed to test “the skills in social 
engineering of the United Nations and the Specialised [sic] Agencies.”91 This 
technocratic conceit is found in the earliest internal discussions of the AIP. In its 
initial proposals to the United Nations Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB), for 
example, the ILO deemed previous efforts to bring about the “integration” of 
indigenous peoples as “piecemeal, provincial, over-simple, unscientific and 
91 Ernest Beaglehole, “A Technical Assistance Mission in the Andes,” International 
Labour Review 67 (June 1953): 520-534. 
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impractical.”92 The chief result was “a vast accumulation of facts and a poverty of 
tested practical experience.”93 In contrast, the multilateral program envisioned by the 
ILO would be “integrated, organic, regional, scientific and practical.” 94 
As a method of intervention and control, the AIP could be disbursed and 
adapted to suit local needs and conditions. At the same time, ILO officials took great 
interest in cataloguing the “collective” ethnic and racial identity of indigenous 
peoples. The identification of certain shared characteristics that defined “indigenous 
experience” was paramount to the developmentalist goals of AIP technocrats. They 
believed that “effective international help [could only] be made available to 
governments” if a firm grasp of the “common denominators” was achieved. At the 
same time, the belief that indigenous peoples shared basic characteristics of history, 
culture, and circumstance, which needed to be identified, catalogued, and assessed, 
92 “Collaboration of the United Nations with the International Labour Organisation on 
Resoution Vii of the Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour in accordance with 
the recommendation of the Social Commission on the Andean Indians,” 6 July 1951, 
TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The governments of Peru, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador had rejected previous efforts on precisely these same grounds dating 
back to the mid-1940s, as the UN Department of Social Affairs promoted a series of 
seminars on child and community welfare. Even as officials stressed the novelty of 
the new program, in an effort to legitimate the Andean Program they cited numerous 
precedents. In addition to various UN mandates, the resolution on the “conditions of 
life and work of indigenous populations” passed at the Fourth Conference of 
American States Members of the International Labor Organization (Montevideo, 
1949) had recommended a program involving the resources of the United Nations 
Expanded Technical Assistance Program. Similarly, the ILO’s Committee of Experts 
on Indigenous Labor recommended the creation of a “joint field working party” at its 
meeting in La Paz, Bolivia three years later. The UNTAB was the administrative 
entity created at the UN to oversee its Expanded Technical Assistance Program, 
which provided both the funding and administrative oversight of the Andean 
Program. 
93 “Technical Assistance to Latin American Countries on the Problems of Indigenous 
Populations,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
94 “Technical Assistance to Latin American Countries on the Problems of Indigenous 
Populations,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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helped buttress official emphasis on the comprehensive nature the program. AIP 
officials carefully charted the existence of “national characteristics and differences,” 
while simultaneously viewing the program as a regional “development” project.95 
In fact, the preoccupation with the “common denominators” of indigenous 
experience shaped a range of policy decisions and enabled the AIP’s technocratic 
managers to draw parallels to and from experiences in other parts of the world. The 
influence of Ernest Beaglehole’s views on character structure and integration 
(discussed above) were clearly visible in the way the ILO would continue to define 
the AIP project. Thus, even as officials discussed the “special difficulties” faced by a 
group of Quechua-speaking participants in the ILO’s colonization project at Santa 
Cruz, Bolivia, they defined the basic problem confronting the colonists as that of 
“adaptation to a new environment and mode of life.” As a result, when ILO officials 
chose international personnel for the project, they deemed knowledge of the Quechua 
language “not quite as important” as other qualifications, yet considered “tropical 
experience” an “essential” asset.96 Indeed, one example of the sort of personnel 
choices made by the international administrators at the UN and ILO was the selection 
of Beaglehole himself to lead the 1952 survey mission that outlined recommendations 
95 “Technical Assistance to Latin American Countries on the Problems of Indigenous 
Populations,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. After 
the 1952 Beaglehole Mission (discussed in another section of the dissertation), the 
apotheosis of the ILO’s effort to define a set of collective characteristics that could be 
applied to indigenous peoples in toto came in 1953, with the ILO’s publication of 
Indigenous Peoples: Living and Working Conditions of Aboriginal Populations in 
Independent Countries. See International Labor Office, Indigenous Peoples: Living 
and Working Conditions of Aboriginal Populations in Independent Countries 
(Geneva, Switzerland: International Labor Office, 1953). 
96 “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO concerning staffing and 
equipment questions,” Paris, 28 November 1955, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet 
Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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for the Andean Program to the UN Technical Assistance Board. 
The concept of integration and its method of implementation also merged with 
the theme of “self-help.” In the case of the AIP, the term “self-help” referred to both 
the contributions of national governments as well as to the participation of indigenous 
peoples themselves. It became both a necessary requirement to secure funding and an 
operating principle that shaped the nature of international technical assistance 
programs during 1950s and subsequent periods. Even before the initiation of the ILO 
programs, “self-help” was one of the foundational principals behind U.S. bilateral 
assistance programs, dating back to the Office of Inter-American Affairs and the 
Institute of Inter-American Affairs during the Second World War and continuing with 
the Truman Administration’s Point IV program and the Kennedy sponsored Alliance 
for Progress.97 Not surprisingly, throughout the life of the Andean Program the most 
intense source of pressure to emphasize “self-help” as a prerequisite for international 
action came from the United States and particularly from the U.S. Congress. In 1952, 
for example, congress was eager to cut money designated for UN multilateral 
assistance programs from the federal budget. Had not the U.S. President (Harry 
Truman) intervened, congressional action would have halved the budget for 
multilateral assistance programs from 26 to 13 million dollars. For many 
97 As an advisor to U.S. President John F. Kennedy noted in a memorandum on the 
Alliance for Progress, “The keynote of the Alliance for Progress is a sustained effort 
for economic development and social progress, combining vigorous measures of self-
help with provision of complementary outside resources under the guidance and 
stimulation of greatly strengthened agencies for regional cooperation.” “Draft 
Memorandum From the Consultant to the Task Force on Latin America (Gordon) to 
the President’s Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin),” in Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. John P. Glennon, 
Edward C. Keefer, and Louis J. Smith (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1996), 6. 
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congressional members, technical assistance programs were worthy of consideration 
only if administrators could demonstrate a substantive contribution by local or 
national governments.98 Since the United States was by far the largest source of 
funding for the UN Expanded Technical Assistance Program, the constant threat of 
budget cuts had a dramatic impact on the final shape of technical assistance policy. 
The U.S. Congress was not the only source of pressure with regard to the 
emphasis on self-help, however. Integration discourse, and the technocrats who 
promoted its influence, contributed to an international climate in which “self-help” 
distinguished “development” from philanthropy. In 1955, for example, ILO 
administrators met with representatives of UNESCO (United Nations Education, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), 
and WHO (World Health Organization) to discuss the Andean Program. At the 
meeting, UNESCO officials stated their view that, “it should not be over-looked that 
the ultimate objective [of the Andean Program] must be the preparation of the 
members of the indigenous communities themselves for responsibility in what one 
might call ‘local government.’” Lacking this component, they concluded, no 
integration program was likely to succeed. Generally speaking, the UNESCO 
representatives insisted that, “members of indigenous communities should be 
provided with opportunities for the development of their own initiative and 
leadership,” especially in light of “the unhappy results of certain paternalistic 
experiments.” UNESCO officials rooted the basis for this belief in the “[m]odern 
98 Memo, Thatcher Winslow (Director of ILO Washington Office) to David A. 




                                                 
 
theory and practice concerning integration,” which “indicate[d] that outside assistance 
should act primarily as a sparking plug,” or a catalyst designed “to help the 
indigenous group to become aware of and develop its own potential resources.” The 
emphasis on “self-help” was meant to be prescriptive, a pedagogical rubric for nation 
building. To be effective, the UNESCO officials advised that technical assistance 
“should provide a minimum of material aid and services without which change could 
not be initiated,” but, “be given in such a way that it will stimulate the Indian’s own 
sense of responsibility.”99 At least in theory, the principle of self-help extended to 
relations with the national governments that participated in the program, but also to 
the participation of indigenous peoples themselves.  
Highlighting the active participation of aid recipients, the architects of the 
Andean Program attempted to head-off accusations of “paternalism” or neo-
imperialism, especially from critics located in or allied with the Soviet Union. At the 
same time, the ILO had to defend the program to outside observers and to other UN 
officials against the charge of unprofessional, unscientific philanthropy.100 As a 
mandated component of many “development” programs that began in the 1950s, the 
emphasis on “self-help” acted as an institutional sieve, constraining and limiting the 
99 “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO, Paris, 26 November 
1955,” Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.  
100 In early August of 1959, for example, the ILO was in the process of negotiating 
additional resources for the Andean Program through the UN Special Fund. One of 
the biggest obstacles in their quest was the skepticism of many UN officials, 
principally M. A. Lewis, the Managing Director of the fund. The ILO representative 
at the talks celebrated his success at convincing Lewis that the AIP “is not a 
philanthropic type of work but has a definite economic impact.” “Results of 
Discussions with Mr. W. A. Lewis on the Andean Indian Submissions to the Special 




                                                 
 
manner of projects granted international funding and support. At the same time, the 
link between “integration” and “self-help” also had important implications on the 
ground, for those programs that did receive the imprimatur of international support. 
As discussed in the next chapter, the AIP contained a number of different operational 
components designed to address the issue of integration as a universal model of 
economic and social development. The ILO’s universalist model, what it called its 
“integral approach,” was determined by the intersection of a field of forces that 







Chapter 4:  The ILO’s Integral Method and the Politics of Rural Development in 
Bolivia 
 
In 1958, on the eve of the organization’s 40th anniversary, International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Deputy Director-General Jef Rens addressed a Trade Union 
House in Caracas, Venezuela. The official purpose of his visit was a months-long 
review of the organization’s programs across the region, but Rens used the occasion 
to “[retrace] the history of the relations between the Latin American countries and the 
I.L.O.”1 In summarizing the last forty years, he reserved the highest praise for the 
Andean Indian Program (AIP). Six years after its launch in 1952, Rens noted, the 
enterprise was training “millions of efficient producers in agriculture, handicrafts and 
industry, who will form a market of some 8 million people with a far higher 
purchasing power.”2 He immodestly likened the AIP to “a new life … being born,” 
formed around the idea that, “the campesinos, by their own labour [sic], can improve 
their own lot.”3 According to Rens, the AIP demonstrated to indigenous peoples how 
they could increase their output and profit more from their own labor, while raising 
their standard of living and contributing to the economic development of the region as 
a whole. “We try to point the way towards civilisation [sic],” he reflected, “and the 
1 The speech was subsequently printed and made available to readers of the 
International Labor Review (ILR), the ILO’s quarterly journal. Jef Rens, “Latin 
American and the International Labour Organisation: Forty Years of Collaboration 
1919-1959,” ILR, vol. 80, no. 1 (July 1959): 1-25, 1. 
2 Rens, “Latin American and the ILO,” 18. 




                                                 
 
Andean Indians have shown themselves eager to follow.”4 Rens believed that the AIP 
had the potential to redefine life on the Altiplano.  
This chapter grapples with a more complicated and ambiguous history: one in 
which different social and political interests frequently collided. It examines 
encounters between national and international experts, pro- and anti-government 
forces, and indigenous peoples that fed into a larger debate about “development” and 
modernization in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America during the first decades of 
the Cold War. The ILO promoted the spread of the AIP’s “action bases” and 
“colonies” as a way to grow an indigenous middle class, to increase agricultural 
production, and to establish the foundations for future economic growth and political 
stability. As the following analysis demonstrates, however, those who came into 
contact with the AIP freely assigned their own meanings to the project. 
Confrontations over the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, the issuance of 
property titles, and the failure to provide promised services all could and did serve as 
sources of discord and mistrust. Colonization and resettlement were especially 
controversial aspects of the AIP scheme, attacked for the expense relative to other 
projects and for the difficulties encountered establishing permanent settlements. 
Focusing on the interplay of these and other elements of the AIP’s day-to-day 
operation complicates the legacy of the ILO’s activities in Latin America and 
compels us to ask new questions about the nature of its postwar turn toward social 
and economic development.  
4 Rens, “Latin American and the ILO,” 18. 
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The ILO conceived the AIP as an experiment to “develop every approach and 
technique which seems practically useful in breaking down obstacles to [social and 
economic] integration.”5 This included various “instrumentalities,” from the 
expanded use of existing community centers and the application of new land 
utilization techniques to more “experimental” programs in fundamental education, 
market cooperatives, and “community migration” or resettlement.6 In the AIP’s 
earlier planning stages, ILO officials had warned that some of these actions would be 
disruptive to daily life. Indeed, the recommendation made by Ernest Beaglehole and 
others (discussed in the last chapter) to utilize anthropologists to “circumvent or 
dissolve” the “cultural blockages and resistances […] encountered during the 
operation of the program” anticipated, and perhaps encouraged, this as a virtual 
certainty.7 The organization insisted, however, that, “the programmes [sic] of 
development will be initiated in such manner that they can become normal and 
integral parts of the national life of the countries concerned.”8 The result was 
something of a methodological conundrum, which the ILO’s postwar leadership 
committed the organization to solving. Disruption of the traditional patterns of daily 
life appeared to be an unavoidable cost of building a more integrated society in 
5 “Technical Assistance,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland. See also “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes, Andean Indian Project (Spring 
1958),” Z 1/1/1/1 (J.6), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 






                                                 
 
Bolivia and across the region, but the AIP would adopt an “integral approach” in a 
attempt to avoid the miscues and mistakes of earlier modernization schemes.9 
For those charged with managing the AIP’s daily operations, it was indeed the 
project’s underlying methodology that set it apart: what the ILO described as its 
“integral method” or “integral approach.” While surveying the program’s various 
operations during his 1958 trip, for example, Jef Rens insisted that, “[the Andean] 
[P]rogramme [was] a method rather than anything else,” as it “attempt[ed] to arouse 
the interest of the Indians in activities covering all aspects of life on the Altiplano.”10 
The AIP “trie[d] to teach the Indians how to improve their agriculture and to obtain 
from the soil higher production[,] both in quality and in quantity.”11 With the 
overarching goal of increasing production, the AIP’s focus included “experiments 
with seeds and new plants, as well as with natural and artificial fertilizers,” various 
construction projects, and the distribution of modern farming equipment.12 It 
encompassed “demonstrations on the care of animals and their diseases[;] medical 
and hygiene services; the increase of rural schools and the improvement of education; 
the organisation [sic] of vocation training in order to provide, for the Indian villages 
9 One example that was cited as a cautionary tale was the initial “failure” of the 
UNESCO fundamental education project in the Marbial Valley, Haiti. Jean Guiton, a 
UNESCO education expert, noted that in the case of the Marbial Valley project 
“responsibility . . . was shared with the Government of Haiti, but in the eyes of 
everyone it was UNESCO’s responsibility.” However, “UNESCO had met with 
financial and practical difficulties, and its prestige had very heavily suffered as a 
result.” According to Guiton, the project began to succeed only after “UNESCO had 
relinquished any responsibility for it.” “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with 
UNESCO, Paris,” 22 November 1955, Z 10/11/8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. 






                                                 
 
and communities, the skilled workmen who are lacking.”13 Rens noted that “[t]he 
‘integral’ method of the Andean Programme also provid[ed] literacy courses for 
adults, social assistances who work among women, to teach them how to make their 
homes more comfortable, to care for their children, to vary their diet, etc.”14 Finally, 
the need to move indigenous peoples from their traditional homes was also an 
important tool of the integral approach, which attempted to address every aspect that 
could support the success of the AIP experiment. As the AIP’s Regional Director 
reported in April of 1956: “We knew, certainly, the unfavorable conditions of the 
Altiplano, but the rank dryness which has just befallen these areas must convince us 
that the true solution to the problem of the Andean populations is the transfer of a 
great percentage of this population to areas that will ensure them of better living 
conditions.” It was for this reason that, “our Cotoca Project is of such cardinal 
importance as the first test of establishing the peasants of the Altiplano in the 
lowlands.”15 In short, virtually any area of daily life that could be legitimately tied to 
improvements in living standards fell within the purview of the AIP. 
 In practice, all this activity occurred throughout a network of “action bases” 
located in the rural areas targeted for reform. The bases formed the “linchpins” of the 
program’s ground operations, the scaffolding of the AIP’s institutional and 
administrative framework.16 To unpack the actual work that was done at these action 
bases one needs to consider the location of individual bases and the problems that the 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 12 April 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), 
ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 




                                                 
 
missions were meant to address. In Bolivia, the first of several bases was established 
at Pillapi, located in the Andean highlands near the country’s border with Peru. The 
location of the other Bolivian bases included Playa Verde in the southwest, Otavi in 
the south, and a resettlement colony at Cotaca in the Santa Cruz region to the east. In 
addition to providing social services and technical training to the local population, the 
purpose of Pillapi and the other bases was to create a permanent presence for the AIP, 
and hence for the Bolivian state, in regions where the government’s reach was limited 
or non-existent.17 As Rens suggested in a 1957 letter to his ILO colleagues, “the 
proje[c]t sites […] were never [intended to be] pilot projects” in the most limited 
sense. Rather, they were considered “bases from which action could be launched for 
the conquest of the Altiplano by progress and civilization.”18 Use of the term 
“conquest” to delineate the activities of the ILO’s field operations, particularly in a 
region where the tragic legacy of earlier imperial conquests were still quite visible 
and keenly felt, suggests the contradictions and solipsism of the ILO’s “integral” 
method. Even as it offered a critique of past imperialisms and emphasized the need to 
preserve indigenous culture, its practioners relied on an updated discourse of 
“conquest.” 
Located in relatively remote villages, high in the Andes Mountains, the action 
bases were outposts of reform activity that extended the reach of international experts 
and government officials into the countryside. The fact that the “administrative 
authority [of the Bolivian government] does not go beyond a radius of one hundred 
17 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” Z 11-10-8, 
David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
18 Jef Rens to Albert Guigui and David Efron, 28 January 1957, Jacket 4, Box 9, 
Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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kilometers from the large towns” was a prime consideration, which made the action 
base model an attractive solution to crusading international experts and government 
officials alike.19  Indeed, the very label “action base” implied the kind of dynamic 
changes sought by both groups, particularly the synthesis of socio-cultural 
“integration” and economic development. AIP planners had argued from the very 
beginning of the program that indigenous peoples “represent[ed] a great economic 
potential which has so far been barely tapped, or, if tapped, ineffectively.”20 As 
suggested in previous chapters, it was the view of ILO technocrats and many Bolivian 
government officials that, “[i]ntegration will be made easier to the extent that 
economic development can open up new types and sources of production and new 
means of communication, result in closer co-ordination between production and 
markets and, in general, raise the standard of living of the population.”21 For both 
groups, the AIP’s bases and colonies were bridges to a brighter, more prosperous 
future for Bolivia and its neighbors. 
Although the organization of the bases themselves was to serve as a universal 
model for future integration and development projects, other elements of the program 
were more directly adapted to national and local circumstance. In Bolivia, for 
example, passage of the revolutionary government’s new Agrarian Reform Law in 
1953, opened a doorway to the possibility of more fundamental societal changes. 
19 “Collaboration of the United Nations with the International Labour Organisation on 
Resoution Vii of the Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour in accordance with 
the recommendation of the Social Commission on the Andean Indians,” 6 July 1951, 
TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “Andean Indian Programme: Project Submission to Special Fund,” Corrected Draft, 
1959, Z 11-10-18-1 (J.1), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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Under a new revolutionary government with a broad reform agenda, the wholesale 
transformation of Bolivia’s old latifundia system dominated by a few oligarchic 
families seemed a real possibility. After Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution, the newly 
ascendant Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) regime embraced the use 
of agricultural cooperatives to industrialize the planting, cultivation, and harvest of 
rice, peanuts, quinoa, potatoes, and other commodities.22 Indeed, ILO officials 
believed that the new MNR-led government was “keenly interested in cooperating 
with the ILO” as part of its broad mandate to enact the promises of the revolution, 
including the redistribution of individual land titles to indigenous farmers and the 
need to make better use of indigenous labor.23 This was a space that at least some 
Bolivian government officials believed could be filled by the AIP. Bolivia’s new 
Minister of Indigenous Affairs, for example, emphasized that the government had an 
interest in ensuring that land granted under its Land Reform Decrees would be put to 
productive use. The ILO did not see this as a fact limited to Bolivia, as “[a]ll the 
projects in the Andean Indian Programme in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador have some 
22 “Extract from letter from M. Papdakos to M. Rens,” 28 October 1954, Z 11-10-8, 
David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
23 “G. Koulischer to Jef Rens,” 31 May 1952, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland. Koulischer was Assistant Director of the ILO’s Latin American Field 
Office and wrote to Rens to report on effort to negotiate with the Bolivian 
government regarding the AIP survey recommendations and field missions. The 
initial focus of the MNR’s agrarian reform plan was “only the intensification of 
educative action among the ‘comunarios” (indigenous collective land-owners) 
combined with technical help to the same people” Although, “no action towards 
parcellation [sic] of big land-holdings [was] envisaged,” the political climate in the 
countryside soon altered this plan. Xavier Caballero Tamayo, “Mission to Bolivia 
May 5th-27th, 1952,” 29 May 1952, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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connection with the land problems of the indigenous populations.”24 Although, for 
the reasons documented earlier regarding the control of land resources, the problem 
was especially pronounced there and the AIP’s market cooperatives in particular 
suggested a means of supporting the transition toward improved cultivation, including 
the introduction of modern, mechanized agriculture. Because “[t]he new owners 
would lack the economic resources to quickly improve methods and tools of 
cultivation,” Bolivia’s Minister of Indigenous Affairs reasoned, the market 
cooperatives enacted by the AIP offered a compelling alternative to distributing land 
to individuals or individual families. With the assistance of the AIP, the cooperatives 
“benefit more quickly from the [introduction of] technical aid and modern tools.”25 
For this reason, the Ministry recommended that the “operational range” of the 
Andean Mission cooperatives be expanded to become “a mechanism for the 
supplying of the cities.”26  
As a solution to the chronic shortfalls in national food production that led to a 
reliance on imports, agricultural cooperatives in which a small portion of earth could 
be distributed in the form of individual land titles while a larger share remained for 
collective production were an important component of the ILO and the Bolivian 
government’s “integration” and development programs. Yet, the ILO tread 
cautiously, lest it be accused of benefiting from the government land seizures. In the 
24 International Labour Office, “Activities of the ILO in the Field of Agrarian Reform 
and Related Subjects, 1955-1958,” Jacket 7, Box 10, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
25 Nuflo Chavez Ortiz, Ministro de Asuntos Campesinos to Alejandro Oropeza 
Castillo, Representante en Bolivia de la Junta de Asistencia Técnica de Naciones 




                                                 
 
fall of 1953, the ILO’s Director-General David Morse issued orders to the effect that, 
“it should be made clear that the Andean Project could not be associated with the 
expropriation programme [sic] of the Bolivian government.” Morse concluded that, 
“the ILO does not wish to take a position in respect of this policy,” but “it nonetheless 
would be wrong for an international institution to profit by such a policy.”27 
Considering the tripartite nature of the ILO, Morse’s reasons for enacting this policy 
are not difficult to surmise. In the event that such deals were made public, as they 
surely would be, he plainly feared a backlash from some of the ILO’s members.28 
Yet, he also insisted that, “there was no question of abandoning the project.”29 Morse 
instead sought to avoid any public endorsement or criticism of the Bolivian 
government’s land reform policies by the ILO. 
 Despite David Morse’s efforts to navigate around the politically delicate issue 
of land reform, the ILO’s partnership with the Bolivian government produced many 
opportunities for misunderstanding. For example, as Colonel Epifanio Rios 
Zambrana, of the Bolivian army, completed a report on the suitability of land near the 
city of Santa Cruz for use by the Andean Indian Program’s Cotoca settlement, he also 
reported on his confrontations with the small landowners who currently occupied the 
land. As numerous documents in the ILO’s central archive reveal, the Cotoca colony 
was envisioned as a kind of weigh station for “all Indians coming down from the 
highlands with a view to resettling in the Santa Cruz area whether on a spontaneous 
27 “Memorandum on discussion on land for the Andean Project,” 5 November 1953, 
Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. However, as the 
evidence below suggests, this was not the last word on the subject of land 





                                                 
 
or assisted basis.”30 Confronted with inquiries from the current occupants about the 
security of their existing land claims, Zambrana replied that “[t]he Government [has] 
recognized that the individual farmer’s efforts did not contribute in any way to the 
regional economy,” and it had “decided to organise [sic] agricultural co-operatives” 
with the assistance of the Andean Program.31 These farmers were not members of the 
landowning oligarchy that had dominated Bolivian agriculture for centuries. By 
Zambrana’s own admission, most were subsistence farmers who had themselves 
received the land in the form of a government grant. Yet,“[i]f a man who calls 
himself a stockbreeder only breeds 30 or 40 animals on a given area of land that 
would suffice for five or six hundred,” Zambrana sardonically reflected, “the practical 
result, whatever he may say or whatever strange ideas of prosperity he may have, is 
that he is a parasite living on the proceeds of his selfish little herd.”32 Given Bolivia’s 
chronic dependence on agricultural imports, Zambrana insisted the government’s 
plans would “not be jeopardized by the private interests of a handful of landowners,” 
whose current use of the land for the purposes of “small-scale farming” presented “a 
pathetic picture of inertia, quite incomprehensible in the modern world.”33  
An AIP survey conducted at about the same time, though more measured, 
seemed to echo Zambrana’s own conclusions about the government’s priorities. The 
results of the study “led to the recognition that there were three types of farmer and 
30 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” 20 June 1960, Z 
11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
31 “Report by Col. Epifanio Rios Zambrana on the Cotoca Area and the Lands 






                                                 
 
two types of [agricultural] exploitation” in Bolivia. 34 The first type included “large 
landowners or ‘haciendos’[sic], small landowners, and peons.” The second consisted 
of “haciendas and family farms.”35 The AIP report noted that, “[a]lmost without 
exception, the haciendas were prosperous because they had sufficient capital in 
various forms, and workers,” while “the family farms were economically deficient 
and at times poverty-stricken.”36 On this basis, “the conclusion was reached that the 
AIP project should follow the ‘hacienda’ system and not family exploitation, thus the 
system advocated was that of agricultural cooperation, in which it would be possible 
to assemble [the] capital and human effort needed for a large undertaking without 
hacendados [sic].”37 But the observations of other AIP officials suggested that the 
similarities to the old hacienda system were not just limited to the scale of the farms 
or the resources at their disposal. In 1957, the Chief of the AIP’s Cotoca mission 
noted in a letter to superiors that because “[r]elations between [the Indians] are highly 
personalized,” the problem confronting the AIP was “not a matter of colonizing large 
groups of Indians, but rather [of] efforts to help them with their own personal 
problems.”38 He concluded that, “this aid is symbolized by the Director of the project, 
a reflection of the old patron system.”39 If the goal was simply to increase agricultural 
production yields as quickly as possible, both the government and AIP assessments 









                                                 
 
agreed, then the creation of cooperatives based upon the model of the large haciendas 
was surely the quickest path to success.  
The AIP study largely agreed with the conclusions of the government survey, 
but at least some AIP officials took seriously the need to reassure local farmers who 
feared they would be adversely affected by the expansion of the cooperatives. 
Enrique Sanchez de Lozada (the AIP’s first Regional Director) attempted to allay the 
concerns of the displaced farmers by explaining that it was not the intent of the 
program “to harm the small holders established on the grounds given by the 
Government to the colony, but quite the contrary to try and help them.” Lozada 
assured the farmers that, “if the colony, as it was the case, needed their land to 
establish the village, we would make efforts to choose land elsewhere[,] provided that 
this does not harm the colony as a whole."40 Indeed, partly through Lozada’s own 
efforts, the landowners were induced to accept an arrangement in which the project 
used a portion of their lands to avoid a complete forfeiture of their property.41  
Local landowners were not the only individuals who questioned whether the 
Cotoca lowland resettlement colony represented the best use of the available land and 
resources. At a meeting in Paris in 1955, officials with the United Nations Education, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization doubted that the project was justified given that, 
“the needs of the populations which have moved and are moving from the Highlands 
unaided and those who remain in the Highlands are so great.”42 A memo circulated 
40 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 5 April 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), 
ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.  
41 Ibid. 
42 “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO,” 26 November 1955, Z 
11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The ILO would 
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by Jean Guiton, an UNESCO Education Expert, had precipitated the meeting. Guiton 
had voiced concerns that, “if the [Cotoca] Santa Cruz experiment results in harming 
one single ‘transplanted’ person [. . .] , or brings about the death of a single Indian, 
[the international] organizations . . . bear the responsibility.” The nub of the problem, 
for Guiton, was that, “our actions would sometimes seem to suggest [. . .]we believe 
that our status as international officials shelters us from such risks.” 43 Guiton’s letter 
to Rens explained his intentions in raising the alarm to his UNESCO colleagues and 
represented a serious attempt to raise difficult questions about a project that suffered 
much ambiguity of purpose. The original memo indicates that Guiton’s concerns 
stemmed from a conversation he had with two French social scientists who 
“expressed their misgivings (I should say their anger) at the [Andean Indian] project 
continue to battle doubts and skepticism of the Cotoca project in the future. The 
Director of the Peruvian indigenous institute, Dr. Carlos Monge Medrano, for 
example, allegedly sponsored a press campaign in 1957 that decried the 
“displacement of the populations of the ‘Altiplano’ into the low areas” as “pure and 
simple genocide.” When confronted, Monge denied his involvement. Enrique 
Sanchez de Lozada to Jef Rens, 9 September 1957, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. Lozada later reported, the opposition of such a prominent 
expert threatened to jeopardize the whole Peruvian program: “Our visit with the 
Minister was thus very profitable because, being already familiar with our action, he 
posed precise questions to us about Cotoca and admitted that we had restored his 
confidence, which had been somewhat shaken a few days before by the statements of 
a distinguished doctor who caused him a great concern by ensuring him that the roads 
of penetration towards the low valleys would not have any economic value [and that] 
it was illusory and even dangerous to consider the migrations of the natives of 
Altiplano towards the plains of Tambopata.” Enrique Sanchez de Lozada and Carolos 
d’Ugard to Jef Rens, 30 January 1957, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
43 Guiton continued, “[t]he responsibility of international officials seems to me, in 
such a case, to be much graver than that of national officials; the latter are exposed in 
the course of their duties to risks which we do not run.” Jean Guiton to Jef Rens, 17 
November 1955, TAP-A 13-2, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.  
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itself and the way in which it is conducted.”44  The main ILO representative at the 
talks, Deputy Director Jef Rens, responded directly to the fears raised by Guiton and 
insisted that new resources were being allocated to the Highlands. However, Rens 
also asserted that, “the demographic pressure [in support of migration] was 
inescapable, and it was impossible to improve quickly enough the agrarian economy 
of the Highlands to ensure the survival of the entire population of the Altiplano.”45 
Overcoming the initial resistance of his colleagues, Rens explained that the solution 
was to create a more sustainable system of agriculture in the lowlands, which relied 
upon “a combination of private ownership to supply individual stimulus to the Indians 
and large-scale exploitation to meet the economic needs of the community as a 
whole.”46 In other words, use of the AIPs cooperatives and the colonies themselves, 
which involved a combination of land redistribution and reorganization of local 
agricultural markets, were deemed essential to the deployment of the ILO’s integral 
method in Bolivia. They were deemed worth the risk, despite the objections raised by 
officials such as Guiton.  
The Cotoca site, located some 20 kilometers east of the city of Santa Cruz, 
represented one aspect of the two-pronged approach eluded to by Rens: first, to 
improve conditions on the Altiplano and, second, to ease the way for “natural” or 
“assisted” migration into under populated regions.47 This was, in fact, a “government 
policy” that the ILO was asked to help facilitate. Yet, officials from the Corporación 
44 Jean Guiton, “Andean Indian Highland Project: resettlement in the Oriente region,” 
Memorandum, 14 October 1955, TAP-A 13-2, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
45 “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO,” 26 November 1955, Z 





                                                 
 
Boliviana de Fomento (CBF), the government agency paired with the AIP to support 
the Cotoca settlement, criticized the Cotoca project for its “extremely high cost and 
poor administration.”48 International experts stationed at the AIP’s Otavi base 
screened and handpicked the settlers using a range of criteria, including health, family 
situation, age, and other factors.49 And several classes of experts were stationed at the 
Cotoca site itself: including construction and carpentry, public health, fundamental 
education, agriculture, manpower, and social work. However, at best, indigenous 
participation in the program was extremely modest. By August of 1957, “some 180 
colonists had been transferred to the project[,] about 80 of whom had moved away 
after varied periods of residence.”50 This result barely scratched the surface of the 
problem the Bolivian government sought to address through colonization, namely 
increased production and more efficient use of indigenous labor. It also, of course, 
was a rather modest result for a program that sought to bring “civilization” to the 
Andes. 
Several circumstances contributed to the slow rate of progress and the attrition 
of the colonos. The Cotoca mission chief, American Olen Leonard complained that 
there was a lack of equipment and other necessities at the Cotoca settlement and that 
the Playa Verde and Otavi action bases both were better equipped than Cotoca despite 
the fact that it employed 4 to 5 times more personnel. He specifically cited the failed 
48 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 30 March 1956, TAP-A 13 1-1 (J.3), 
ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. One CBF representative requested that the organization 
be freed from “any responsibility concerning the project.” Ibid. 
49 “Otavi,” Jacket 2, Box 12, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
The document was undated, but the other materials in this box were created between 
March 1954 and November 1955. 
50 “Cotoca Center-Inducement to Colonization of the Eastern Lowlands of Bolivia,” 3 
February 1957, Jacket 6, Box 9, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.  
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delivery of two trucks to Cotoca when they were re-routed to the other bases, lack of 
adequate funds, and the need for additional power generators and better pay for the 
experts.51 The challenges of transportation to and from the village contributed to 
these and other complaints and criticism by internal and external stakeholders.  
In addition to the challenges faced by the experts, the colonos themselves 
faced the greatest difficulties and hardship. As they attempted to establish roots in 
their new home, the settlers struggled to repay money advanced by the Bolivian 
government for housing construction.  Several years into the project, there were still 
not enough houses for all those who had come. The failure to distribute individual 
land titles in a timely fashion was also a major source of frustration, but which was 
largely outside the control of the international experts. The inability of the 
government to complete a timely survey of the colony slowed distribution of the land 
to individual settlers, and the small size of the land titles that were distributed (10 
hectares or not quite 2.5 acres) “force[d] the colonists to dedicate a major portion of 
their time to cooperative projects frequently against their will.”52 Finally, the effort to 
transform Cotoca into a regional breadbasket was severely hampered by the fact that 
there was no “decent road” linking Cotoca with the nearest city of Santa Cruz. 
Eventually better roads were constructed and important rail connections were 
established in Santa Cruz that literally paved the way for the desired economic 
growth.  
51 Olen Leonard to Abbas Ammar, 20 May 1957, Jacket 4, Box 9, Documents of Jef 
Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
52 “Cotoca Center Inducement,” 3 February 1957, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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ILO Deputy Director, Jef Rens had a different view of the underlying problem 
that plagued the colony at Cotoca, suggesting that it had much to do the “quality” of 
the settlers themselves. Rens believed that changes in the way settlers were selected 
would improve the situation. “Many of our settlers have already reached a certain age 
and have experience of life.” In other words, “[t]hey are not only miners and seasonal 
workers used to going to Argentina for the harvest, but also ex-soldiers from the 
Chaco War.” Whether Rens meant their age or overall life experience is not clear, but 
this evidently was the wrong sort of settler. “The Altiplano, however, is full of young 
and poor campesinos who have nothing to lose.” It was among this group, Rens 
suggested, “that the best settlers can be found.” 53  
Despite the difficulty the AIP experienced in recruiting and retaining settlers 
for the Cotoca settlement, ILO and AIP officials continued to stress the importance of 
the project as an experiment in social change. “The Cotoca experience, at least in 
part, has been unique in the annals of planned migrations,” concluded one memo. 
Admittedly, the project “has operated under conditions many experts have long 
considered as suicidal, i.e. have considered the transfer of people from high to low 
altitudes as a means for certain death.” But rather than question the efficacy of the 
project, this suggested, “a major contribution to the existant [sic] knowledge of the 
field,” which “will be lost within a few years and many of the pains of the project will 
be experienced all over again at some other time and some other similar place” unless 
pains were taken to learn from the Cotoca experience.54 This view of the AIP colony 
53 Jef Rens, “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes, Andean Indian Project (Spring 1958),” 14 
May 1958, Z 1/1/1/16, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
54 “Cotoca Center Inducement,” 3 February 1957, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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as an experiment in social change illustrates the ways in which every component of 
the program was constructed with an eye toward broader changes elsewhere. The ILO 
sought to refine the administration and practice of the “action base” and the “colony” 
in fulfillment of its technocratic vision. Under this paradigm, local circumstances, 
needs, and constraints could very easily be subsumed by the program’s larger 
“civilizing” mission. 
The politics of land reform and a failure to understand the complexities of 
local conditions and concerns compounded the difficulty of promoting the AIP’s 
agricultural cooperatives and experimental colony at Cotoca. This difficulty was also 
visible in the conditions that resulted from enactment of the Bolivian Agrarian 
Reform Law.  As suggested above, the Reform Law itself was a delicate subject for 
the ILO’s leadership, which complicated the ILO’s attempts to depoliticize the 
Andean Indian Program. This was especially the case with the so-called “ex-
comunarios.” As indigenous migrants who had left the countryside for the city some 
years before, under the new law the ex-comunarios were able “to reclaim the land that 
belonged to their family.”55 Yet, the interests of the ex-comunarios were not 
necessarily aligned with those of their rural relatives and former neighbors. In 
January of 1955, the AIP’s Regional Director Enrique de Lozada first warned that, 
“the natives of the [Pillapi] region [had become] very easy victims of this new enemy 
which, in addition to his indigenous origin […] was a member of the [ruling] Party 
[and] the trade unions, and had real political influence.”56 The danger, Lozada 
55 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Jef Rens, 4 January 1955, Jacket 1, Box 12, 




                                                 
 
explained, was that the ex-comunarios laid “claim to being [land] owners without 
working the land themselves, [and] involving the indigenous [people] in conditions 
less favorable than that which existed under [their] former bosses.”57 The potential 
existed for a “new system of exploitation” that, he concluded, the ILO and the AIP 
“could in no way accept.”58 Indeed, by October of 1955, the AIP Chief of Mission at 
Pillapi related that the situation had reached a critical stage, as the program’s 
agronomy expert who attempted to intervene in a land dispute had received threats 
against his life. “[T]hings got so bad last Friday, 7 October,” the Pillapi Mission 
Chief reported, “that our tractors had to work under the eye of armed guards.”59 The 
use of armed guards provided an ad hoc, temporary solution, but the legal questions 
opened up by land reform were left unresolved for years to come. Despite the 
confusion that sometimes resulted, the Agrarian Land Reform Law would remain an 
important aspect of the AIP and the Bolivian government’s campaign to bolster 
Bolivia’s agricultural self-sufficiency until the early 1960s. There is little doubt that it 
was one of the important legacies of the 1952 revolution, whatever its limitations.  
The example of the Pillapi mission illustrates how quickly events could spiral 
out of control at any of the AIP’s action bases. Tensions between the international 
experts and the national personnel stationed at the site had been a problem since at 
least January of 1955. By May of the same year, the situation had gone from bad to 
worse. The former Chief of the Mission, an American named William Dillingham, 
had left the project under a cloud of accusation and suspicion. The facts are far from 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 “Extract from letter from Mr. L.D. Schweng to Mr. Rens,” 9 October 1955, Jacket 
1, Box 12, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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clear in the historical record. However, as an exasperated Jef Rens later put it, he had 
allegedly “abandoned his post to go sprawl in the arms of his mistress in La Paz.”60 In 
February 1955, Rens wrote that he had made up his mind about what to do about 
Dillingham. “The Director-General, whom I up-date regularly […] strongly insists 
that we get rid of Dillingham.”61 This was not the first incident involving Dillingham 
and evidently Morse “had a precise memory of the previous incidents and thinks that 
we will always have difficulties with him.” Dillingham’s abrupt departure was 
followed by various intrigues, including “a cabal” that pitted portions of the local 
indigenous population, the Bolivian teachers at the base, and a nebulous collection of 
outside interests against the international experts. The situation finally came to a head 
when a young man named Mariano Huanco claimed that “on Monday 39 May, 
around 11 h. in the evening, he had seen a large truck near the Pillapi workshops 
unload 250 rifles[,] several machine-guns and some quantity of ammunition.”62 
Huanco alleged that individuals associated with the AIP base were arming themselves 
for an assault on local representatives of the government. Huanco specifically 
implicated Pacifico Vasquez, a teacher at the base, in the alleged plot. Vasquez was 
arrested and a government investigation ensued, which eventually cleared him of all 
charges. The risk of counter revolutionary forces or violence stoked by local 
60 Jef Rens to Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, 8 June 1955, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
61 Rens to de Lozada, 16 February 1955. TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland. Despite Dillingham’s shortfalls, he was still considered for a new post 
on the project in Puno, Peru. Rens granted that, “[i]t is true that Dillingham did good 
work in Lima in connection with the organization of the employment service.” 
However, “[t]he Puno project, on the other hand, will pose problems similar to those 
of Pillapi [and]  is a task whose complexity and political and human aspects exceed, 
in my opinion, Dillingham’s capacities.”  
62 De Lozada to Rens, 8 June 1955. TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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vendettas was a real concern. Subsequent events suggested that the witness was 
associated with a group that stood to benefit from the confusion such incidences 
could unleash, either as part of a dispute of land or as part of a plot by enemies of the 
government. The AIP’s Regional Director deemed Vasquez’s accuser to be “nothing 
but a tool of the ex-comunarios and communist agents.”63 Whatever the reasons 
behind Huanco’s accusations, the damage was done and the ILO’s trust in the 
national personnel assigned to the project was completely undermined. Instead, it was 
determined that the entire national staff at the base would have to be purged. As Jef 
Rens rhetorically asked after the sordid affair, how can a project “with the goal of 
integrating the Indians into the national community [of Bolivia]” fulfill its mission 
“with people who do not believe in it?” To succeed “with a population which was 
plunged for centuries in a sleep of inactivity,” Rens reflected, “[o]ne needs faith.”64 
Indeed, where the ILO lacked the wherewithal to control events on the ground, as was 
the case in Pillapi, the “faith” of Rens and a few others was one of the AIP’s greatest 
assets.  
On the other side of the AIP’s economic equation from the issue of land 
reform and the utilization of indigenous labor to raise agricultural production was the 
promotion of rural consumption, especially by encouraging the creation of a region-
wide middle class made up of skilled industrial laborers and independent farmers. 
Building a new middle class was the message that Jef Rens brought to the Andes 
during his 1958 tour and review of the Andean Indian Program. To the government 
officials he met with from Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador (all participants in the Andean 
63 De Lozada to Rens, 9 June 1955. TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
64 Rens to de Lozada, 13 June 1955. TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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Indian Program), Rens emphasized the need to engender the “middle-class,” by 
providing “increased wellbeing” and “land” to the “Indians.”65 In this way, he 
insisted, “a class would thus be created which, because of its comfortable 
circumstances would represent a factor of social and political stability in the life of 
the country.”66 Of course, this also meant finding ways to inculcate the values and 
standards of western, middle-class households. According to the diary he kept of his 
activities, Rens was never more impressed during the 1958 trip than when, upon 
arriving in a small village, he was met by “the whole community […] with the 
children lined up in two rows, waiting for us outside the school.”67 The school itself 
had been built with AIP assistance, but his attention was drawn more to the 
appearance of the people. To his surprise and pleasure, the children “were spotlessly 
clean, all wearing their best clothes,” and “smell[ing] of soap.” Rens concluded that, 
“from the point of view of cleanliness and clothing, they compare favourably [sic] 
with the schoolchildren of my own country.”68 The AIP school and the “spotlessly 
clean” children “smelling of soap” were no doubt outward signs of what Rens and the 
ILO hoped to achieve: a normative standard (of order, respectability, cleanliness, etc.) 
that synthesized the goals of social and cultural “integration” with economic 
development.  
No single group of individuals better epitomized the ILO’s efforts to 
encourage an indigenous middle class than the indigenous “social promoter,” who 







                                                 
 
served as “agents or intermediaries in the introduction of modern practices of 
economic organization.”69 As indigenous agents of modernization, the job of the 
social promoter was to mobilize “the material and human resources” of their 
community.70 The specific application of social promoters differed from country to 
country, but ILO administrators considered them essential to the AIP’s central aims. 
In most cases, they were provided with a certain level of scientific and/or technical 
training: for example, some received instruction in providing basic health services 
such as how to clean and dress a wound, while others learned industrial skills such as 
gasoline engine repair. As the social promoters applied what they had learned in their 
own communities, it was reasoned, they would help overcome the resistance of 
indigenous peoples to the use of outsiders’ methods. As one AIP official concluded, 
“[i]n every one of our projects the paramount objective will be to help each country in 
one way or another to integrate the indigenous populations.”71 In Bolivia, “this [was] 
achieved through short periods of training to gain a certain degree of ‘know-how’, 
after which the trainee [was] sent back to his own community to practice and 
propagate his newly acquired skill.”72 Those individuals selected to be social 
promoters were evaluated on their progress, while “[t]hose who succeed best in this 
propagation [were] brought back again for further training.”73 International experts 
69 “Andean Indian Programme—Project Submission to Special Projects Fund,” Z 11-
10-18-1 (J.1), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Enrique de Lozada to Albert Guigui-Théral, 30 October 1953, TAP-AND 2 (1953), 
ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. See also “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO, Paris, 26 
November 1955,” Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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organized and provided the training, but their impact would be amplified through the 
use of social promoters.  
The ultimate goal of the social promoters program was to institutionalize a set 
of practices deemed essential for integration and economic development. Put 
somewhat differently, as semi-permanent institutions that could be absorbed into the 
apparatus of the Bolivian government, the AIP’s “action bases” and “colonies” 
represented one metric of progress toward this goal. But another way that the AIP’s 
international experts defined success was through the cultivation of indigenous 
surrogates for themselves. Inevitably the social promoters worked more closely with 
the AIP’s international staff than did other members of their community, 
complicating the role they played in the program’s field operations. When social 
promoters rendered basic services to the community, it was hoped they “[would also] 
gain the confidence of the people” and “eventually… [be] recognized as community 
leaders.”74 If such individuals did emerge as leaders and/or civil administrators their 
role was more complex than that of an enabler. By virtue of their special position vis 
à vis the international experts and as a result of their knowledge of and close contact 
with their communities, they could function as brokers or bricoleurs between the 
AIP’s mission experts and indigenous communities.  Social promoters could act as 
agitators who questioned and even disrupted the plans of ILO administrators. 
Whatever difficulties were encountered by their use, the goal remained the same. As 
the AIP’s regional director Enrique de Lozada wrote in 1953, “the most desirable 
outcome would be for [the indigenous auxiliaries and social promoters] . . . to become 
74 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” 1960, Z 11-10-
8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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Government employees,” creating “for the first time” a group of “Indian 
administrators.”75 In this way, Lozada concluded, “a great degree of integration 
[would be] reached.”76 Thus, the social promoters were a key element of the ILO’s 
integral approach to development and as such encompassed many of the 
contradictions of that approach as it was put in practice. 
Although the ILO supported the view of Bolivian state officials who wanted 
to connect increasing production and consumption to indigenous “integration,” there 
were sometimes tensions between the AIP’s focus on the gradual process of 
“integration” and the desire of many government officials for more immediate signs 
of progress in agricultural or industrial production. The ILO integration policy 
projected the gaze of the Andean Indian Program years, sometimes decades into the 
future, beyond “immediate circumstances, such as the current industrial situation.”77 
In Bolivia, ILO policy sought to address “the possible economic development of the 
country” at a “moment when the reorganization of agriculture and the exploitation of 
other natural resources such as oil, would give rise to a demand for qualified labor.”78 
In contrast, officials from the Bolivian government often sought more immediate 
gains. For example, as the MNR government sought to boost its oil production, 
particularly in the area near Santa Cruz and stretching north to Cochabamba, the 
government sought to boost domestic consumption of oil products. Bolivian President 
Paz Estenssoro expressed his view to AIP Director Enrique de Lozada that, “it would 
75 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Albert Guigui-Théral, 30 October 1953, TAP-AND 
2 (1953), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
76 Ibid.  





                                                 
 
be necessary […] to introduce the use of oil products among the Indian population,” 
in order to both improve the standard of living and to boost domestic consumption. 
The use of oil based products and the use of oil stoves constructed out of scrap metal 
would, Estenssoro suggested, “have a very great effect upon the agriculture of the 
highlands, since, from time immemorial the Indians have been using natural 
fertilizers for fuel purposes, thus depriving the soil of its only natural fertilizer.”79 
The stoves could be produced using the AIP’s machine shops, the Bolivian President 
suggested, at relatively low cost.  
While the long view espoused by the ILO was frequently repeated back to 
Bolivian government officials impatient with the Andean Program’s rate of progress, 
the ILO also could not afford to simply ignore the AIP’s critics.  
Attempts were made to address the gulf between the AIP’s ambitious goals and its 
much more modest results, particularly the suggestion that the programs colonization 
schemes distracted from the goal of raising industrial output, which was heard from 
Bolivian and non-Bolivian critics alike.  The economic strategy of import substitution 
embraced by many Latin American governments during the 1950s and1960s called 
for more emphasis on rapidly building up national industrial capacities. By the end of 
the 1950s, as plans to expand the AIP using resources from the United Nations 
Special Fund for Economic Development and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
somewhat greater emphasis was directed toward creating “conditions necessary for 
encouraging capital investment” and for “a greatly expanded demand for the products 




                                                 
 
of industry.”80 ILO officials had always said that, “higher production and the raising 
of living standards of the Indians would enormously contribute to the national income 
and would increase internal markets.” This conclusion was based on the fact that, 
“[t]he Indians constitute the main potential source of manpower for new industries 
and for the colonization of new lands.”81 But industrial development was a distant 
goal of the AIP’s rural development strategy, a fact that increasingly brought it and 
the ILO into conflict with the nearer term aspirations of the Bolivian government. By 
the 1960s, if not before, the pendulum had shifted. The government was impatient for 
a new strategy. 
The goal of the Andean Indian Program was to formulate a synthesis between 
the social and cultural objectives of integration and rural economic development. 
Indeed, an ILO calendar printed in the late 1950s and featuring the AIP’s purported 
achievements suggested the anticipated results of this synthesis. The calendar 
described the indigenous participants in the program as “peons of today, men of 
tomorrow.”82 On the one hand, the ILO had premised the AIP on the notion that 
“integration” required dramatic changes in the culture of indigenous peoples, and 
even the mass relocation and removal of entire communities from the Altiplano.83 To 
80 “Andean Indian Programme: Project Submission to Special Fund,” Corrected Draft, 
1959, Z 11-10-18-1 (J.1), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
81 The memo trumpeted the AIP’s achievements over the last decade for the benefit of 
the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, who was then on a 
diplomatic tour of the region. “Memorandum for Adlai Stevenson,” 16 June 1961, Z 
11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
82 “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes, Andean Indian Project (Spring 1958),” Correspondence 
between the D-G and Mr. Jef Rens. Jan. 1957-December 1958, Z 1/1/1/16 (J. 6), 
David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
83 As discussed above, relocation was the a key recommendation of the Beaglehole 
mission and a prerequisite of the AIP’s Cotoca, Bolivia settlement and a favored 
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build the “men of tomorrow,” the AIP promoted indigenous “integration” and non-
coercive assimilation as essential to raising living standards and increasing economic 
productivity. This represented a challenge to (if not an outright assault upon) 
traditional ways of life in the Andes, and it subsumed the protection of indigenous 
individual and/or collective rights under the broader goal of improvements in “living 
conditions.” In the calculation of many AIP and Bolivian government officials, this 
was the price of progress.  
The calendar and the events that followed its publication suggest the immense 
uncertainty that defined the Bolivian political landscape and the slipperiness of the 
ILO and the AIP’s own development discourse. During his 1958 mission to the region 
described in the introduction to this chapter, Jef Rens used the calendar’s 
transformational message as an illustration of what he predicted to be the future of 
Bolivia and the region as a whole. In one respect, his prediction proved almost 
prescient. The AIP’s emphasis on building-up the middle-class did, in fact, anticipate 
some of the thinking that would inform the United States’ sponsored Alliance for 
Progress in the 1960s. In 1961, the historian and then special assistant to U.S. 
President John F. Kennedy Arthur Schlesinger Jr. urged that U.S. policy be directed 
toward “carry[ing] the new urban middle class into power and produce, along with it, 
such necessities of modern technical society as constitutional government, honest 
public administration, a responsible party system, a rational land system, an efficient 
system of taxation, mass education, social mobility, etc.” Schlesinger made his 
solution by several of the program’s international experts and administrators. See for 
example Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 12 April 1956, TAP-A 1-1 
(J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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recommendations days before President Kennedy announced “a vast new 10-year 
plan for the Americas.”84 But the situation on the ground was never the ILO’s to 
direct and control. By 1965, as part of the Alliance for Progress initiative, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) had launched a new 
community development program in Bolivia, the introduction of which coincided 
with the 1964 military coup that overthrew Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro 
in favor of a junta led by the Vice President, René Barrientos. In many ways, the 
USAID program mirrored and indeed eventually absorbed the activities of the AIP. 
But it also (no doubt) better complimented the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s 
anti-communist operations in the Bolivian countryside, especially in pursuit of the 
Argentine revolutionary Ché Guevara.85 The AIP was, then, finally absorbed into the 
fabric of Bolivian politics and society, but hardly in the way its cadre of international 
experts had intended. The opening for applying the ILO’s integral method to execute 
its unique but flawed version of “development” was rapidly closing. 
84 Arthur Schlesinger, “Report to the President on Latin American Mission February 
12-March 3, 1961,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume 
XII, American Republics, eds. John P. Glennon, Edward C. Keefer, and Louis J. 
Smith (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 11.  
85 See “Bolivia – National Integration Plan,” Jacket 2, Box 12, Documents of Jef 
Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. This document was undated but the source folder 
contains material from March 1954 to November 1955. On the capture of Ché 
Guevara see “Briefing Background Material: Bolivia,” Spring 1969, Folder 1216, 
Box 150, Series O: Washington, D.C., Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family 
Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York. See also, for 
example, Kenneth D. Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 153-157; Klein, Bolivia, 225. 
Unfortunately, the USAID records pertaining to this period of activity in Bolivia 




                                                 
 
Chapter 5:  The AIP and the “Integral Method” as Regional Development 
 
This chapter continues the analysis of the ILO’s efforts to develop a new 
model of social integration and economic development in the Andes region 
throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. Whereas the last chapter focused on the 
development politics that engulfed the ILO’s Andean Mission in Bolivia, chapter five 
looks more closely at the regional character and impact of the program. The Bolivian 
project was, throughout the history of the ILO’s involvement in the region, the 
conceptual and technical center of the AIP—the fortunes of the program tended to 
rise and fall on the success and failure of the Bolivian experiment. Bolivia possessed 
the largest population of indigenous peoples in the region and it was the original 
impetus behind the establishment of the program. Yet, as suggested in previous 
chapters, the AIP had always been conceived in broader terms. As Deputy Director 
Rens reflected in his to a colleague, “[o]ne of the main aims to be achieved [was] to 
get the national administrations of the Andean countries in such a shape that they 
[could] handle Indian affairs in the same manner as matters of concern to all other 
categories of citizens.”1  The ILO defined the goals of the AIP not just in terms of 
“integrating” indigenous peoples, but also specific practices and techniques of 
governance. It did so as a part of a comprehensive approach to regional development.  
Regarding the goal of transferring the AIP projects intact to the national 
governments, the ILO sought “guarantees that with our help[,] the ministerial 
departments will organise [sic] themselves so as to be able to cope in a routine 
1 Jef Rens to Abbas Ammar, 11 March 1957, Jacket 4, Box 9, Documents of 
Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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manner with Indian affairs.” To this end, as early as 1957 the governments of the 
Andean nations that participated in the program were encouraged to “begin to think 
about taking over responsibility for [AIP] projects.”2 The establishment of societal 
and governmental structures that would make the “handl[ing] of Indian affairs” as 
routine, as unexceptional as any other service provided by the state or state 
institutions—this was the overarching regional goal of the AIP.3 Perhaps 
unavoidably, this effort to make indigenous affairs an unremarkable aspect of the 
social, political and economic landscape of Bolivia and its neighbors conflicted with 
the desire of indigenous peoples for cultural and economic autonomy and was at odds 
with the particular historical factors and circumstances that defined the societies 
where the AIP operated.  
The ILO’s integral method was conceived as a transnational, cross-cultural 
method that could be suited to meet the needs of a particular national situation while 
remaining widely applicable as a mode of translation between the so-called 
“developed” and “developing” worlds. As discussed in Chapter 3, the purported 
universal applicability of the ILO program was also rooted intellectually in the 
perspectives of Indigenism, structuralist sociology and the ethno-psychological 
theories promoted by Ernest Beaglehole and others. Looking to Bolivia’s neighbors in 
Ecuador, Peru and Colombia, this chapter explores how the AIP attempted to 
organize local villagers and migrant settlers into new communities throughout the 
Andes region. In doing so, it addresses the degree to which the Bolivian case was 
representative of the AIP’s efforts throughout the region during the period 1952-1965 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid.  
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and describes some of the ways in which the AIP confronted local or national 
circumstances in the deployment of a regional development strategy. It demonstrates 
that at the regional level the AIP was applied as an antidote to many of the national 
“exceptionalisms” that both its experts and development discourse in general 
identified as the chief impediments to economic growth and social integration. While 
a detailed project-by-project comparison of the AIP’s operations across the region 
would be a useful exercise for the purpose of teasing out specific differences between 
the affected countries, such an exercise is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Emphasizing the “common denominators” and circumstances affecting indigenous 
peoples throughout the Andes, regardless of national borders, the AIP’s experts 
conceived their work in terms of its regional impact. Lessons learned in one country 
were to be applied universally. In this regard, the Bolivian case is proven to be 
representative of the AIP’s primary goals and operations in other countries and an 
important case study of the ILO’s integral approach to development under the 
leadership of its Director General, David Morse. The following sections on Ecuador, 
Peru, and Colombia illustrate this fact while at the same time suggesting some of the 
challenges that accompanied this construction of the AIP as a regional program. 
The Ecuadorian Case 
In the fall of 1962 an “uprising” occurred in the village of Cuenca, Ecuador, in 
the province of Azuey.4 The event led to several deaths, including two AIP officials 
4 The substance of my account comes from a report from the Ecuadorian chief of 
mission, as well as the report from a meeting involving several ILO administrators 
and the Catholic Bishop from the region in which the event occurred. The 
observations of the Bishop of Riobamba, Leonidas Proaño, were particularly 
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who were visiting the village, Dr. Jorge Merchán (Chief of the Azuay “sub-centre”) 
and a social worker named Hernán Vinueza. Two other members of the team, a nurse 
and a driver, suffered injuries. On the morning of October 2nd, the four-member team 
disembarked for Cuenca amid reports that there were plans to attack members of the 
AIP in the region, which according to subsequent testimony they disregarded. When 
the team arrived at the village square, a group of “probably 100 hostile men and 
women with sticks, machetes and stones” confronted them and “forced [Dr. Mechan, 
Mr. Vinueza, the nurse and their driver] out of [their] vehicle.”5 Failing to dissuade 
their attackers, the AIP team made their way to the village church and sought 
assistance from the local parish priest. The account found in the ILO archives 
suggests that the priest offered no assistance, refused to address the mob and retired 
to his house in the village. The AIP representatives “followed him, being attacked all 
the time by the hostile crowd and then tried to take refuge in the priest’s house.”6 The 
crowd then continued to attack the team. “Cut with a blow from a machete,” the nurse 
fainted and “was then poked in the cheek with a knife and left for dead.”7 Regaining 
consciousness somewhat later, both the nurse and chauffeur managed to escape by 
important in attempting to reconstruct the event. Proaño served as Bishop of 
Riobamba for over three decades and was known as one of the most outspoken 
promoters of Catholic liberation theology in Ecuador. There is no indication that an 
investigation beyond the initial report provided by the Chief of Mission and the 
administrators’ meeting ever occurred or attempted regarding the incident. See 
Memo, David Efrón, “Note on the Cuenca Tragedy,” 7 October 1962, Director-
General’s Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILO Archives, Geneva, Switzerland; “Report 
from Chief,” Andean Programme, Ecuador, 9th October, 1962, Director-General’s 
Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILOA; and Abbas Ammar to David Morse and David Efron, 
30 October 1962, Director-General’s Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 





                                                                                                                                           
 
stealth from the scene. Meanwhile, the doctor and the social worker absorbed the 
mob’s fury, “put[ting] up what resistance they could.” Mr. Vinueza, “who was young 
and fit, received many blows before he collapsed.”8 According to the report, “[t]he 
crowd was so violent that both the bodies of the doctor and the social worker were 
stripped naked,” and “the social worker’s eye was poked out and his whole body was 
covered with cuts.”9 A local teacher who had attempted to assist them “was attacked 
in a similar fashion, knocked unconscious and left for dead while the crowd set […] 
to cover the other two bodies with dried leaves and set fire to them.” When local 
authorities later arrived to recover the bodies, the village was empty.10 
The violence of the above account is arresting, but just as striking are the 
conclusions offered in explanation of the bloody episode.  Noting that there had been 
similar occurrences in the region before, although none involving AIP experts, the 
ILO officials who examined the attacks and the aftermath concluded that the 
uprisings were instigated, “by certain elements who were anxious to maintain the 
status quo and saw in the work of ‘Mision Andina’ a danger to their vested 
interests.”11 Among those groups were political parties, the local Chimborazo 
Provincial Council, the Riobamba municipality, big landowners, and the liquor 
merchants, who were described as “[t]he greatest enemies of the Programme [sic] 
who do not hesitate to spread gossip and lies in order to create confusion and hostility 








                                                 
 
Comercio (Quito) on October 3, 1962 suggested that the Indians associated the AIP 
with the Agricultural Census (carried out by the Ecuadorian government).13 The 
papers also suggested that members of the AIP were “smeared as having communistic 
affiliations,” while the standard account of the incident found in the Director-
General’s files also emphasized the fact the AIP officials were mistaken for 
“communists.”14 Indeed, one of the indictments made against the parish priest in the 
aftermath of the attacks was that he had not attempted to persuade the crowd that the 
AIP experts were not, in fact, communists.  
ILO and AIP officials had always approached relations with Catholic Church 
and its representatives with respect and caution. In 1957, for example, the AIP had 
discussed a partnership with the Catholic Bishop of Riobamba who was interested in 
getting some assistance from the AIP “for the more efficient utilization of Church 
estates [that lay] within the area of the Andean Indian project in Ecuador.”15 The 
assistance provided involved some soil surveys, “farm management advice,” and 
some assistance from a “co-operative expert.” From the perspective of project 
leaders, collaboration with the church represented an opportunity to develop certain 
elements of the program. But it did not come without risk. As D.L.W. Anker (the AIP 
expert who handled the negotiations) noted, “[b]earing in mind the prominent 
position of the Church in Ecuador I consider that a successful effort by the Bishop 
would do much to foster ‘colonisation’ work in Ecuador.” Anker suggested that, 
13 David Efron, “Note on the Cuenca Tragedy,” 7 October 1962, Director General’s 
Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
14 Ibid. 
15 D.L.W. Anker to Abbas Ammar, 7 October 1957, Jacket 5, Box 9, Documents of 
the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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“[t]he Government having set up a Colonisation [sic] authority recently[,] there would 
seem to be every reason for encouraging the success of the first efforts” but with an 
eye toward ensuring that the project was guaranteed to succeed. Therefore, Anker 
concluded, “the Bishop should not be encouraged to proceed unless he can be assured 
of adequate technical advice until the project can stand on its own feet.”16 The AIP 
welcomed collaboration with the Church, under the right circumstances, but 
proceeded with caution lest the risk of failure might jeopardize the wider efforts of 
the Andean Program. 
Stronger and more generalized reservations about close cooperation with the 
Church or its representatives can be found elsewhere. Jen Rens cautioned about the 
appointment of a Father Froman to one of the Ecuadorian AIP sites on the grounds 
that it could establish an undesirable precendent. “Without wanting to exclude priests 
from our T.A. Programme,” Rens wrote, “I do not think it is wise to put them on the 
education posts.” Rens pointed out that “there is some fear among certain Indian 
quarters towards our Programme on account of the use of the word ‘Mission’[and], 
[s]o as to overcome this fear, we are planning to abandon the use of the [term]” It 
would seem highly inconsistent, Rens continued, “now to recruit a priest.”17 While 
the church was highly influential in and across the region, the ILO sought to steer the 
AIP clear of the complicated legacy that informed the Church’s relations with 
indigenous peoples.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Memo, Rens to Ammar, 21 March 1956, Jacket 3, Box 9, Documents of the Jef 
Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. See also Rens to Ammar, 17 July 1957, Jacket 4, 
Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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Despite the tragedy that befell Dr. Merchán and his team at Cuenca, the AIP’s 
Chief of Mission in Ecuador (an American by the name of David Luscombe) believed 
that the Andean Program was on much firmer footing in the rest of the country, in 
part “because the methods adopted are closely in line with the original experimental 
project in Chimborazo and depend on secure bases in the communities which we have 
been influencing from the very beginning.”18  However, he added that, in addition to 
the Azuey where the attack on Dr. Merchan had occurred “[t]here are some 
exceptions to this in Tungurahua Province,” and that financial problems were mostly 
to blame: the Mission had not “been able to carry out many of the useful physical 
projects of the type which attract attention and we have not apparently, as a result, 
had the degree of support from the mass of the villagers which was essential to 
maintain or activities against the counter-interests,” i.e.  the politicians, landowners, 
and liquor merchants cited above.19 The motives of the project’s enemies could be 
financial and political, linked as they were to the administration of government 
authority and government programs for rural development. In the narrative 
constructed around the Cuenca tragedy, which Luscombe highlighted as a struggle 
between the forces of “reaction and progress,” the villagers who allegedly perpetrated 
the violence are portrayed as the victims of outside forces, incapable of generating 
grievances of their own or of acting for their own purposes.20 This depiction of 
“indigenous peoples” as innocent savages erases the complicated field of forces that 
contributed to the incident.  
18 “Report from Chief,” Andean Programme, Ecuador, 9th October, 1962, Director-





                                                 
 
It is not unlikely that many of the participants in this tragedy, from the 
villagers to local interests who opposed the AIP’s efforts in the region, from ILO 
officials in Geneva to church officials in the region largely viewed the incident 
through the lens of the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution in particular. Ecuador’s 
political landscape was deeply affected by the Cuban Revolution, which gave rise to a 
series of anti-communist regimes largely controlled by the military. President José 
María Velasco Ibarra had been elected with widespread popular support in 1960, but 
his refusal to purge his government of alleged communists and to break off relations 
with Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba fell afoul of U.S. policy in the region and ran 
counter to the interests of traditional ruling elites. Terrorist attacks, some of which 
were later found to have been orchestrated by rightwing paramilitary groups against 
the Catholic Church and other village institutions, were blamed on communist 
insurgents and slowly drove much of Ecuador’s indigenous population away from 
liberal politicians such as Velasco and his Vice President and immediate successor 
Carlos Julio Arosemana. Arosemana’s time in office ended abruptly with a military 
coup in 1963.21 
The Cold War context notwithstanding, the villagers also confronted a series 
of changes, which coincided with or were brought about directly by the AIP. One 
such project was the construction of a 40-kilometer long road built by the Ecuadorian 
army, with American support and the help of local, indigenous voluntary labor. 
Construction of the road was to support the migration of indigenous groups, which in 




                                                 
 
officials generally looked upon such migration as a key element of any scheme to 
improve the quality of life for indigenous groups in the region, Ecuador exemplified 
the contradictions that accompanied a large scale migration program. Vocational 
training provided by the AIP made it possible for local villagers to seek work 
elsewhere, which from the perspective of some national government officials 
undermined efforts to develop rural areas. Likewise, in the Peruvian context, two AIP 
experts went so far as to suggest that demonstration project set up to teach basic 
mechanical skills be reconsidered because, “the training would be wasted since, 
instead of returning to their communities, the Indians would try to get Government 
jobs.”22  
In Cuenca, the negotiations for the road into the region were being conducted 
David Luscombe. As mentioned above, Luscome was an American and the AIP’s 
Mission Chief in Ecuador. Luscombe hoped that the road would improve “access to 
Indian areas in the Province and in beginning to set up the basic services necessary” 
to support the AIP’s and the government’s activities in the region.23 Indeed, to 
explain the tragedy that occurred at Cuenca, Luscombe pointed to the region’s 
relative lack of contact with the outside world and noted that, “the Province has 
always been a difficult one to work in because the pure Indian communities are very 
isolated and in areas where roads have not yet been constructed and […] have very 
special and difficult problems not found to the same degree in other parts of the 
22 “Memorandum sobre la Asistencia Técnica a las Poblaciones Andinas (Más 
especialmente Muquiyauyo,” 5 August 1954. Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of the Jef 
Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
23 “Report from Chief,” Andean Programme, Ecuador, 9th October, 1962, Director-
General’s Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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country.” 24 Not to be discouraged, he concluded that the Cuenca incident “has 
resulted in us receiving a great deal of sympathy and, above all, in the stark nature of 
the clash between reaction and progress being forced into the forefront of the 
situation of the entire country,” referring specifically to the coverage in the national 
daily El Comercio.25 
The AIP program in Ecuador began along similar lines as those conceived for 
the program in Bolivia. A document included as an annex to the 1956 “Report on the 
Nation” (Informe de la Nacion, 1955-1956) by the Ecuadorian Minister of Social and 
Labor Affairs noted that in Ecuador as in Bolivia,“the task of incorporating the Indian 
into national life is a task which should be integral, covering all aspects of the life of 
the indigenous populations.”26 As in Bolivia, the ILO and its partners conceived this 
to mean that the program “should be augment the productivity of the campesino and 
the indigenous artisan, making him a more efficient producer, and aiding him to 
commercialize his products, converting him into a more useful consumer.”27 The way 
in which this goal was pursued by the program was also consistent with the AIP’s 
actions in Bolivia, which emphasized providing indigenous men with “instruction and 
a trade which would enable him adequately to earn his living when he had to leave his 
habitual occupation or social medium, improving his house, food and conditions of 
health and hygiene, giving him elemental knowledge which will serve him as a 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Annex to Report to the Nation 1955-1956, “Assistance Programme to the 
Indigenous Communities of Ecuador,” Jacket 3, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, 




                                                 
 
foundation for accepting new techniques and adapting himself to modern progress in 
social life”28   
In Ecuador, the AIP did place more emphasis on promoting the development 
of local handicrafts for a commercial market. Attempts to promote the idea led to an 
exhibition of Ecuadorian rugs at UN headquarters in Geneva, which included “some 
of the Indian workers on [the] project.”29  Yet the similarities between the Bolivian 
and Ecuadorian projects were stronger than their differences.  The use of social 
promoters and the training of national experts to eventually take over the work of the 
AIP was also a core focus of the Ecuadorian program, as it was in Bolivia. It was 
necessary for the local populations to “participate actively from the beginning in their 
own emancipation so that they can take advantage of and use to the full the means 
given to them, to improve their present situation.” 30 This meant cooperation with 
local village leaders as well as Provencal Councils and national government 
ministries. In a letter to David Luscombe in March of 1958, ILO Assistant Director-
General Abbas Ammar reminded the Chief of the Ecuadorian project of the 
importance of developing that national expertise. “I do not need to emphasize the 
importance of this matter,” Ammar wrote, “as I am sure you will agree that it is a 
basic factor in our programme and that no useful purpose will be served by our 
28 Ibid. 
29 Abbas Ammar to Andrew W. Cordier (Exec. Assistant to Secretary-General, UN), 
17 March 1956, Jacket 3, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
30 “Visit by Mr. Abbas Ammar, Assistant Director-General of the International 
Labour Organisation, to Ecuador Friday, 10 May to Friday, 17 May 1957,” Jacket 4, 
Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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continuing to do the work ourselves.”31 He nevertheless felt the need to make the 
point that, “[e]ducation is the essence of our programme: the sole reason for our 
presence in Ecuador is the training of national personnel in order that they may 
gradually become capable of working alone along the lines we jointly lay down and 
may eventually take over full responsibility for the project.”32 In Ecuador as in 
Bolivia, the use of Indigenous social promoters was intended to eventually replace the 
international experts with national counterparts, thus institutionalizing the changes 
enacted by the AIP, and advancing the AIP’s regional focus on “the social 
rehabilitation and real integration of the Indians in their national society.”33  
The Peruvian Case 
Although transportation and communication were of constant concern to the 
officials in charge of managing the Andean Indian Program in all of the countries 
where it operated, nowhere did the construction of a single road so govern the 
program’s fate as it did in the Tambopata Valley of Peru. Although the Peruvian 
government and the AIP sought to promote Indian migration and settlement of the 
valley, the Tambopata region near the town of Sandia was rapidly becoming a 
destination for migrants who traveled from the Late Titicaca Region as well as the 
Yungas region of central Bolivia as a result of a number of factors unrelated to the 
plans of the government or international organizations. Perhaps the most important 
single factor was several years of prolonged drought in the 1950s, which squeezed 
31 Abbas Ammar to David T. Luscombe, 6 March 1958, Jacket 10, Box 10, 





                                                 
 
families and created more difficult living conditions than normal throughout the 
region. In addition, the Bolivian Revolution in 1952 had the effect of repatriating 
many indigenous migrants who had originated from across the border in Peru but had 
served as the primary labor force of the Yungas in Bolivia. As the AIP experts 
dispatched to review the situation concluded, “these newcomers were fulfilling a very 
important function, since they were well-acquainted with tropical agriculture, 
particularly in coffee growing, and were helping in the adaptation of those who had 
come from the highland regions.34 
ILO officials, including Deputy Director Rens, saw enormous potential for 
development in Peru along with many challenges. Besides the AIP, American and 
German investment was involved in the mining and agricultural sectors.  The 
American businessman Robert Le Tourneau, for example, was engaged in a scheme 
to clear nearly 100,000 acres of tropical forest for settlement and agricultural 
development. Le Tourneau was best known for the design and production of 
engineering equipment, a field in which his company was an innovator and market 
leader. Using his large earth moving equipment, Le Tourneau planned to sell the 
cleared land in Peru to German immigrants. Rens, for one, suggested the project 
might be worth a closer look by the ILO, “as it may well be that we can do some 
business in the field of migration.”35  
34 “Excerpts from Progress Reports on Andean Indian Programme Dealing with 
Negotiations with Peruvian Government,” Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of the Jef 
Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
35 Jef Rens to the Director-General, 5 August 1954, Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of 
the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 184 
 
                                                 
 
Despite the potential for large scale agricultural production in the valley, the 
hopes to establish a program to support the natural migration that was already 
occurring hinged on the construction of the road. Jef Rens remarked that, “the main 
condition for success…is the construction of this damn road about which everybody 
speaks and nobody seems to do anything about.”36 “Without roads,” another official 
who reviewed the situation reported, “it will be difficult to undertake the resettlement 
of surplus populations from the highlands.”37 The role of the AIP in the region was 
not to construct the necessary roads, but to support resettlement with the 
establishment of health services and training centers that would assist the migrants 
with the transition to their new homes and provide the know-how necessary to 
accelerate agricultural production. The Peruvian government was faced with limited 
resources and sought partnerships not only with the ILO, but also with the U.S. aid 
program then known as Point Four. While the ILO wished to complete additional 
studies before committing to action, Peruvian government officials were impatient to 
show results. A frank discussion with the Peruvian Minister of Indigenous Affairs in 
April 0f 1954 led Enrique de Lozada, the AIP’s regional director to conclude that, 
“what is happening means that we cannot proceed in the usual [slow and cautious] 
manner of international organizations [sic].”38 His conversation with the Minister 
suggested that the Peruvian government would “not wait for several months until the 
health and agricultural experts have gone and made their studies, as was the original 
36 Ibid. 
37 “Excerpts from Progress Reports on Andean Indian Programme Dealing with 
Negotiations with Peruvian Government,” Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of the Jef 
Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
38 Enrique de Lozada to Luis Alvarado, 7 April 1954, Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of 
the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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plan.”39 As discussed in previous chapters, this was one of the principal reasons that 
the ILO had embarked on the AIP in the first place, i.e. to remake itself as more than 
a regulatory organization and to take a bold new step in expanding its field 
operations. According to Rens, embarking on a program of technical assistance that 
produced rapid results was, “the only way in which we will satisfy the [Peruvian] 
Government in the long run.” It was simply fact, Rens continued, that “[t]echnical 
assistance becomes more and more meaningless and uninteresting to the receiving 
countries, unless they see, from the outset, practical results and not [m]ere written 
reports, no matter how good these may be.”40 To achieve the ambitious goals of the 
program (integration, community development, increased economic production and 
consumption) and to satisfy the Peruvian government, the ILO had to show results. In 
the end, Lozada’s lobbying effort along with the support of several government 
offices resulted in promises to provide the funds for construction of the road. 
Unfortunately, there was still by no means unanimous agreement within the Peruvian 
government as to the need for the venture, which continued to delay completion of 
the project. 
The ILO confronted challenges with the implementation of the AIP in Peru in 
other ways as well. The Peruvian Institute for Indigenous Affairs and its President, 
Dr. Carlos Monge, was considered an obstacle to the success of the program because 
of his doubts about the efficacy of resettlement programs such as those promoted by 
the AIP in Tambopata. Monge was a prominent physician and founder of Peru’s 





                                                 
 
biology of “Andean man,” which combined aspects of evolutionary biology with the 
Indigenist discourse discussed in previous chapters. According to Monge, the Andean 
man constituted a “distinct climatological variety of the human race” and in the way 
in which he had adapted to the unique ecosystem of the Andean highlands 41 On this 
basis, he warned that efforts directed at relocation or colonization—such as the AIP’s 
Cotoca settlement in Bolivia and its site in Puno, Peru—were a mistake. He opposed 
resettlement on the grounds that climatic adaptations that had made life in the 
mountains easier for indigenous peoples would lead to illness and death in lower 
elevations. Indeed, Monge had opposed the resettlement projects advocated by the 
original Beaglehole mission and Jef Rens and others suspected that he meant to stop 
the program in its tracks if he could. As Lozada recalled his previous encounters with 
the man as part of the Beaglehole mission, he noted that, “the theories of Dr. Monge 
would oblige us to give up one of the most effective branches of our activities: the 
displacement of the populations of the “Altiplano” into the low areas.”42 Monge 
supported more focused efforts to develop the highland regions, however suspect his 
biological theories may appear today. His dispute with the AIP, however, illustrates 
the way in which the program’s main tenets and chosen methods of implementation 
were applied across the region to affect the condition of indigenous peoples. 
The Colombian Case 
Colombia was the last of the countries to which the projects of the AIP were 
extended under its regional framework. The AIP was deployed in a limited fashion to 
41 “Andean Man,” June 23, 1947, Time Magazine. 




                                                 
 
Colombia as part of the transition in funding sources away from the Expanded 
Program for Technical Assistance and to the UN Special Fund. Colombia was 
attempting to emerge from a 20 year civil war (often referred to in Spanish as la 
Violencia), the bloodiest conflict in the Western Hemisphere during that period. 
Despite the violence and bloodshed that plague the country from 1946 to 1966, the 
Colombian government engaged a number of international resources during this 
period for the purposes of promoting economic development. Perhaps the most well-
known of these was the so-called Lebret Report, named after the French Dominican 
economist Father Louis Lebret. In the 1950s, Lebret was commissioned by the 
government of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to complete a report on Colombian society that 
included recommendations for how to promote development.43 In the late 1950s, the 
ILO expanded the Andean Program to the Cuaca region in Colombia, at the request 
first of the Roja regime and subsequently the National Front, a centrist political 
coalition. Before and after the end of the Rojas regime in 1957, the details of the 
Lebret Report had begun to be enacted with the deployment of teams of experts 
across the country. It was within this context that the ILO dispatched Grégoire 
Koulischer between September and December 1958 to devise a plan for the proposed 
expansion of the AIP. An emergency credit issued by the U.N. Technical Assistance 
Board funded the Koulischer mission. The dispatch of Koulischer, an ILO official 
who had completed a similar mission to Ecuador in 1955-1956 and who would go on 
to direct the ILO’s programs in Africa, followed a formal request by the Colombian 
43 Robert Karl, “The Politics of International Community Development in Colombia’s 
New Cold War, 1957-66,” Paper presented at the Transnational/International History 
Postgraduate Intensive, 22-25 July 2008, University of Sydney, Australia. 
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government for international assistance. While Koulischer’s report focused 
specifically on indigenous groups living in the Cuaca Valley, it drew heavily from 
and supported many of the conclusion found in the Lebret Report.44  
Cauca, where the ILO study was focused, was one of the five Colombian 
provinces most seriously affected by the violent political and social crisis which had 
ravaged the country since 1946. Within Cuaca, municipalities with a large Indian 
population had suffered the most, yet according to Koulischer, the Province contained 
one of “the greatest concentrations of Indians who, though not yet integrated, are 
considered capable of being integrated immediately.”45 Critical to the impact of the 
civil war on the indigenous population in Colombia was the resguardos, a system of 
communal property that dated to the colonial period, and Cuaca contained 54 of the 
84 resguardos in the country. Each resguardo was governed by a cabildo or 
community council.46 Along with their communal system of governance, Koulischer 
noted, one other significant aspect of the resguardos was their relative lack of 
agricultural productivity. Due to “the peculiar conditions of the Indian communities,” 
Koulishcher concluded that the territories of the resguardo are “badly farmed and 
much of it left fallow.”47 He found that the inhabitants of the resguardos “have no 
knowledge of the use of fertilisers [sic.], crop rotation or irrigation […] and they lack 
the machinery to improve or repair [their] primitive equipment.”48 The lack of 
production largely explained why the Colombian government and the AIP attempted 








                                                 
 
to work together in Cuaca, but the resguardo system often did not function in practice 
as it was supposed to in law. Somewhat differently than the struggles that resulted 
from the Bolivian Land Reform law discussed in previous chapters, small groups 
within the Indian communities had come to dominate the cabildo and communal 
lands were sold-off despite legal limitations prohibiting such sales. The result, 
Koulischer concluded, was “social and moral degradation” of resguardos and the 
communities they served.49 He had no doubt that this constituted “an obstacle which 
must be overcome both in the interest of the Indian population and with a view to 
implementing plans of economic development for the whole province.” As to how to 
approach the problem, Koulischer suggested that the situation of the resguardos 
would change “only by increasing the Indians’ output, which requires in its turn the 
application of an over-all programme (general and technical education, supervised 
credit, extension and organization of markets, etc.) adapted to the peculiar 
characteristics of the resguardo population.”50 His report went on to stress the 
changed circumstances of these communities in the modern world. The affected 
communities were being forced to confront new modes of regulation, which included 
the intrusion of a monetary economy. “Unprepared for the need to buy and sell, 
unfamiliar with technical progress and wage labour,” Koulischer concluded, “they 
require technical assistance.”51   
For its part, the Colombian government sought not to abolish the resguardo 






                                                 
 
areas with little cultivable land to territories with more arable land. In Colombia, as 
with the colonies established by the AIP in Cotoca, Bolivia and Puno Peru, the 
purpose of such relocation programs was to make the resguardos “into units capable 
of administering themselves” through the “progressive development of co-operative 
methods, de facto if not de jure, in all matters concerning sales, purchases and credit,” 
and adjustments in the nutritional habits of the population.52 Despite efforts to 
address the problem in Colombia, the program had been largely ineffectual. The key 
to unlocking the economic potential of the resguardos was, in addition to 
administrative reforms, new roads and other infrastructure improvements, the training 
of “Indians who will be capable of promoting the rehabilitation and integration 
programmes [sic] in their respective communities.”53 Drawing on the AIP 
experiments in Bolivia, Koulischer recommended, “these Indian promoters [would 
obtain] the technical knowledge required to enable them to help the resguardos in 
adjusting to modern forms of economic and social organization.”54 Quoting the 
Lebret Report and echoing the diagnosis of the Beaglehole Report from the AIP’s 
original survey mission, Koulischer argued that, “what must be done is study all the 
positive aspects of their ancient customs in order to help those Indians to evolve 
towards more productive types of work and a higher standard of living.”55 In short, 
Colombia needed the organic, holistic approach to integration that the ILO and the 
AIP had already prescribed for Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. 






                                                 
 
Unintended Consequences 
The Andean Program promoted indigenous “integration” and non-coercive 
assimilation as essential to raising living standards and increasing economic 
productivity. This chapter has specifically addressed some of the ways in which the 
AIP was applied across the Andes region to support social integration through the 
application of international expertise. As suggested above, unique circumstances 
affected the AIP’s efforts in each country, but the focus and primary goals of the 
program varied rather little as a result of the ILO’s contemplation of specific national 
differences. Ecuador, Peru, and the planned expansion into Colombia by the ILO and 
its fellow U.N. agency partners shared many of the same characteristics and basic 
assumptions as the program deployed to Bolivia discussed in previous chapters. 
Across the region, because the AIP largely defined integration in terms of, firstly, 
acculturating indigenous peoples to an a priori concept of modernity and, secondly, 
increasing the production and consumption of national economies across the region, it 
tended to subsume the protection of indigenous individual and/or collective rights 
under the broader goal of economic and social development. Ironically, the true 
regional significance of the AIP may have been that the ILO’s involvement with the 
program helped to push the organization toward ratification of a special category of 
rights for indigenous peoples. That resolution was the ILO’s Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention, passed in 1957 and commonly known as Convention 107. 
The AIP was conceived as a means of launching the ILO on a bold new path 
that target social integration and development; the AIP it did not give a prominent 




Nevertheless, it was through the ILO’s orchestration and administration of the AIP 
that Convention 107 was made possible. The ILO’s management of the AIP allowed 
the organization to claim some direct knowledge and expertise in attempting to 
address the problems that affected indigenous peoples. Moreover, the lack of any 
provision for social and political rights within the framework of the AIP exposed the 
gaps in the ILO’s own “integral” approach, leading at least indirectly to eventual 
passage of Convention 107. For its part, Convention 107 provided an opening for the 
subsequent recognition of the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples 
by international law.56 It did so by recognizing, for the first time, “[t]he right of [land] 
ownership, collective or individual” by indigenous peoples and by providing specific 
protections for traditional indigenous “customs and institutions.” Convention 107 
shared the integrationist perspective of the Andean Program by defining these special 
protections and other measures as transitory and unnecessary after the process of 
social integration was complete.57 It did not, as has been subsequently noted by 
scholars such as S. James Anaya, “envisage a place in the long term for robust, 
politically significant cultural and associational patterns of indigenous groups.” 58 
Convention 107, nevertheless invoked the Philadelphia Declaration’s affirmation of 
the right of “all human beings . . . to pursue both their material well-being and their 
56 See for example S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 55-56; Patrick Thornberry, 
International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, , 1991), 367. 
57 International Labor Conference, “Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection 
and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in 
Independent Countries,” June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (entered into force June 2, 
1959).  
58 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, 55. 
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spiritual development.”59 For all its historic and historical limitations, and as James 
Anaya concludes, “through the conceptual and institutional medium of human rights,” 
Convention 107 “established a foothold” for the subject of indigenous peoples within 
the international system.60 This “foothold” became an important precedent for 
subsequent struggles by indigenous groups across Latin America, Africa, Australia, 
and elsewhere. Convention 107, combined with the subsequent efforts of indigenous 
peoples themselves to challenge the integrationist narrative, eventually led to a 
version of indigenous identity within international law that articulated autonomous 
rights for indigenous peoples regarding land, work, social and cultural institutions. 
 
59 General Conference of the International Labor Organization, “Declaration 
Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization 
(Declaration of Philadelphia),” Twenty-Six Session, Philadelphia, 1944. 
60 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, 56. 
 194 
 
                                                 
Conclusion 
The origins of the Andean Indian Program cannot be reduced to a single moment 
or isolated historical event. Nevertheless, the ubiquitous expansion of technical assistance 
and “developmentalism” since the 1950s—not to mention the millions of lives affected 
by such programs—underscores the importance of understanding the triggers that 
compelled the ILO’s postwar turn. My dissertation has argued that initiation of the AIP 
depended on the establishment of new transnational networks and institutions, which 
spurred the formation of a new internationalism at the ILO. I have argued that this 
internationalism reflected the will of a technocracy possessing both a shared experience 
and a common belief in the capacity of international institutions to meet postwar 
challenges and the efficacy of American models of economic and social development for 
the world. Officials at the ILO sought to make the ILO relevant after World War II, and 
the AIP compelled a significant reorientation of the ILO’s traditional methods of 
operation. To affect international social policy norms, the ILO previously had focused its 
efforts on the passage of international labor standards. With the inauguration of the AIP, 
this focus began to be matched, if not entirely superseded, by direct programs of technical 
assistance. Several aspects of this new approach first found expression in the Andean 
Indian Program. Perhaps most importantly, the AIP explicitly linked technical expertise 
to specific techniques for social and economic development. These techniques included 
the establishment of “action bases” and colonies that brought local communities under 
the AIP’s sphere of influence. Resettlement projects such as Cotoca were designed to 
reverse or reorient centuries old patterns of migration, settlement, and work in Ayamara 




economic cooperatives that more closely tied local agricultural production to demand for 
products in national and regional markets. Rural education and infrastructure 
development were also important components, which required the collaboration of 
Bolivian state officials and the use of indigenous social promoters. Together, the various 
elements of the ILO’s strategy contained a putatively universal model of development 
that was heavily determined by United States hegemony. This strategy supported the 
goals of modernizing Latin American states, increasing production and consumption, 
growing the region’s middle class, and integrating historically excluded populations. This 
approach, what the ILO increasingly defined as its “integral” approach, was a departure 
from the past: for the first time, and as a compliment to the organization’s traditional 
standard setting activities, the ILO attempted to enact international social policy norms 
directly from the field. 
The application of technical expertise at precise geographic points on the globe—
i.e. the social-political vectors that appeared most at risk and prone to failure—was the 
essence of the new internationalism that David Morse and others brought to the ILO. 
Morse’s friend and confidant Snowden Herrick summarized this new internationalism 
succinctly in a letter to Morse in 1953, although Morse himself and others quoted 
throughout this dissertation expressed almost identical sentiments. Several key themes 
discussed throughout this dissertation resonate in Herrick’s letter. The idea of “putting 
people in the field,” Herrick wrote, would overcome the perception that the ILO “spends 
most of its time looking for occasion [to pass] new Conventions and Recommendations, 




knows how to do.”1 This impulse toward legislation, these “sterile preoccupations” as 
Herrick referred to them, was a “hangover from the days before technical assistance.”2 To 
compel the necessary changes at the ILO and beyond, Herrick suggested, was a herculean 
task that required deliberate action and resources. If the ILO was to become an effective 
and meaningful force in world affairs, he concluded, then the United States was “key to 
the situation,” as “the dynamic country,” as the source of ideas, money and resources to 
act on shared ideals.3 Thus, besides the familiar call to action and reform, Herrick’s letter 
captures another important theme of my dissertation, namely that faith in technical know-
how, in the expert’s capacity to bring about a “perceptible decrease in human misery,” in 
a technocracy of expertise, was a version of American exceptionalism vigorously 
exported in the decades immediately following the Second World War.4  
As if continuing the conversation with Snowden Herrick decades later, Morse’s 
1969 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech connected the themes of “peace-building” and 
the need to develop “social cohesion and stability” as the primary justification for the 
ILO’s technical assistance efforts over the last decades: “To provide these countries with 
the resources, the technical and managerial know-how, and the institutional and 
administrative framework which are essential for viable nationhood in the modern 
1 Snowden Herrick to David Morse, 8 May 1952, Folder 41, Box 53, David A. Morse 




4 Ibid. Morse wrote back to Herrick several days later on May 19th that, “I think you are 
correct in practically all the points you make (perhaps because they happen to coincide 
with points that I have been making and reiterating in Geneva ever since I took over).” 
David Morse to Snowden Herrick, 19 May 1952, Folder 41, Box 53, David A. Morse 




                                                 
 
world,” it was “for this reason that the ILO gives top priority in its work today to the 
strengthening of developing nations.”5 In addition to the emphasis on building up this 
“social infrastructure,” as Morse described it, my analysis of the ILO’s efforts to promote 
development and social integration through the auspices of the AIP also suggests the 
need to pay close attention to specific encounters. In the communities targeted by the 
Andean Indian Program, confrontations over the formation of market-oriented 
cooperatives, the distribution of property titles, the use of the natural environment, and 
the failure to provide social services defined the contours of resistance and participation 
by indigenous peoples. These types of encounters, some of which have been discussed 
throughout this study, illustrate the need to widen the lens through which international 
institutions have been viewed historically. Thus, a third theme is the need to understand 
such institutions as arenas in which ideas about the “nation,” “region,” “expert” or 
“populations” are construed, constructed, and contested. My work on the AIP contributes 
to our understanding of the transnational nature of these encounters as seen through the 
lens of the international technocracy. 
The need to demonstrate the ILO’s capacity and commitment to the active 
deployment of expertise in support of social justice made the Andean Indian Program an 
important, if risky, venture for the ILO. The degree of cooperation and coordination 
required, involving numerous state and non-state actors, had rarely if ever been attempted 
before the launch of the AIP in 1952. In addition to the unprecedented nature of the AIP, 
other circumstances may have reduced the ILO’s willingness or ability to sustain the 
5 David Morse, "International Labour Organization - Nobel Lecture: ILO and the Social 
Infrastructure of Peace,” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace 
/laureates/1969/labour-lecture.html (accessed November 12, 2013).  
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program, without diminishing its importance as a model for future initiatives. First, there 
is some evidence that David Morse’s relationship with his Deputy, Jef Rens, had begun to 
disintegrate by the early 1960s. Obviously, the AIP figured larger in the ILO’s postwar 
plans than the vision of just one man, but, as previously suggested, Rens had been a 
champion and defender of the AIP since its inception. By 1962, Morse had served as the 
ILO Director-General for thirteen years and contemplated retirement, which he 
announced in the fall of 1961.6 Although he had made enemies during his first 10 years at 
the helm of the ILO, he still retained many strong personal and professional relationships 
with colleagues in the United States government.. Indeed, Arthur Goldberg, then U.S. 
Secretary of Labor, personally “recruited” and persuaded Morse to reverse his decision 
and seek another term as Director General.7 When the votes were finally counted, among 
the member states, only Russia, who had rejoined the ILO in 1954, and Romania opposed 
his reelection. Morse was unanimously supported by the Workers Group of the ILO’s 
Governing Body.8  
Despite widespread support from the ILO’s membership for his reelection, 
Morse’s decision to pursue another term did not please the leader of the largest and most 
powerful labor union in the United States, AFL-CIO President George Meany. Upon 
learning of Morse’s retirement plans in the fall of 1961, Meany backed Jef Rens as 
6 “Memorandum: For the Files,” 5 January 1962, Folder 8, Box 53, David A. Morse 
Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New 
Jersey. 
7 “Memorandum: For the Files,” 5 January 1962, Folder 8, Box 53, David A. Morse 
Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New 
Jersey. 
8 David Morse to Arthur Goldberg, 19 March 1962, Folder 8, Box 53, David A. Morse 




                                                 
 
Morse’s successor.9 In the spring of 1962, after Morse had reversed course and 
announced his decision to seek another term, Meany unleashed a bitter public tirade 
against the ILO. Articles quoting Meany were published in the Christian Science Monitor 
and the AFL-CIO News, entitled respectively “Meany Sees ILO Slipping From West” and 
“Free Nations Warned of Red Drive in ILO.”10 Morse’s friends in the U.S. Labor 
Department wrote to warn him that Meany and Rens were “in cahoots” and that Rens had 
been encouraged to “stick around and expect to succeed you—before your term is up!”11 
When Morse finally spoke face-to-face with Rens, it was determined that he would 
remain in place as Morse’s Deputy, but only on the condition that Rens be “prepared to 
go back to [their] original footing of collaboration without reservation.”12 Although 
difficult to confirm the long term impact of this episode, if Rens’s relationship with the 
Director-General deteriorated over time, it is reasonable to suppose that this may have 
had some impact on his ability to influence events at the ILO. Whatever the exact nature 
of the disagreement involving Morse, Rens, and Meany, it may have been at the cost of 
diminishing one of the AIP’s most consistent and outspoken advocates.  
It is not clear what, if any, impact Rens’s relationship with Morse may have had 
on the ILO’s handling of the AIP throughout the 1960s. However, there were definite 
gaps in ILO’s ability to sustain its commitment to the AIP. Following the 
9 David Morse to Cass Millard, 18 July 1962, Folder 7, Box 49, David A. Morse Papers, 
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Cass Millard to David Morse, 11 August 1962, Folder 7, Box 49, David A. Morse 
Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New 
Jersey. 
12 “Memorandum: For the Files,” 5 January 1962, Folder 8, Box 53, David A. Morse 




                                                 
 
recommendations of the initial Beaglehole mission, indigenous social and cultural 
“integration” was most frequently described as a prerequisite to economic development. 
By the late 1950s, ILO leadership in Geneva privately expressed doubts that “the ILO 
could carry on indefinitely such a multi-lateral and multi-agency Programme [sic].”13 
Integration was proving to be a slow process on a national and regional scale, difficult to 
measure or show progress in meaningful terms. “Integration will be made easier,” the 
ILO concluded, “to the extent that economic development can open up new types and 
sources of production and new means of communication, result in closer co-ordination 
between production and markets and, in general, raise the standard of living of the 
population.”14 Within the ILO, disagreement about the efficacy of its chosen methods 
also mattered. Some officials, such as then director of the ILO Conditions of Work 
Division, David Efron, believed that not enough emphasis had been placed in the past on 
the economic sources of “underdevelopment” in the Andes. Efron criticized the 
integration model originally emphasized by Beaglehole and argued that, “[the AIP] 
cannot continue indefinitely to apply a socio-anthropological approach to problems which 
have important economic development aspects.”15 At the same time, Bolivian state 
officials urged the ILO to expand the program and accelerate its progress, while 
indigenous groups were increasingly frustrated by the slow transfer of land titles and top 
down control that characterized the program. These sources of pressure led Rens to 
conclude that the ILO, “must obtain the means of expanding the base of our operation, or 
13 “Director-General’s Meeting to discuss the Andean-Indian Programme, 4 November, 
1957,” Cabinet Files of David Morse, Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
14 “Andean Indian Programme: Project Submission to Special Fund,” Corrected Draft, 
1959, Z 11-10-18-1 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
15 “Minute No 38,” David Efron to Regional Director of Andean Indian Programme, 1 
April 1963, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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else, or else [the program] risks cracking under the current framework.”16 With the need 
to show accelerated progress and answer critics, the ILO pressed Bolivia and the other 
AIP countries to seek additional assistance for the program from the newly inauguration 
United Nations Special Fund (established in 1959) and other sources such as the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB).17. Unlike the AIP, which married social 
“integration” with economic development, the Special Fund and the IADB more 
exclusively and explicitly targeted economic development initiatives.  
Another source of difficulties for the program occurred in 1964, at precisely the 
moment that the first Special Fund and IADB resources were made available. The return 
to power of Victor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia resulted in a series of shake-ups within the 
Bolivian government that would frustrate the AIP’s goals of economic growth and 
stability. As discussed above, Estenssoro had led the MNR at the time of the revolution 
and served as Bolivia’s first president (1952-1956) after the revolution. In the years since 
16 Jef Rens to Enrique de Lozada, 16 July 1958, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, 
Switzerland.  
17 The AIP was initially funded through the UN’s Expanded Technical Assistance 
Program, but when the Special Fund was created in 1959, the ILO urged Bolivia and its 
neighbors to apply for additional funding to expand the program. The concept of the 
IADB in particular dated back to the 19th century, but its creation was not successfully 
negotiated by the Organization of American States until 1959. With the establishment of 
the bank, new funds became available to regional governments, provided they met the 
banks criteria. An IADB loan for Bolivia was agreed to in 1964, via the Social Progress 
Trust Fund, “for the purpose of consolidating and expanding the National Rural Develop 
Plan on the basis of the project drawn up by the Government with the collaboration of the 
AIP Advisory Group.” The Advisory Group had just been created to provide a 
institutional body made up of international experts from the ILO and the other UN 
agencies (FAO, WHO, etc.) that contributed to the program. The loan to the Bolivian 
government was in keeping with the bank’s support of programs in the region that 
involved settlement of populations in tropical areas and totaled $15.6 million. Jef Rens to 
Alejandro Quesada, 26 February 1958, Jacket 7, Box 10, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, 
Geneva, Switzerland. See also “Bolivia – National Integration Plan,” Jacket 2, Box 12, 
Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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the revolution, a power struggle emerged within the MNR that increasingly pitted a left-
wing faction headed by Juan Lechin against a more conservative faction led by Walter 
Guevara. By the early 1960s, Paz Estenssoro remained a popular if diminished figure 
with Bolivian voters, who had grown disenchanted by some of the failed promises of the 
revolution and, perhaps more importantly, the intra-party fights between the supporters of 
Guevara and Lechin. Lechin in particular had the solid support of the well-armed miners 
and workers, which had been critical to the success of the revolution in 1952. To launch 
his third presidential campaign and gain the support of the important miner-workers 
block, Estenssoro chose Lechin as his running mate. However, the alliance was short 
lived, and Lechin was forced into exile. With his bid for a third term requiring an 
amendment to the Bolivian constitution and with dwindling support on the political left in 
Bolivia after the split with Lechin, Estenssoro became increasingly dependent on the 
military to retain his position. In 1964, he was forced into exile by a military coup. A 
reorganization of many government offices and agencies followed the successful coup. 
The bases and colonies created by the AIP came under the control of the Community 
Development and Agricultural Extension Service (Servicio de Desarrollo de la 
Comunidad y Extension Rural or SEDEX), which operated as a joint USAID-Bolivian 
government run agency. By the time General Alfredo Ovando seized power of the 
Bolivian state in 1969, the AIP had all but ceased to exist. A skeleton staff persisted as a 
reminder of the program’s former ambitions until 1972, with the ILO’s presence in the 
country reduced to one expert in vocational training and one expert in rural 
cooperatives.18 Despite its slow unraveling at the end of David Morse’s term atop the 
18 “Bolivia – National Integration Plan,” Jacket 2, Box 12, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, 
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ILO, the AIP interests as a subject of historical analysis issues from its status as an 
extended episode in the history of postwar “developmentalism” and the construction of 
the postwar international system. Understood as an apparatus of reform, the AIP has at 
least a dual significance: as part of a strategy of self-preservation for the ILO itself and as 









Figure 3: David A. Morse, longest serving Director General of the International 




Figure 4: On the left, long time Deputy Director General of the ILO, Jef Rens, pictured circa 1944.ILOA photo.
Figure 5: At right, ILO official David Efron, circa 1944. Efron filled a number of different positions during his career at the 




     
Photos from a workshop conducted by the ILO in 1955 and sent back to ILO headquarters in Geneva. Figure 6: On the left, 
the caption found in the report reads, “The work of the expert is being studied.” ILOA photo.
Figure 7: At right, a laborer and unionist are demonstrating an assembly line process. He is watched and timed by two 











Figure 8: Photographs from a pamphlet produced by the ILO and the Ecuadorian government entitled, “La Vivienda 
Campesina: Mision Andina de Reconstruccion Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda.” The pamphlet describes the housing 
program implemented as part of the AIP. It  was produced in 1961 and contains a series of photographs illustrating the phases 















Figure 9: Additional photographs from “La Vivienda Campesina” showing the final phases of construction for a house 











Figure 10: A photograph printed in the La Paz based newspaper, La Nacion, on 25 October 1954 announcing the launch of the 
AIP action base at Pillapi. William Dillingham, Pillapi Mission Chief is pictured two from the right as he addressed the 






Figure 11: A map depicting the Cotoca settlement of the AIP. Although the project was known by the name Cotoca, the 
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